An account of Boeschian cooperative behaviour

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingBook chapterResearchpeer-review

Documents

  • Olle Blomberg
According to reductionist accounts, intentional joint action can be exhaustively analysed with concepts that are already available and anyway needed for understanding intentional singular action. Most such accounts include a condition that it must be common knowledge between the participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that causes and coordinates the joint action (a CK-condition). Without such common knowledge, the resulting joint action supposedly isn’t an intentional joint action. I argue that reductionists should reject the CK-condition. Either the CK-condition is unnecessary or else the reductionist fails to account for the target phenomenon of intentional joint action.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCollective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems : Explanation, Implementation and Simulation
EditorsCatrin Misselhorn
Number of pages16
Place of PublicationCham
PublisherSpringer
Publication date22 Jul 2015
Pages169-184
ISBN (Print)978-3-319-15514-2
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-15515-9
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 22 Jul 2015
SeriesPhilosophical Studies Series
Volume122
ISSN0921-8599

Number of downloads are based on statistics from Google Scholar and www.ku.dk


No data available

ID: 130769619