"CFS Lecture by Anthony Steinbock: ""Pride as Self-Dissimulation and Self-Givenness through Humility""";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2013-02-05";"13.15";"";"15.00";"Center for Subjectivity Research, Njalsgade 140-142, 5. floor, room 25.5.11, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Lecture by Anthony Steinbock, Department of Philosophy, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, USA.";"Lecture by Anthony Steinbock, Department of Philosophy, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, USA. ""Pride as Self-Dissimulation and Self-Givenness through Humility"" This paper examines interpersonal experience through the lens of pride. By suggesting basic experiences of the self that are taken up in pride, it describes pride as a moral subjective attitude. Pride is characterized further as self-dissimulating insofar as it resists the interpersonal basis that it presupposes. Distinguishing pride from related experiences, this paper gestures toward humility as revelatory of the interpersonal and relational core of the self as “Myself.” "
"Conference: ""Enactive and Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity""";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2013-02-07";"";"2013-02-08";"";"Copenhagen University, Faculty of Humanities, Njalsgade 134, Aud. 22.0.11, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Prior registration is not required.The conference is free and open to all, including students. Welcome!";" Drawing on insights from phenomenology, neuroscience, developmental psychology, psychiatry and psychotherapy, the conference, which is organized by the Marie Curie ITN programme TESIS, addresses the following questions: How do we perceive and share other people’s emotions and intentions? What is the role of empathy and perspective-taking in constituting human sociality? How is social interaction shaped by our bodily experience? Speakers include Anita Avramides, Cristina Becchio, Sjoerd Ebisch, Thomas Fuchs, Vittorio Gallese, Shaun Gallagher, Hanne De Jaegher, Claas Lahmann, Søren Overgaard, Ezequiel Di Paolo, Vasudevi Reddy, Andreas Roepstorff, Hans-Bernard Schmid, Corrado Sinigaglia and Dan Zahavi. Prior registration is not required.The conference is free and open to all, including students. Welcome! For more information about the TESIS network please follow this link http://tesisnetwork.wordpress.com/ AccommodationFor information about accommodation please click here How to find usMap to conference venue please click here Program 7 February 2013 9.00-9.10 Introduction and Welcome9.10-11.10 Section on Interaction and Joint Intentionality 9.10-9.50 Vasudevi Reddy (University of Portsmouth): Joining Intentions 9.50-10.30 Andreas Roepstorff (University of Aarhus): The Proof is in the Pudding: Predictive Persons in Interaction 10.30-11.10 Ezequiel Di Paolo (University of the Basque Country):Interactive Time-travelling and other Interpersonal Determinants of Intentions 11.10-11.25 Coffee break 11.25-12.15 Replies by TESIS Fellows (Katrin Heimann, Glenda Satne, John Elias, Laura Galbusera) 12.15-13.15 Lunch break 13.15-15.15 Section on Embodiment, Simulation and Perspective-Taking 13.15-13.55 Vittorio Gallese (University of Parma): The bodily Self and its motor Potentialities. Behavioral and Neurophysiological Evidence 13.55-14.35 Thomas Fuchs (University of Heidelberg): An Enactive Account of Perspective-taking 14.35-15.15 Claas Lahmann (Technical University Munich): Embodiment as core Element in bodily Psychotherapy 15.15-15.30 Coffee break 15.30-16.20 Replies by TESIS Fellows (Miriam Kyselo, Nicole Rossmanith, Tatjana N. Tömmel, Zuzanna Rucinska) 16.20-17.10 Keynote Lecture by Cristina Becchio (University of Turin): Action in Perspective: from Movement Observation to Intention Understanding 17.10-18.10 Poster Session 8 February 2013 9.00-11.00 Section on Social Perception and Empathy 9.00-9.40 Shaun Gallagher (University of Hertfordshire/University of Memphis): Perceiving and Inferring Intentions and Emotions 9.40-10.20 Søren Overgaard (University of Copenhagen):Other Minds and Disjunctivism about Behaviour 10.20-11.00 Sjoerd Ebisch (University of Chieti): Insights from Functional Neuroimaging on the Nature of the altered Self-Other Relationship in Schizophrenia 11.00-11.30 Coffee break 11.30-12.20 Replies by TESIS Fellows (Stephanos Ioannou, John McGraw, Elena Cuffari, Zeynep Okur) 12.20-13.10 Keynote Lecture by Anita Avramides (Oxford University): On Seeing that Others have Thoughts and Passions 13.10-14.10 Lunch break 14.10-16.10 Section on Self-Other and We 14.10-14.50 Dan Zahavi (University of Copenhagen): Empathy, Emotional Sharing, and the We 14.50-15.30 Hanne De Jaegher (University of the Basque Country): Participatory Sense-making and Interactional Experience 15.30-16.10 Corrado Sinigaglia (University of Milan): Motor Representation and Goal Ascription 16.10-16.30 Coffee break 16.30- 17.20 Replies by TESIS Fellows (Angelique Eydam, Sebastian Wallot, Valentina Fantasia, Krizta Sajber) 17.20-18.10 Keynote lecture by Hans-Bernhard Schmid (University of Vienna): Plural Self-Awareness"
"CFS Lecture by Smail Rapic: ""Husserl's account of the temporal self-constitution of subjectivity on the background of German Idealism.""";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2013-04-09";"14.15";"";"16.00";"Center for Subjectivity Research, Njalsgade 140-142, 5. floor, room 25.5.11, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Lecture by Smail Rapic, Philosophisches Seminar, Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Germany";"Lecture by Smail Rapic, Philosophisches Seminar, Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Germany Abstract Ludwig Landgrebe pointed out that Husserl waves in his analysis of the temporal self-constitution of subjectivity between two almost contradictory positions. On the one hand, he equates the self-constitution of subjectivity with its self-objectivation; this view comes close to the Kantian thesis that time presupposes a transcendental ego. On the other hand, he takes into account the opposite contention that the ego has been generated by the self-constitution of time. This anti-Kantian stance is inspired by Hume; it overcomes, however, Hume´s mechanistic account of associations by identifying the self-constitution of time with the self-constitution of intentionality. On the background of Husserl´s critique of the Kantian dichotomy of reason and the senses his anti-Kantian account of the ego touches on Hegel´s theory of time in the Encyclopedia. A dialectical reinterpretation of Husserl´s theory of time may help to excape its aporetic traits."
"CFS Lecture by Mattia Gallotti: ""Social interaction, shared intentionality and the we-mode""";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2013-04-10";"13.15";"";"15.00";"Center for Subjectivity Research, Njalsgade 140-142, 5. floor, room 25.5.11, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Lecture by Mattia Gallotti, Jean Nicod Institute, Paris, France";"Lecture by Mattia Gallotti, Jean Nicod Institute, ParisAbstract:The theory of collective intentionality is now a central player in the study of the roots of human sociality. Philosophers generally agree that, if an action is to count as joint, then it is not sufficient that interacting agents each individually intend to contribute. However, despite widespread agreement that joint action involves something like shared intentions, the question remains as to how to characterize the relevant sharing of minds. According to the ‘we-mode hypothesis’, whenever people intend to do something together, they have the content of their individual actions specified by representing aspects of the interactive scene - including themselves and the others - in an irreducibly collective attitude. But to say that you and I succeed in a joint action by framing things in the first-person plural (as a ‘we’) is not very informative unless one specifies how the we-mode sustains the meeting of minds that is essential to joint action.My aim in this paper is to address this question in light of the current ‘interactive turn’ in social cognition. I shall start by reviewing the literature on the we-mode, drawing upon theoretical and empirical resources from behavioural and brain research as well as from philosophical analyses of shared intentionality. The root idea of the we-mode is that agents take into consideration the viewpoints of their interacting partners when they intend and enact things in the first-person plural perspective. This gives each agent a broader understanding of the options available for action thus expanding the potential for social knowledge and interaction. In the second part of the paper I examine the scope and significance of this claim against the background of recent suggestions about the constitutive role of interaction for social cognition"
"CFS Lecture by Hong Yu Wong: ""Embodiment in Individual and Joint Action""";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2013-04-15";"14:15";"";"16:00";"Center for Subjectivity Research, Njalsgade 140-142, 5. floor, room 25.5.11, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Lecture by Hong Yu Wong, PhD, Philosophy of Neuroscience, Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, Germany.";"Lecture by Hong Yu Wong, PhD, Philosophy of Neuroscience, Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, Germany. Abstract It has been argued that the common coding of perception and action provides a framework for action that unifies individual and joint action. This is part of a recent trend in social cognition research where accounts of different mental phenomena which unify both the individual and social varieties of mental phenomena are preferred. I want to examine whether though there are important similarities, there are also important differences which are being missed. I will look at some recent work on joint action as a case study. Knoblich, Sebanz and colleagues at the SOMBY lab (Sebanz et al. 2003, Sebanz et al. 2006, Knoblich et al. 2011) have demonstrated that joint action is subject to some of the same representational principles as individual action, namely, the common coding of perception and action (Prinz 1997, Hommel et al. 2001). This is taken to show that joint action is a form of action proper. Whilst this work has greatly advanced the subject, the question arises whether the insights from their work can be retained without the assumption that there are no substantive differences between individual and joint action qua action. I will question whether the common coding framework provides for an account of embodied agency in general. If it does, then it follows that all extant philosophical theories of agency are wrong. It it does not, then it raises questions about the extent to which a unified theory can be given for individual and joint agency."
"CFS Workshop: ""Measures of Agency""";"FKK (grant to Phenomenal Consciousness and Cognitive Motor Control), Center for Subjectivity Research (University of Copenhagen), and Neural Control of Movement (University of Copenhagen)";"2013-04-16";"10:00";"2013-04-16";"18:00";"Auditorium 3, August Krogh Building, Nørre Campus, University of Copenhagen";"Neuroscientific, psychological, and philosophical perspectives on the sense of agencyWorkshop: Tuesday 16 April, 2013: 10:00am – 6:00pmVenue: Auditorium 3, August Krogh Building, Nørre Campus, University of Copenhagen";"Neuroscientific, psychological, and philosophical perspectives on the sense of agency Workshop: Tuesday 16 April, 2013: 10:00am – 6:00pmVenue: Auditorium 3, August Krogh Building, Nørre Campus, University of CopenhagenSee map over Nørre Campus A fast growing number of studies in cognitive neuroscience and psychology investigate the role of consciousness in voluntary movements. “Sense of agency” is often taken to be the subjective mark of voluntary action. Various attempts have been made to device measures of agency on the basis of implicit and explicit measures of the sense of agency. This workshop aims to shed light on the nature and role of the sense of agency by bringing together recent work in cognitive neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy. List of Speakers: Martin Voss (Neuroscience/Psychiatry, Berlin): “Disturbances of agency in Schizophrenia” Hong Yu Wong (Philosophy, Tübingen): ""Sense of agency and knowledge of agency: How do they relate?"" Morten Overgaard (Cognitive Neuroscience, Aarhus/Aalborg): “Correlation and explanation between different levels of description in the cognitive neuroscience of perception and intention” Mark Schram Christensen (Neuroscience, Copenhagen): “Probing sensation of movement with brain stimulation” Thor Grünbaum (Philosophy, Copenhagen): “‘Feeling of agency’ and ‘Judgement of Agency’: How do they relate?” The workshop is open and free but only has room for a limited number of participants. Registration is required. If you wish to participate, you register by sending a message to tgr@hum.ku.dk with “Measures of agency 16 April” as the subject header. In the message please state in the following format: 1. Surname, Forename 2. Departmental/institutional affiliation Organizers: Thor Grünbaum (Philosophy Section, Dept. Media, Cognition, and Communication, University of Copenhagen) Mark Schram Christensen (Dept. of Neuroscience and Pharmacology, University of Copenhagen) Supported by FKK (grant to Phenomenal Consciousness and Cognitive Motor Control), Center for Subjectivity Research (University of Copenhagen), and Neural Control of Movement (University of Copenhagen) "
"11th Annual Meeting of the Nordic Society for Phenomenology";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2013-04-18";"";"2013-04-20";"";"University of Copenhagen, Njalsgade 134, Aud. 22.0.11, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Keynote speakers: Giovanna Colombetti, Mirja Hartimo, Shigeru Taguchi, Nicolas de Warren and Jonathan Webber.";" Keynote speakers: Giovanna Colombetti, Mirja Hartimo, Shigeru Taguchi, Nicolas de Warren and Jonathan Webber. Thursday 18 April 09:45 – 10:15 Registration 10:30 – 10:45 Welcome Address 10:45 – 12:15 Nicolas de Warren: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, BE Husserl and Deleuze on time 12:15 – 13:15 Lunch Break 13:15 – 15:00 Parallel sessions 15:00 – 15:30 Coffee break 15:30 – 17:15 Parallel sessions 17:30 - 19:00 Reception Friday 19 April 9:00 – 10:30 Jonathan Webber, Cardiff University, UK First-person Authority and the Phenomenology of Desire10:45 –12:30 Parallel sessions 12:30 – 13:30 Lunch Break 13:30 – 15:15 Parallel sessions 15:15 – 15:45 Coffee break 15:45 – 17:15 Giovanna Colombetti, University of Exeter, UK Bodily feelings in Depersonalization 17:15 – 18:00 NoSP Business Meeting Saturday 20 April 9:00 – 10:30 Mirja Hartimo, University of Helsinki, FI Husserl, Sciences, Norms 10:45 – 12:30 Parallel sessions 12:30 – 13:30 Lunch Break 13:30 – 15:15 Parallel sessions 15:15 – 15:45 Coffee break 15:45 – 17:15 Shigeru Taguchi, Hokkaido University, JP Evidence as Medium: A Phenomenological Interpretation of Certainty 17:15 - 17:30 Closing Words 19:00 - 23:00 Conference Dinner The Nordic Society for Phenomenology The Nordic Society for Phenomenology / Nordisk Selskab for Fænomenologi (NoSP)was founded in May 2001 in Copenhagen.Its aim is to further dialogue and cooperation between phenomenologists in the Nordic countries, and to promote scholarship, teaching, research and publication affiliated with phenomenology. The executive committee of the society consists of five members, one from each of the five Nordic countries: Sara Heinämaa, Finland, (President), Gabriel Malenfant, Iceland, Hans Ruin, Sweden, Camilla Serck-Hanssen, Norway, Søren Overgaard, Denmark. "
"CFS Workshop: ""Self-Intimation""";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2013-04-22";"";"";"";"Center for Subjectivity Research, Njalsgade 140-142, 5. floor, room 25.5.11, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Participants: Giovanna Colombetti, Dan Zahavi, Kristian Martiny, Adam Farley, Simon Høffding. Participation by invitation.";"Participants: Giovanna Colombetti, Dan Zahavi, Kristian Martiny, Adam Farley, Simon Høffding. Participation by invitation. More details TBA. Organizers: Adam Farley, lzk717@hum.ku.dk and Simon Høffding, simonf@hum.ku.dk"
"CFS Lecture by Siri Hustvedt: ""Borderlands: First, Second, and Third Person Adventures in Crossing Disciplines.""";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2013-05-03";"14.15";"";"16.00";"Copenhagen University, Faculty of Humanities, Njalsgade 128, Aud. 23.0.50, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Lecture by Siri Hustvedt. Prior registration not required.";"Lecture by Siri Hustvedt Siri Hustvedt is an American novelist and essayist. Her books include: The Blindfold (1992), The Enchantment of Lily Dahl (1996), What I Loved (2003), The Sorrows of an American (2008), and The Shaking Woman or A History of My Nerves (2010), Living, Thinking, Looking (2012). Her work has been translated into twenty-nine languages. Abstract for Borderlands: “First, Second, and Third Person Adventures in Crossing Disciplines.” In this paper, I address the epistemological difficulties involved in creating theories of the self and subjectivity that cross disciplines, especially ones that hope to unite the hard sciences and the humanities. The third-person “objective” view of neurobiology can bring insights into the synaptic and neurochemical workings of the brain, but these biological realities do not describe individual phenomenal experience. Brain-based studies often ignore the role of language and culture in constituting persons in the world, just as constructionist continental theories often ignore human biology for abstract bodies made of words and ideas. I argue that all theoretical positions rely on metaphors. The very notion of the hard sciences and the soft humanities and arts partake of deeply inculcated and often unconscious ideas about sexual difference. By drawing on work in analytical philosophy, phenomenology, the history of science, social theory, and neuroscience, I attempt to delineate the difficulties of categorization in general and the benefits of applying multiple theoretical points of view to the same problem. Websitewww.sirihustvedt.net Prior registration not required."
"CFS Lecture by Joseph Neisser: ""How to put the 'neuro' in 'neurophenomenology'""";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2013-05-07";"14.15";"";"16.00";"Center for Subjectivity Research, Njalsgade 140-142, 5. floor, room 25.5.11, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Lecture by Joseph Neisser, Department of Philosophy, Grinnell College, USA";"Lecture by Joseph Neisser, Department of Philosophy, Grinnell College, USA. Abstract Rapid advances in neuroscience have spurred the emergence of a “neurobiological image” of mind and person that promises to alter our understanding of ourselves as biological creatures. Neurophenomenology is an attempt to relate this new image to subjectivity. But In its official form, Neurophenomenology® remains at odds with natural science because the relation between experience and biology remains formal and descriptive. The way forward for neurophenomenology is to combine a phenomenological analysis of the genesis of the first-person perspective with the use of comparative and historical methods in systems biology, collectively dubbed homology thinking. Putting the neuro in neurophenomenology is the project of making phenomenology continuous with evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo) and affective neuroscience, and part of a common investigation into the biological basis of the first-person perspective."
"Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry III: The Nature and Sources of Historical Change";"Faculty of Health and Medical Sciences and Center for Subjectivity Research";"2013-05-09";"09:00";"2013-05-11";"16:00";"University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Health and Medical Sciences, Haderup Auditorium, Blegdamsvej 3B, DK-2200 Copenhagen ";"Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry III: The Nature and Sources of Historical Change";" PHD Course and ConferenceRegular seats 100Course and Conference fee 4.080 DKK (free of charge for Danish PhD students)Instructor Josef ParnasPoint 2,50 Aim and content An important question within the history and philosophy of science is the degree to which ""progress"" or ""change"" in science results from internal, largely empirically driven processes (e.g. new data or theories) versus arising from a range of external influences including shifting cultural values, economic- and socio-political processes, other historical forces and the search for professional respect and authority. Psychiatry sits at the cross-roads of the biomedical science, the social sciences and the humanities. In being the one medical specialty that diagnoses and treats mental illness, it has been subject to major changes in the last 150 years. This conference seeks to understand the nature of the forces that have shaped these changes and especially how substantial ""internal"" advances in our knowledge of the nature and causes of psychiatric illness have interacted with a plethora of external forces that have impacted on the psychiatric profession. The presenters are mix of philosophers and historians with an interest in psychiatry and working psychiatrists or psychologists with an historical/philosophical bent. Proposed four sections to the conference: i) General Philosophical Background - Setting the Stage on the Nature of Change in Science ii) 19th Century iii) Early to mid 20th Century and iv) Last half of the 20th and the 21st Century"
"CFS Lecture by Jonardon Ganeri: ""Self and Nonself in Biology and Buddhist Psychology""";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2013-05-14";"14.15";"2013-05-14";"16.00";"Center for Subjectivity Research, Njalsgade 140-142, 5. floor, room 25.5.11, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Lecture by Jonardon Ganeri, Department of Philosophy, University of Sussex, UK";"Lecture by Jonardon Ganeri, Department of Philosophy, University of Sussex, UK Abstract Is there a stable distinction between self and non self? And can the idea of a person survive the collapse of that distinction? I will explore these questions drawing on ideas in early Buddhist theory of mind, the work of Harry Frankfurt, and contemporary discussion of biological identity (Tauber et al.). I will claim that there is an important and illuminating analogy between Buddhist descriptions of the self/nonself distinction and immunological accounts of the biological self."
"CFS Workshop: The Second Person";"";"2013-05-21";"10.00";"";"13.00";"Center for Subjectivity Research, Njalsgade 140-142, 5. floor, room 25.5.11, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Workshop on the Second PersonPresentations by Adrian Haddock (University of Stirling) and Matthias Haase (University of Leipzig)";"Workshop on the Second Person 10:00-11:15 On Address - Adrian Haddock (University of Stirling) Speech acts in which one speaks not (or not only) about another subject but to another subject appear to exemplify a distinct and neglected form of intentionality—a form of directedness which is not merely directedness at objects, but directedness towards one’s fellow subjects. The aim of this talk is to begin to shed light on this neglected form by establishing: first, that this form intrinsically involves the application of the first person concept to a subject other than the one who employs this concept; second, that intentional actions cannot be the only exemplifications of this form; and third, that understanding this form requires understanding the sheer bodily presence of one subject to another as itself a cognitive act. The talk ends with some remarks about the significance of this form for understanding the basic concepts of “social philosophy”—testimony, community, social practice, and so on. 11.15 – 11.30 Coffee Break 11:30-12:45 Practical Contradiction - Matthias Haase (University of Leipzig) The paper investigates the conditions of the possibility of a certain posture the mind can adopt towards the action of another. It is characteristically expressed by a specific use of what G.E.M. Anscombe calls “stopping modals” – namely, the one where the ‘You can’t do this; it’s my…’ signifies the necessity of what is traditionally called ‘justice’. In a speech act of this form the speaker addresses the hearer as having a duty to her not to do the thing in question, because she has a right towards him that he doesn’t. The aim of the paper is not to provide an account of the possibility of the posture of mind so expressed, but to articulate a condition of adequacy for such an account. It argues that a proper account will have to be one that vindicates a peculiar claim that Aristotle makes at the beginning of the Politics. Aristotle suggests that this form of speech defines the very idea of language and with it the very idea of a rational animal: we are told that the point of language is to express the just and the injust and that it therefore belongs to the nature of rational animals to live in a state. In contemporary literature, this thesis tends to be regarded as a metaphysical excess. Why should one make such a strong claim? The demand would be vindicated if it could be shown that to understand the necessity of justice one has to understand how the principle in the light of which actions are just or injust must at the same time explain the reality of the subjects so related. The aim of the paper is to argue that this is so. The conference is free and open to all, including students. Welcome!Prior registration is not required, but recommended.If you wish to attend please send an email to Glenda Satne (satne@hum.dk.ku)"
"Conference: ""Phenomenology of Empathy""";"Center for Subjectivity Research and Department of Media, Cognition and Communication";"2013-05-29";"";"2013-05-31";"";"Copenhagen University, Faculty of Humanities, Njalsgade 128, Aud. 23.0.49, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Confirmed speakers include Sara Heinämaa, James Jardine, Jean-Francois Lavigne, John Michael, Dermot Moran, Søren Overgaard, Helena De Preester, Matthew Ratcliffe, Peter Rosan, Matthias Schlossberger, Joona Taipale and Dan Zahavi.";" 29-31 May 2013 Confirmed speakers include Sara Heinämaa, James Jardine, Jean-Francois Lavigne, John Michael, Dermot Moran, Søren Overgaard, Helena De Preester, Matthew Ratcliffe, Peter Rosan, Matthias Schlossberger, Joona Taipale and Dan Zahavi. Programme May 29th, 2013 14:00-15:15 Dermot Moran (University College Dublin, Ireland): Empathy as Ineinandersein: Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on Understanding Others and Oneself 15:15-15.45 Coffee Break 15:45-17:00 Jean-François Lavigne (Université de Nice, France): Edith Stein's conception of the ""Einfühlung"": between Husserl, Lipps and Scheler May 30th, 2013 9:30-10:45 Sara Heinämaa (University of Helsinki, Finland) The Child and the Animal: From Embodiment and Empathy to Generativity 10:45-12:00 Dan Zahavi (University of Copenhagen, Denmark) Levels of Empathy 12:00-13:00 Lunch Break 13:00-14:15 Søren Overgaard and John Michael (University of Copenhagen, Denmark) How (not) to think about empathy 14:15-14.45 Coffee Break 14:45-16:00 Helena De Preester (Ghent University and University College Ghent, Belgium): Is it possible to empathize with traces of human gestures? 16:00-17:00 James Jardine (University of Copenhagen, Denmark) Empathy and Intentionality: The Experience of Other People in Husserl and Stein May 31st, 2013 9:30-10:45 Matthew Ratcliffe (Durham University, UK): Phenomenology is Exploration, not Simulation 10:45-12:00 Peter J. Rosan (Bronx Children’s Psychiatric Center, USA): A Phenomenology of Empathy: The Play of Mimesis and Alterity 12:00-13:00 Lunch Break 13:00-14:15 Matthias Schloßberger (Universität Potsdam, Germany) Empathy or Recognition? Different approaches to normative social philosophy 14:15-15:30 Joona Taipale (University of Copenhagen, Denmark): Embodiment and the immediacy of the other Prior registration is not required.The conference is free and open to all, including students. Welcome! With thanks to generous support from VELUX FONDEN."
"Varieties of Normativity";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2013-06-11";"";"2013-06-12";"";"Center for Subjectivity Research, Njalsgade 140-142, 5. floor, room 25.5.11, 2300 Copenhagen S";"NormCon Workshop";"NormCon Workshop Copenhagen, June 11th-12th 2013 Programme Tuesday, June 11th 9.00-9.15 Introduction and Welcome 9.15-12.00 (incl. coffee break)IP 2&4 Salzburg (Johannes Brandl, Frank Esken, Josef Perner & Beate Priewasser)When is Protesting a Sign of Normative Understanding? 12.00-13.30 Lunch 13.30-16.00IP 3 Copenhagen (Alba Montes Sánchez, Dan Zahavi & Glenda Satne)13.30-14.15 Shame, Self-Intimation & Self-Regulation (Montes) 14.15-14.45 Coffee Break 14:45-16.00 We-normativity (Zahavi & Satne) Wednesday, June 12th 9.00-10.00Johannes RoesslerReason Explanation and the Second Person Perspective 10.00-10.30 Coffee Break 10.30-12.00 IP1 Lund (Ingar Brinck and Patrizio Lo Presti)Embodied, Embedded and Meta. 12.00-13.30 Lunch 13.30-14.30Philippe RochatRoots of norms and dispositional habitus 14.30-14.45 Coffee Break 14.45- 16.15General Discussion & Future Plans"
"Copenhagen Summer School in Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind 2013";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2013-08-12";"";"2013-08-16";"";"University of Copenhagen, Njalsgade 134, Aud. 22.0.11, 2300 Copenhagen S";"The Summer School will take place August 12-16, 2013.";"Place: Copenhagen University, Njalsgade 134, Aud. 22.0.11, 2300 Copenhagen S. Time:12-16 August, 2013The course will provide essential insights into central themes within the philosophy of mind, viewed from a phenomenological perspective. Topics include:Perception, Place, Normality, Embodiment, the Self, the You, and the We. The course will consist of a mixture of key note lectures, PhD presentations and seminars (30 hours total), aimed at advanced MA students and PhD students. Post Docs are also invited to apply. The Summer School is co-funded by the PhD programme in philosophy at the University of Copenhagen. Speakers:Steven Galt Crowell, Rice University, USASara Heinämaa, University of Helsinki, FinlandRasmus Thybo Jensen, University of Copenhagen, DenmarkJeff Malpas, University of Tasmania, AustraliaSøren Overgaard, University of Copenhagen, DenmarkDan Zahavi, University of Copenhagen, Denmark"
"CFS Lecture by Stefano Micali: ""Subject of Anxiety. A phenomenological Investigation""";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2013-09-17";"14.15";"";"16.00";"Center for Subjectivity Research, Njalsgade 140-142, 5. floor, room 25.5.11, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Lecture by Stefano Micali, Klinik für Allgemeine Psychiatrie, Universität Heidelberg.";"Anxiety is a fundamental and multifaceted phenomenon of emotional and affective life. It is essentially characterised by ambiguity and complexity. In my lecture, I will first outline a topography of anxiety from a phenomenological perspective. Subsequently, I will focus on a specific aspect: anxiety arises in the expectation of an imminent threat. The “impressional” awareness of this expectation is characterized by a specific form of certainty. In this context, I will concentrate on the relationship between time-consciousness and unclear phantasy (in Husserl’s sense)."
"Workshop: Experiential Reasons";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2013-10-29";"";"2013-10-30";"";"KUA";"Speakers include: Bill Brewer, Hannah Ginsborg, Heather Logue, John McDowell, Alan Millar, Susanna Siegel and Charles Travis.";"29.10.2013-30.10.2013 Speakers include: Bill Brewer, Hannah Ginsborg, Heather Logue, John McDowell, Alan Millar, Susanna Siegel and Charles Travis.Participation in this workshop is by invitation only. Organized by: Rasmus Thybo Jensen, Johan Gersel, Morten Sørensen Thaning and Søren Overgaard Contact: s.overgaard@hum.ku.dk"
"Public Lecture Series: Reason and Experience";"Department of Media, Cognition, and Communication";"2013-10-31";"10:00";"2013-11-01";"16:45";"University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Humanities, Karen Blixens vej 4, Auditorium 23.0.50,  2300 København S";"In this series of public lectures a number of distinguished philosophers will present their work on issues such as perceptual knowledge, practical self-knowledge, rule-following and logic.Speakers: Bill Brewer, Hannah Ginsborg, Heather Logue, John McDowell, Alan Millar, Susanna Siegel, Rowland Stout, Charles Travis";"31st October — 1st November 2013 Auditorium 23.0.50 In this series of public lectures a number of distinguished philosophers will present their work on issues such as perceptual knowledge, practical self-knowledge, rule-following and logic. The lectures are open to all, including students. No prior registration is needed. Contact email: experientialreasons@gmail.com Speakers: Bill Brewer, Hannah Ginsborg, Heather Logue, John McDowell, Alan Millar, Susanna Siegel, Rowland Stout, Charles Travis Thursday 31st October 10.00–11.15 Bill Brewer (King’s College London) Natural Continuants 11.15–11.30 Coffee/Tea 11.30–12.45 Susanna Siegel (Harvard University) The Rational Enrichment of Experience 12.45–14.00 Lunch 14.00–15.15 Alan Millar (University of Stirling) Reasons for Belief, Perception, and Reflective Knowledge 15.15–15.30 Coffee/Tea 15.30–16.45 Charles Travis (King’s College London) How to Depart From Frege: Two Pictures of Logic Friday 1st November 10.00–11.15 Rowland Stout (University College Dublin) Sensory Stimulation is No Part of Perception 11.15–11.30 Coffee/Tea 11.30–12.45 John McDowell (University of Pittsburgh) Self-consciousness in Acting 12.45–14.00 Lunch 14.00–15.15 Heather Logue (University of Leeds) The Argument From Illusion 15.15–15.30 Coffee/Tea 15.30–16.45 Hannah Ginsborg (University of California, Berkeley) The Significance of Signposts: A Challenge to ‘Quietism’ about Meaning Organizers: Johan Gersel (University of Copenhagen), Rasmus Thybo Jensen (University of Copenhagen), Søren Overgaard (University of Copenhagen), Morten Sørensen Thaning (Copenhagen Business School). With the support of: The Mind Association, The Department of Media, Cognition and Communication, University of Copenhagen, The Danish Council for Independent Research, Humanities. "
"CFS Workshop: The we and its phenomenology";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2013-11-05";"14:15";"2013-11-05";"17:00";"Center for Subjectivity Research, KUA1, Njalsgade 140-142, 5. floor, room 25.5.11, 2300 Copenhagen S";"Workshop devoted to the phenomenology of we";"Workshop: The we and its phenomenology Programme 14.15-14.30 Introduction14.30-15.30 Thomas Szanto: ""Stein on Shared Experiences and Collective Empathy""15.30-15.45 Coffee Break15.45-16.45 Emanuele Caminada: ""Background and Horizon of Collective Intentionality: Gerda Walther’s Embedment Analysis of We-Intentionality""16.45-17.00 Concluding remarksThe workshop is open, no registration is needed. Abstracts Stein on Shared Experiences and Collective EmpathyThomas Szanto, University of ViennaRecent years have witnessed a growing interest in Edith Stein’s theory of empathy (Stein 1917), not only within, but also outside traditional phenomenological circles, and in particular, within debates on social cognition. What is less known, even to most phenomenologists, however, is Stein’s later, arguably more sophisticated and also more controversial, work on the phenomenology of sociality as expounded, above all, in her Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities (Stein 1922; cf. also Stein 1925). In this paper I shall reassess, against the background of the contemporary collective intentionality and shared emotions debate, Stein’s hitherto rather neglected later social ontology. Here, I will focus specifically on her account of shared or communal experiences. Moreover, I shall explicate how Stein’s concept of empathy can indeed not only be accommodated within her social ontology, which thus leaves room for ‘collective empathy’, but, moreover, might provide a solution for the most imminent problems Stein’s theory of shared experiences faces. The argument of the paper has three strands: (1) I will start mapping the terrain by outlining what I take to be three central requirements for any account of shared experiences: the ‘Plurality Requirement’, the ‘Non-Summative or Integrity Requirement’ and the ‘Anti-Collectivism Requirement’. (2) Next, I will address the question of where to tie in, as it were, collectivity in collective experiences (i.e., in their subject, mode, content or object) and then discuss their intentional structure and types as well as the ‘mechanisms of integrating’ experiences into what Stein calls a ‘communal stream of experiences’. (3) Finally, I will raise a number of prima facie problems for Stein’s and, more generally, any theory of shared experiences, viz., a.) the problem of the (communal) subject of shared experiences (as opposed to shared experiential contents), b.) the well-known problem in a social ontology of membership misidentification, c.) the problem of shared experiences in ‘empty set’ groups, and finally, d.) the problem of normativity of shared experiences. By way of a solution, I shall point to Stein’s own conceptual resources for accounting for (most of) these challenges and, in particular, her theory of empathy. Ultimately, I aim to show that Stein offers an original, two-dimensional account of sharing minds, which, not least, significantly advances contemporary accounts. According to Stein’s two-dimensional account, robustly integrated communities not only have a rationally integrated point of view, upon which they deliberate and in the light of which they reason, form intentions and act (Rovane 1998; Pettit 2003; List & Pettit 2011), but, moreover, have an own phenomenologically integrated centre, constituted precisely by shared experiences, their phenomenal contents and qualities. Conversely, I shall show how contemporary accounts help clarify what is (and what is not) entailed by Stein’s phenomenology of shared experiences. Background and Horizon of Collective Intentionality: Gerda Walther’s Embedment Analysis of We-IntentionalityEmanuele Caminada, University of Cologne The aim of this talk is to present Gerda Walther’s theory of social community (1923) and to develop further her phenomenological understanding of we-intentionality. According to Walther, the basic phenomenon of communal life is given in community bonding and emotional ties that shape the intentional life of the community members. She conceptualizes her intuition through the notions of ‘habitual joining’ [habituelle Einigung] and ‘intentional embedment’ [intentionale Einbettung]. Walther develops Pfänder’s idea of joining (1913; 1916) by relating it to the process of habitualization, while the notion of ‘intentional embedment’ comes from the implementation of Husserl’s (1913) background analysis in a noetic way. Walther’s aim is to clarify how sentiments shape the background beyond our awareness. The results of her phenomenological description are summarized in these ontological terms: a community is essentially grounded in the concrete background that arises through habitual joining. A social community is a community that is capable of we-intentionality. If a reflexive and thematic We is necessary to give institutional form to the community, a thematic We is achievable only against the pre-thematic We embedded in the background. Walther shows how both personal I-intentionality and We-intentionality emerge from the joint background and basic levels of concrete background. We-Intentionality does not exclude subjective perspectives, but it occurs through common joint frames and against a common background. I-Intentionality is always a matter of a socialized self since I reinforce myself in relation to my counterparts. Walther stresses the fact that if the object of joining is another subject, habitualization takes the form of an (intentional) “other in me” through and with whom I can experience the world (Walther 1923: 71). Beyond our self-awareness we carry in the background “others in me” that are intentionally embedded on our mental life. What does it mean to live with others in the background? And how do they structure (or de-structure) the horizon of our experience? Applying Husserl’s mature genetic phenomenology to Walther’s intuitions and referring to the concepts of ‘affect attunement’ and ‘regulator of the self’ (Stern 1985), ‘others in mind’ and ‘evaluators of the self’ (Rochat 2009), as well as Honneth’s (1992) remarks on ‘recognition’, I will provide possible answers to these questions. My interpretation of Walther’s concept of we-intentionality touches on issues related to phenomena such as hallucinations (i.e. hearing voices, invisible friends, etc.), the constitutive role of phantasies in normal as well as pathological social life, and forms of first-person perspectives within different structures of common intentionality. "
"Clinical psychiatry. The management of the acute patient";"Professor Josef Parnas, University of Copenhagen and Region Hovedstadens Psykiatri";"2013-11-14";"09:00";"2013-11-14";"16:00";"University of Copenhagen, Aud. 23.0.50, Njalsgade 128, 2300 Copenhagen S ";"";""
"Workshop and PhD course: The scope and limits of direct perception";"Center for Subjectivity Research";"2013-12-12";"";"2013-12-13";"";"Center for Subjectivity Research, Njalsgade 140-142, 5. floor, room 25.5.11, 2300 Copenhagen S";"In recent years, numerous versions of the so-called “direct-perception” thesis have been advanced. These accounts offer various different arguments in favor of the claim that we can acquire awareness and/or knowledge of others’ mental states through perception. It is not clear, however whether all of these approaches offer compatible arguments, and to what extent they are arguing for the same claim(s).";"In recent years, numerous versions of the so-called “direct-perception” thesis have been advanced. These accounts offer various different arguments in favor of the claim that we can acquire awareness and/or knowledge of others’ mental states through perception (e.g. Gallagher, Zahavi, Smith, McNeill, Overgaard, Krueger and Overgaard, De Jaegher). It is not clear, however whether all of these approaches offer compatible arguments, and to what extent they are arguing for the same claim(s). Aims of the workshop: - to distinguish, compare and contrast these arguments, examining to what extent they are compatible with each other, whether they support the same conclusions; - to evaluate them both conceptually and in light of empirical findings; - to articulate the conceptions of perception and cognition and the distinction between them that these theorists endorse; - to consider the scope of the claims advanced by DP theorists. For example, does DP apply only to basic emotions? To emotions in general? To some other kinds of mental states, such as (motor) intentions? To some kinds of beliefs or proto-beliefs?; - to examine the relevance of context for DP Participation in this workshop is by invitation only.Contact: John Michael, mpt658@hum.ku.dk Format: 6 talks given by invited speakers, each with a commentary by a PhD student. The commentators will be selected through an application process initiated by a call for commentators to be launched by Sep. 1. The philosophy department will cover the expenses of the PhD students selected as commentators’. Publication: A special issue devoted to this topic will be edited by John Michael and Leon De Bruin. We can offer to the invited speakers and the selected commentators the opportunity to submit papers to this special issue (which will be reviewed), and if desired to first submit their papers to us to receive feedback in advance of formal submission. Programme Thursday 12 December 2013 9:45 Coffee and Welcome 10:00-10:15 John Michael (University of Copenhagen) and Leon de Bruin (Radboud University Nijmegen, and the Free University of Amsterdam): Introduction to the Debate 10:15-11:30 Shaun Gallagher (University of Memphis/ University of Hertfordshire): The new hybrids: Continuing debates about direct perception 11:30-12:00 Vivian Bohl: (University of Tartu) Invited Commentary on the Debate LUNCH 13.00-14:15 Will McNeill (University of Cardiff): Seeing that you want more ice cream COFFEE 14.30-15.45 Søren Overgaard (Copenhagen University): The Unobservability Hypothesis 15:45-17:00 Jane Suilin Lavelle (University of Edinburgh): What kinds of mental state can we perceive? 17:00-18:15 Ulrike Pompe (University of Stuttgart) Perceiving Faces and Objects: An empirical approach to the direct perception theory Friday 13 December 2013 9:15-10:30 Marco Tamietto (University of Torino, Italy, and Tilburg University, The Netherlands): Attentional and sensory unawareness for emotions: neurofunctional and neuroanatomical systems COFFEE 10:45-12:00 Beatrice De Gelder (Maastricht University): TBA LUNCH 13:00-14:15 Dan Zahavi (University of Copenhagen): That, what, why and how: Empathy and social cognition. COFFEE 14:30-15:45 Julian Kiverstein (University of Amsterdam): Social intelligence as an embodied skill 15:45-17:00: Marc Slors (Radboud University Nijmegen) Action coordination: attunement versus social cognition"