"Frédérique de Vignemont: ""Are we so egocentric after all?""";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2012-02-01";"13.15";"";"15.00";"Center for Subjectivity Research, Njalsgade 140-142, 5. floor, room 25.5.11, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Lecture by Frédérique de Vignemont, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris, France. ";" Lecture by Frédérique de Vignemont, Institut Jean Nicod, Paris, France. Abstract: In many circumstances we tend to assume that other people believe or desire what we ourselves believe or desire. This has been coined under the label of egocentric bias. One of the assets of the Simulation theory of mindreading and of the recent discovery of mirror neurons is the ability to explain egocentric bias. However, recent evidence seems to indicate the existence of what may be called allocentric bias: another's perspective can furtively intrude even when no reason seems to require it, or even when it is detrimental for us. But how does allocentric bias fit in simulation-based accounts of mindreading? "
"Understanding Schizophrenia. Investigations in Phenomenological Psychopathology";"University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Health Sciences and Center for Subjectivity Research";"2012-02-13";"10:00";"";"13:00";"University of Copenhagen, Njalsgade 136, Building 27, Aud. 27.0.09, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Public Defence of Mads Gram Henriksen's PhD Thesis ""Understanding Schizophrenia. Investigations in Phenomenological Psychopathology"". ";" Public Defence of Mads Gram Henriksen's PhD Thesis ""Understanding Schizophrenia. Investigations in Phenomenological Psychopathology"". Click to see abstract Assessment Committee: (Chairman) Clinical Associate Professor, MD Lennart Bertil Jansson Dept. of Neurology, Psychiatry and Sensory Sciences University of Copenhagen Denmark Professor, dr.med. Christoph Mundt Klinik für Allgemeine Psychiatrie Universitätsklinikum Heidelberg Germany Professor, PhD Shaun Gallagher Department of Philosophy University of Memphis USA Faculty supervisor: Clinical Professor, Josef Parnas Dept. of Neurology, Psychiatry and Sensory Sciences University of Copenhagen Denmark Project supervisor: Professor, PhD, Dan Zahavi Dept. of Media, Cognition and Communication Center for Subjectivity Research University of Copenhagen Denmark "
"Michael Wheeler: ""Thrown Machines: in Defence of a Heideggerian Cognitive Science""";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2012-02-23";"13:15";"";"15:00";"University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Humanities, Njalsgade 140, Aud. 23.4.39, 2300 København S";"Lecture by Michael Wheeler, University of Stirling, Scotland, UK. ";" Lecture by Michael Wheeler, University of Stirling, Scotland, UK. Abstract: In this talk I shall argue first (and briefly) that the very idea of a Heideggerian cognitive science makes philosophical sense and second (and in much more detail) for a particular vision of what such a cognitive science ought to look like. To achieve the first of these goals, I shall provide a sketch of how to interpret Heidegger's existential phenomenology such that it is consistent with - indeed, is in a relation of mutual illumination with - the scientific study of mind. To achieve the second goal, I shall highlight the key elements of Heideggerian cognitive science as I understand it, and then defend my view against some criticisms that have been directed against it by Hubert Dreyfus and Erik Rietveld. As I understand Dreyfus and Rietveld, they agree with me that something worth calling a Heideggerian cognitive science is certainly possible, but they take my particular unpacking of the idea to be seriously flawed. The dispute here turns on the issue of how to explain the human capacity for fluid and flexible sensitivity to context-dependent relevance, a capacity which has arguably proved resistant to orthodox cognitive-scientific theorizing, but which promises to yield to a properly conceived Heideggerian approach. With luck, then, resolving the Dreyfus-Rietveld-Wheeler debate might even deliver a better understanding of this distinctive human capacity. It is here that the notion of a thrown machine - a closely coupled brain-body-environment mechanism that is activated correctly only in the presence of the right, contextually relevant input - will play a crucial role. "
"Workshop: ""Mind, Consciousness and Body.""";"A Joint Workshop of the Center for Subjectivity Research (CFS) and the University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy (UTCP) ";"2012-03-09";"09:00";"";"16:00";"University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Humanities, Njalsgade 140-142, Lecture room 25-5-11, 2300 København S";"Joint workshop of the Center for Subjectivity Research and the University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy (UTCP) Participation by invitation only.";"A Joint Workshop of the Center for Subjectivity Research (CFS) and the University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy (UTCP) Center for Subjectivity ResearchUniversity of Copenhagen9th March 2012Lecture room 25-5-11Participation by invitation only 9th March 9.20-9.30 Welcome and Introduction: Rasmus Thybo Jensen (University of Copenhagen/CFS), Katsunori Miyahara (University of Tokyo/UTCP) and Kohji Ishihara (University of Tokyo/UTCP) 9.30-10.15: Joel Krueger (University of Copenhagen/CFS) “Interactive Origins of the Socially Extended Mind” The extended mind thesis is the view that the physical basis of some cognitive processes may, at times, include not only brain processes but also structures and processes in the agent’s environment. I pursue a liberal interpretation of this idea. Drawing upon developmental psychology, I argue that, for a time, at least, the bodily presence of other people is part of the infant’s socially extended mind; they enable the infant to do things she could not otherwise do, cognitively speaking. In developing this idea, I borrow some concepts central to the work of Lev Vygotsky. I argue that these concepts help us see how, from the earliest days and weeks of life, the physical interventions of caregivers function as social scaffolding—what Vygotsky terms “extra-cortical connections” (Vygotsky 1960)—that constrain, transform, and ultimately extend the infant’s rudimentary social-cognitive capacities. 10.15-11.00: Mineki Oguchi (Tamagawa University/UTCP) “Two visual systems theory and the sensorimotor approach” In recent cognitive science and cognitive philosophy, there are two leading theories concerning how perception and action relate to each other: Two visual systems theory (dualism), proposed by Milner and Goodale, and the Sensorimotor approach (actionism), proposed by Noё and O’Regan.An intuitive conception of the relationship between perception and action is that perceptual experience directly guides motor action. Dualism opposes to this common-sense conception and argues that, in vision, there is a division of labour between conscious perception and motor control. According to this view, our visual system consists of two functionally differentiated sub-systems (i.e., vision for perception and vision for action). Vision for perception merely indirectly guides action via planning it. Vision for action is in charge of programming and online motor control.On the other hand, actionism casts doubts on the input-output model: the sensory information is serially processed from perception to action via cognition. According to actionism, perception is not just a passive input to action. Rather, they are mutually interconnected. Perceptual experience is constitutively dependent on sensorimotor knowledge, which is a sort of tacit knowledge about how the pattern of sensory stimulation changes as a function of self-movement. We cannot have a full-blooded perceptual experience without embodying and exercising this knowledge. Perception is thus a kind of skilful activity.While dualism stresses the functional separation of perception and action, actionism stresses mutual dependency between them. These two theories, therefore, seem to be incoherent. Are they really so? And if they are, which should we favour?In this presentation, I shall address these questions. Firstly, I shall provide an argument against actionism. Some opponents argue that visual form agnosia gives a counterexample to the actionist view. I shall defend this line of criticism by comparison with Block’s overflow argument. Secondly, I shall dispel the concern that dualism is a kind of picture theory. Noё argues that dualism is inevitably committed to the view that perceptual experience is a kind of picture, and that picture theory cannot explain an important character of perceptual experience, that is, the feeling of presence. I shall reply to this argument by rejecting a basic assumption of dualism that the dichotomy between visions for perception/action corresponds with that between allocentric/egocentric frames of reference.I shall conclude that dualism and actionism are really incoherent and that we should favour dualism against actionism. 11.00-11.30: Coffee Break 11.30-12.15: Adrian Alsmith (University of Copenhagen/CFS) “A puzzle concerning spatial consciousness” I would like to consider the following trilemma: (i) A subject’s perceptual experience is unified both within and between its senses according to a single perspective. (ii) The perspectival nature of perceptual experience ought to be conceived as the point of origin for an egocentric frame of reference. (iii) Multiple distinct egocentric frames of reference are employed both within and between the senses. Individually, each of these claims has some plausibility. Collectively, they seem to present an inconsistency: perceptual experience cannot be unified according to a single perspective if that perspective is conceived as the point of origin for an egocentric frame of reference when there are multiple distinct egocentric frames of reference in operation within and between the senses. I will argue that the trilemma is genuine and discuss the motivations for each of the claims constituting it, in the hope of discerning which ought to be rejected. 12.15-13.30: Lunch 13.30-14.15: Ryoji Sato (University of Tokyo/UTCP) “How (not) to Find Consciousness in Vegetative State Patient” Vegetative State (VS) is a kind of disorder of consciousness. VS patients have been considered to not possess any awareness measured on the basis of behaviour. However, there is emerging evidence that some patients still retain awareness. Recent neuroimaging studies (For example, Owen et al. 2006, Monti et al. 2009) give patients with disorders of consciousness an instruction to engage in certain mental tasks and their brain reaction is compared with that of normal controls. Then a comparison between the brain activity of the patients and that of the control group is made and based on that, the existence of consciousness in at least some patients is suspected. However, how can we conclude consciousness in those patients from brain activity? That is the question I am concerned about in this presentation.In the philosophy of mind, when experience is referred to by the term “consciousness,” it is specifically called phenomenal consciousness. I will use this term hereafter and when I simply use consciousness without any notation, I mean phenomenal consciousness. To answer this question of phenomenal consciousness, it is crucial to consider what counts as a reaction related to consciousness and what doesn’t. Therefore, one of my purposes of this presentation is to assess the evidence from broader perspectives of theories of consciousness and consider possible evidence for consciousness in those subjects. However, another purpose is to point out the inherent limitation of the attempt to discover consciousness in VS patients. I argue that we might have to embrace the possibility that there is no fact of the matter if a VS patient has consciousness. (This study is supported by JSPS, KAKENHI No. 21520004) 14.15-15.00: Josef Parnas (Department of Neurology, Psychiatry and Sensory Sciences, Psychiatric Center Hvidovre/CFS) “Phenomenology and Psychiatry: The Psychiatric Object” 15.00-15.30: Coffee Break 15.30-16.15: Kohji Ishihara (University of Tokyo/UTCP) “Robotics for developmental Studies: philosophical and ethical considerations” In the latter half of the 1990s, MIT’s Artificial Intelligence Laboratory began to try to construct interactive humanoid robots based on developmental studies (Scassellati 1996). Japanese researchers have worked especially hard to develop an approach called “cognitive developmental robotics” (Asada et al. 2001) with the potential to contribute to developmental studies as well as build intelligent humanoid robots. One of the advantages of using robots for developmental studies is that we can present interventions in developmental processes to cognitive-developmental robots. This is usually impossible to do when the subjects are human beings; particularly, due to ethical issues, budgetary and time restrictions, and the problem of repeatability of trials. A philosophical and ethical concern of cognitive-developmental robotics is that this approach might enhance the inappropriate premises of developmental studies. I would like to discuss the philosophical and ethical implications of using robotics for developmental studies; particularly, I will refer to the role of robotics in verifying and applying the “theory of mind” to developmental studies. 16.15-16.20 Closing Remarks"
"Trust and Ethical Selfhood";"Faculty of Theology, University of Copenhagen ";"2012-03-30";"13:15";"";"";"Faculty of Theology, Aud. 7, Købmagergade 44-46, 1150 Copenhagen K.";"Public Defence of Gry Ardal Printzlau's PhD Thesis.";"Public Defence of Gry Ardal Printzlau's PhD Thesis ""Trust and Ethical Selfhood"". Assessment Committee: Associated Professor Carsten Pallesen (Chairman) Faculty of Theology University of Copenhagen Professor Emeritus Lars Hertzberg Åbo Akademi Professor Ingolf U. Dalferth Universität Zürich Supervisor: Arne Grøn Out of respect for the candidate the doors will close at exactly 1:15 PM. Interview with Gry Ardal Printzlau at website for University of Copenhagen (in Danish)"
"Workshop: ""Empathy""";"CFS";"2012-04-18";"";"2012-04-19";"";"CFS, University of Copenhagen, lecture room 25-5-11, Njalsgade 140-142, 5th floor.";"Workshop on empathy Participation is for center staff only ";"Workshop on EmpathyParticipation is for center staff onlyProgram: Wednesday 18 April 12.00-12.30: Introduction: Dan Zahavi 12.30-13.30: Lunch 13.30-14.00: PhD project 1: Adam Farley 14.00-14.30: PhD project 2: James Jardine14.30-15.00: PhD Project 3: Zhida Luo 15.00-15.30: Coffee Break 15.30-16.45: Corrado Sinigaglia: “Seeing with the hands” Respondent 1: Peter Hobson Respondent 2: Jean Decety Thursday 19 April 2012 10.00-11.15: Dan Zahavi: “Empathy and Social cognition: The that, the what and the why” Respondent 1: Peter Hobson Respondent 2: Jean Decety 11.15-12.30: Peter Hobson: “On empathy: A perspective from developmental psychopathology.” Respondent 1: Dan Zahavi Respondent 2: Corrado Sinigaglia 12.30-13.30: Lunch 13.30-14.45: Jean Decety: “The neuroevolution of empathy” Respondent 1: Corrado Sinigaglia Respondent 2: Dan Zahavi 14.45-15.15: Coffee Break 15.15-16.30: Strategic planning (for the speakers and senior members of the Velux project)"
"László Tengelyi: ""Agonistic World Projects: Transcendentalism versus Naturalism""";"";"2012-04-26";"14:15";"";"16:00";"CFS, University of Copenhagen, lecture room 25.5.11, Njalsgade 140-142, 5th floor.";"Lecture by László Tengelyi, Philosophisches Seminar, Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Germany.";"Lecture by László Tengelyi, Philosophisches Seminar, Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Germany: ""Agonistic World Projects: Transcendentalism versus naturalism""Abstract: A world project can be understood as an infinite idea with finite experiential evidence. That is why there are always—or at least may always be—different world projects, which enter into conflict with each other. It can be shown how, in our age, a methodological transcendentalism inspired by the phenomenological tradition is encountered and combatted by a naturalism that does not necessarily take reductivist forms. The examples of Alfred North Whitehead, Wilfried Sellars and David Chalmers indicate how a non-reductivist version of naturalism can be based on the interpretation of nature as a self-contained realm of natural laws. The controversy of methodological transcendentalism with such a naturalistic autarcicism cannot be simply decided on the ground of empirical evidence; nor can it be conceived of as an instance of a scientific paradigm shift. Therefore, it turns out to be useful to distinguish the agonistic relationship between divergent world projects from any conflict between rival scientific theories. This does not mean, however, that no rational arguments could be adduced in favour of a particular world project. Indeed, an interesting argument stemming from Husserl’s Ideas II can be elaborated in favour of a strictly methodological transcendentalism. Yet no argument settles the question definitively in such debates. Therefore, in terms forged in another context by William Connolly, an “agonistic respect” is required in order to make a more or less peaceful coexistence of divergent world projects possible."
"László Tengelyi: ""On Merleau-Ponty's Debate with Sartre's Phenomenological Metaphysics"" ";"";"2012-04-27";"11.00";"";"12.00";"CFS, University of Copenhagen, lecture room 25-5-11, Njalsgade 140-142, 5th floor.";"";""
"Heidi Maibom: ""Unimaginable!""";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2012-05-08";"13:15";"";"15:00";"University of Copenhagen, Njalsgade 140-142, lecture room 25.5.11, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Lecture by Heidi Maibom, Department of Philosophy, Carleton University, Canada.The lecture is open to all, including students. Welcome!";"Lecture by Heidi Maibom, Department of Philosophy, Carleton University, Canada Abstract Freudian views maintain that dreams teach us about ourselves because they tap into our unconscious. Dreams are not premonitions about what is to come or messages from Gods. They teach us not about the world, but about how we view the world; about who we are. I argue for a Freudian turn when it comes to how to interpret the empathic imagination. Canonical views suggest that we gain knowledge of how others think and feel by imagining being in their position. I argue that we learn more about ourselves through the empathic imagination than we learn about others. Our deeper attitudes, biases, etc. shine through our empathic attempts, and limit them. This is partly because we project our own thoughts and feeling on to others, and partly because our state of mind affects rather profoundly how we think of them. This is not to say that we cannot gain understanding of others through the empathic imagination. We can. But the imaginative effort does not produce substantive new knowledge of others. Usually, we only imagine within the bounds of what we know. But often we do not know what we know. Our imagination helps bring it out. It plays midwife to our latent knowledge. Maibom is an associate professor at Carleton University at Department of Philosophy & Institute of Cognitive Science. Her research focuses on folk psychology and moral psychology. She recently co-edited Neurofeminism: issues at the intersection of feminist theory and cognitive science (Palgrave MacMillan 2012). Time: Tuesday, 8 May 2012, 13.15 to 15.00 Place: CFS, University of Copenhagen, lecture room 25-5-11, Njalsgade 140-142, 5th floor The lecture is open to all, including students. Welcome!"
"Vittorio Gallese: ""Embodied simulation: From neurons to bodily selves""";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2012-05-30";"13.15";"";"15.00";"University of Copenhagen, Njalsgade 140-142, Aud. 22.0.11, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Lecture by Vittorio Gallese, Department of Neuroscience, University of Parma, Italy";"Guest Lecture by Vittorio Gallese, Department of Neuroscience, University of Parma, Italy “Self” is a complex, multi-layered notion. From a phenomenological perspective, three levels of selfhood have been identified: A pre-reflective ‘minimal’ self, a more explicit awareness of self as an invariant subject of experience and action, and finally a social or narrative self. The concept of minimal, pre-reflective, or “core self” is currently under debate. It is not clear which empirical features such a self is presumed to possess and which kind of experience concurs in shaping it. It will be proposed that beside searching for the neural correlates of a pre-defined, explicit and reflective self-knowledge, empirical research should perhaps first investigate which kind of experience allows (and how) an implicit, pre-reflective self-knowledge to emerge. Empirical evidence shows that the multisensory integration leading to the experience of our body as our own, far from being the outcome of a mere visual–proprioceptive perceptual association, is conditioned by the possibility – or not – to perform actions with a given body part. I will present behavioural and neuroscientific evidence showing the crucial role of the motor system in enabling the distinction between our bodily self and the bodily self of others. The bearing of such implicit distinction for social cognition will be discussed within the framework of Embodied Simulation Theory. Vittorio Gallese is Professor of Physiology at the Dept. of Neuroscience of the School of Medicine of the University of Parma. His major research interest lies in the relationship between action, perception and cognition, using a variety of neurophysiological and neuroimaging techniques. He is also interested in developing an interdisciplinary approach to the understanding of the embodied bases of intersubjectivity and social cognition. Time: Wednesday, 30 May 2012, 13.15 to 15.00 Place: Aud. 22.0.11 The lecture is open to all, including students. Welcome!"
"Louis Sass: ""Surface and Depth: On the Nature and Necessity of Phenomenology""";"CFS";"2012-06-20";"13.15";"";"15.00";"CFS, University of Copenhagen, lecture room 25-5-11, Njalsgade 140-142, 5th floor.";"Lecture by Louis Sass, Graduate School of Applied and Professional Psychology, Rutgers, USA.More info to follow.";"Lecture by Louis Sass, Graduate School of Applied and Professional Psychology, Rutgers, USA."
"Copenhagen Summer School in Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind 2012";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2012-08-06";"";"2012-08-10";"";"University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Humanities, Njalsgade 134, Aud. 22.0.11, 2300 Copenhagen S, Denmark";"Place: Copenhagen University, Njalsgade 134, Aud. 22.0.11, 2300 Copenhagen S.";"Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen, 6-10 August 2012 Place: Copenhagen University, Njalsgade 134, Aud. 22.0.11, 2300 Copenhagen S. Speakers include:Charles Siewert (Rice University, Houston, USA)Uriah Kriegel (University of Arizona, Tucson, USA)Sophie Loidolt (Universität Wien, Austria)Søren Overgaard (University of Copenhagen, Denmark)Dan Zahavi (University of Copenhagen, Denmark)"
"Joel Smith: ""Visual presence and the look of happiness.""";"CFS";"2012-09-04";"15.15";"";"17.00";"University of Copenhagen, Njalsgade 140-142, lecture room 25.5.11, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Lecture by Joel Smith, School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, UK.";"Title: Visual Presence and the look of happiness Abstract: I propose a phenomenological constraint on our visual awareness of others’ emotional expressions. After rejecting one picture of such awareness, I argue that what is required is a distinction between the basic and non-basic ways people, and other things, look. I offer an account of non-basic looks, defending it against a number of objections."
"Jonathan Cole: ""Cerebral palsy; restrictions on intention and action, language and thought""";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2012-09-13";"10.15";"";"12.00";"Copenhagen University, Faculty of Humanities, Center for Subjectivity Research, Njalsgade 140-142, 5. floor, room 25.5.11, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Lecture by Jonathan Cole, Consultant in Clinical Neurophysiology, Poole Hospital. Visiting Professor, University of Bournemouth.";"Lecture by Jonathan Cole, Consultant in Clinical Neurophysiology, Poole Hospital. Visiting Professor, University of Bournemouth.Abstract:A few years ago, at a phenomenological meeting in the UK on healthcare, I met two philosophers, Minae Inahara and Michael Peckitt, who also lived with cerebral palsy. I encouraged them to reveal how they live, one having little control over one side of his body, the other unable to control her head well, or speak without effort and attention. I will discuss some of their insights into agency, action and the effects of their impairment on interaction with others and with the world. I will also discuss the pathology and some clinical aspects of CP in passing, and give some of the insights from two famous Irish authors with severe cerebral palsy, Christopher Nolan and Christy Brown"
"Uriah Kriegel: ""Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness""";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2012-09-19";"14.15";"";"16.00";"Copenhagen University, Faculty of Humanities, Njalsgade 128, Aud. 23.0.49, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Lecture by Uriah Kriegel, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, USA";"Lecture by Uriah KriegelAbstract:One of the most flourishing research areas in the cognitive neuroscience of the past decade has been the search for the neural correlates of consciousness. Yet science is typically interested not only in correlation relations, but also – and more deeply – in causal and constitutive relations. When faced with a correlation between two phenomena in nature, we typically feel compelled to produce an explanation of why the two correlate. The purpose of this paper is twofold. In the first place, I want to lay out the various possible explanations of the correlation between consciousness and its neural correlate – to provide a sort of “menu” of options from which we would ultimately have to choose. Secondly, however, I want to discuss considerations suggesting that, under certain reasonable assumptions, the choice among these various options cannot in principle be based on scientific evidence, in the sense that the traditional metaphysical positions are empirically equivalent."
"Disjunctivism in Action - A Workshop";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2012-09-25";"";"";"";"University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Humanities, Njalsgade 140-142, 5th floor, lecture room 25.5.11, 2300 København S";"To participate please contact Rasmus Thybo JensenSpace is limited so please sign up as soon as possible.";"To participate please contact Rasmus Thybo Jensen (rtj@hum.ku.dk).Space is limited so please sign up as soon as possible. Can we exploit the basic idea of a disjunctive approach developed in the philosophy of perception to tackle problems in the philosophy of action? We will focus on the working out of analogies and disanalogies between problems concerning perception and problems concerning action that might invite or discourage such exploitation. Speakers: Jérôme Dokic (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociale, Paris) Thor Grünbaum (University of Copenhagen) Adrian Haddock (University of Stirling) Jennifer Hornsby (Birkbeck, University of London) Rasmus Thybo Jensen (University of Copenhagen) Uriah Kriegel (Jean Nicod Institute and the University of Arizona) Søren Overgaard (University of Copenhagen) Rowland Stout (University College Dublin)"
"Two talks on Perception -  A mini-workshop";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2012-09-27";"10:15";"";"12:30";"University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Humanities, Njalsgade 140-142, meeting room 25.5.11, 2300 Copenhagen S, Denmark";"Prior registration is not required.The conference is free and open to all, including students. Organizer: Rasmus Thybo Jensen";"Center for Subjectivity ResearchUniversity of Copenhagen27th of September 2012Lecture room 25-5-11Organizer: Rasmus Thybo Jensen (rtj@hum.ku.dk) Prior registration is not required.The conference is free and open to all, including students. Program Thursday 27th of September 10.15-11.15: Frode Kjosavik (Norwegian University of Life Sciences): From immediacy to intimacy? Relational vs. non-relational accounts of perception Both John McDowell and Tyler Burge subscribe to a Content View of perception, and both claim to have broadly Kantian views. Still, they present sharply contrasting accounts of perceptual experiences, including genuine perceptions and perceptual referential illusions, as well as of duplicate substitutions in perception. In my talk, I shall briefly suggest various ways in which epistemological and phenomenological considerations might lead one to take a firm stand on these issues. I shall then discuss and assess both relational and non-relational construals of the immediacy of perceptual acquaintance. 11.15-11.30: Coffee Break 11.30-12.30: Jan Almäng (University of Gothenberg): An Argument Against Disjunctivism Disjunctivist accounts of perceptual experiences are often criticized for failing to adequately explain hallucinations, but their ability to explain veridical experiences are rarely criticized. In this talk it is argued that disjunctivism cannot explain veridical perceptual experiences either. A central claim in disjunctivism is that in veridical experiences the perceived object is a part of the experience. Disjunctivists must consequently claim that a perceptual experience is a complex consisting of at least two relata and a relation connecting them. One of these relata is the perceived object. Little is however said about the second relatum and the relation connecting the two relata in disjunctivists’ account of perceptual experiences. The problem for the disjunctivist is that intentionalists can make the same claim with respect to veridical experiences. An intentionalist can easily claim that veridical experiences differ from hallucinations in that the former but not the latter are characterized by a complex containing the object perceived. In this case the claim would be that there is an intentional state which bears an intentional relation to the perceived object whereas there is only an intentional state in hallucinations. So the complex would on such an account consist of the intentional state and the object perceived, with an intentional relation connecting the two constituents of the complex. Such an account is however obviously not a disjunctivist account, since hallucinations and veridical perceptions have a common factor, viz. the intentional state. In order to be a tenable alternative to intentionalism, disjunctivism must provide us with an account of the second relatum and the relation connecting the two relata in veridical experiences. In this talk the various options available for a disjunctivist are analyzed. It is argued that these options are all metaphysically implausible. Acknowledgments: The organizer thanks The Danish Council for Independent Research for supporting this workshop."
"Empathy in context";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2012-10-11";"";"2012-10-12";"";"University of Copenhagen, Aud. 23.0.50, Njalsgade 128, 2300 Copenhagen S ";"Participants include Shaun Gallagher, Karsten Stueber, Shihui Han, Alessandro Duranti, Jason Throop, Claus Lamm, Andreas Roepstorff, Tobias Schlicht, Joel Krueger, Søren Overgaard, and Dan Zahavi. See programme";" Participants include Shaun Gallagher, Karsten Stueber, Shihui Han, Alessandro Duranti, Jason Throop, Claus Lamm, Andreas Roepstorff, Tobias Schlicht, Joel Krueger, Søren Overgaard, and Dan Zahavi. Prior registration is not required.The conference is free and open to all, including students. Welcome! Programme October 11, 2012 09:00-09:15 Welcome and introduction 09:15-10:45 Alessandro Duranti & Jason Throop (UCLA, USA): Empathy and Attentional Pull: A Phenomenological Anthropology of Human Encounters 10:45-12:00 Shaun Gallagher (University of Memphis, USA): Empathy and externalism 12:00-13:00 Lunch Break 13:00-14.30 Søren Overgaard & Joel Krueger (University of Copenhagen, Denmark): Emotion perception: Direct and contextual 14:30-15:00 Coffee Break 15:00-16:15 Dan Zahavi (University of Copenhagen, Denmark): Dissecting the context of empathy: Lipps, Scheler and Stein October 12, 2012 09:15-10:30 Tobias Schlicht (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany): Mirror neurons, social affordances and the limits of empathy 10:30-11:45 Karsten Stueber (Holy Cross, USA): Empathic Understanding: Its Scope and Reliability 11:45-12:45 Lunch Break 12:45-14.00 Shihui Han (Peking University, China): Understand and share others' emotion in sociocultural context: A Brain imaging approach 14:00-14:30 Coffee Break 14:30-15:45 Claus Lamm (Universität Wien, Austria): Evidence for the malleability of empathic responses from social neuroscience 15:45-17:00 Andreas Roepstorff (Aarhus University, Denmark): What's so emotional about mindfulness?"
"CFS Lecture by Ian Apperly: ""When and how do we mindread?""";"Søren Overgaard, Center for Subjectivity Research";"2012-11-08";"14:00";"";"16:00";"Center for Subjectivity Research, Njalsgade 140-142, 5. floor, room 25.5.11, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Lecture by Ian Apperly, Professor of Cognition and Development, University of Birmingham.";"Lecture by Ian Apperly, Professor of Cognition and Development, University of Birmingham.AbstractAccording to many accounts in the ""theory of mind"" tradition, all social interaction and communication essentially depends upon inferences about the mental states of others. A recent backlash suggests that this position is at best an overstatement and at worst a complete mis-characterisation of social interaction. I believe the overstatement view is correct. Much social interaction can be achieved without inferences about mental states, but we clearly do sometimes mindread. Recognising that mindreading inferences are not ubiquitous helps reduce the task of explaining how we mindread, but only somewhat. I will suggest that mindreading remains more difficult to explain than is typically acknowledged, and will draw on recent data to suggest ways in which it might be achieved by infants, children and adults."
"CFS Lecture by Udo Thiel: ""Hume on Consciousness and the Self """;"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2012-11-12";"15:15";"";"17:00";"Copenhagen University, Faculty of Humanities, Njalsgade 128, Lecture room 24.4.01, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Lecture by Udo Thiel, Karl-Franzens Universität Graz, Austria";"Lecture by Udo Thiel, Karl-Franzens Universität Graz, AustriaHume on Consciousness and the Self AbstractHume variously makes use of the notion of consciounsness in his writings. But what is his notion of consciousness? Not much has been written on this important question. The problem is that there is no section or chapter on the topic in Hume, indeed no discussion at all of consciousness. Hume applies a certain conception of consciousness in his discussion of personal identity and elsewhere without, however, explaining it in any detail. This talk examines Hume’s notion of consciousness and its relation to other accounts of consciousness of the time. In particular we shall look at how Hume’s understanding of consciousness affects his account of the self or mind. Hume states, that “consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or perception” and that “consciousness never deceives”. Does this mean that the mind or self is what it is perceived to be, namely a bundle of perceptions, as some scholars have claimed? Does Hume think that there is no more to the self than what consciousness understood as “reflected thought or perception” reveals?"
"CFS Lecture by Nicolas de Warren: ""From the Illusion of Immanence to the Immanence of Illusion""";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2012-11-27";"13.15";"";"15.00";"Center for Subjectivity Research, Njalsgade 140-142, 5. floor, room 25.5.11, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Lecture by Nicolas de Warren, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium.";"Lecture by Nicolas de Warren, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium.From the Illusion of Immanence to the Immanence of Illusion Abstract: My aim is to develop three theses regarding what I consider novel and significant in Sartre's conception of the imaginary. After a brief presentation of the basic trajectory of Sartre's argument in L'imaginaire (which I shall characterize as a passage from the illusion of immanence to the immanence of illusion), I shall argue: First: central to Sartre's conception of the imagination as a ""degraded form of knowing"" is an insight into how thinking becomes caught in an image. In this manner, the reliance on metaphors for thinking turns in on itself and against itself--we become mislead by the metaphor into what Sartre calls a ""thinking according to things."" I will illustrate this idea with an analysis of Sartre's own critique of the illusion of immanence as a theory of the imagination beholden to the image of spatial inside and outside. Second: this capacity for thinking to become degraded into an image becomes even more pronounced in Sartre's analysis of dreaming. This analysis of dreaming-consciousness reveals a perfected form of immanence in which consciousness becomes entirely fascinated by its own self-produced images. I will here be especially interested in discussing how dreaming-consciousness is understood by Sartre as comparable to a form of temporary psychosis. Third: on the basis of my two previous themes, I shall turn to Sartre's famous analysis of bad faith in Being and Nothing and critically explore how Sartre characterizes falling into bad faith as akin to falling asleep. As with dreaming, bad faith represents a kind of dream in which the self, internally divorced from itself, becomes alienated from its own self-alienation while remaining active (awake) in the world (ie. the waiter acts in the world in order to realize an image of himself to the extent that he is not that image). "
"CFS Lecture by Ingolf Dalferth: ""Situated Selves in 'Webs of Interlocution': What Can We Learn from Grammar?""";"Faculty of Theology and Center for Subjectivity Research ";"2012-11-28";"14.15";"";"16.00";"Faculty of Theology, Købmagergade 46, third floor, Auditorium 11, 1150 Copenhagen K.";"Lecture by Ingolf Dalferth, Institut für Hermeneutik und Religionsphilosophie, Universität Zürich.";"Lecture by Ingolf Dalferth, Institut für Hermeneutik und Religionsphilosophie, Universität Zürich.Abstract:The thesis for which I am going to argue is that the term 'self' has to be understood not as a noun but as an operator. Against the backdrop of relational accounts of the self I shall argue that the self is not a relation but a mode of relating that can best be explained as an orientational device which helps us to reduce the complexity of situations to something with which we can cope and in which we can act."