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Introduction

In *Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence*, Levinas claims that *ipseity* depends upon *alterity*. One of the reasons given is that I, according to Levinas, become a subject exactly by being addressed and accused by the Other. It is when the Other makes an irrefutable appeal to me, it is when I am confronted with an unsubstitutable and irreplaceable responsibility, that I am provided with a true self-identity and individuality. Thus, subjectivity is ultimately taken to be a question of sub-jection to responsibility (Levinas, 1974, pp. 26, 29, 141, 183, 216-217).

I do not want to contest that Levinas is here onto something important, but I think that the notion of subject or self which he brings into play is a latecomer. It could even be argued that he defines selfhood in such a narrow and idiosyncratic manner that the conclusion he reaches concerning the dependency of self upon Other is foregone and trivially true.

Let me without further ado propose an alternative: The notion of self discussed by Levinas is founded in the sense that it presupposes a more primitive but also more fundamental type of selfhood, namely the one intrinsic to the very stream of consciousness, the one to be found in the very subjectivity or first-personal givenness of our experiences. Just as self-awareness in the most basic sense does not involve an awareness of an isolated self detached from the experiences, but simply an acquaintance with the experiences in their first-personal mode of presentation, the most basic form of selfhood is not something that exists apart from or beyond the stream of consciousness, but is rather a feature of or function of its givenness. As the French phenomenologist Michel Henry would say: It is the very affective self-manifestation of experience, which constitutes the most basic form of selfhood (Henry, 1963, p. 581; 1965, p. 53). It is exactly the primary presence or first-personal givenness of a group of experiences which constitutes their *myness*, i.e., make them belong to a particular subject.

If we assume that it makes sense to speak of selfhood already at this level, the obvious question, which will be the topic of this paper, is whether any strong thesis concerning the dependency of self upon alterity can still be

uphold. Does it also hold true for this very minimal sense of selfhood? Michel Henry for one would deny it. But in the following I will try to argue for the opposite conclusion. I will try to argue that the *temporal, bodily, and reflective* dimensions of experience confront us with a manifestation of alterity. To be more exact, I wish to show that these three dimensions contain a kind of *internal alterity*.

An immediate response to this claim might be that regardless of whether or not this is true, it is strictly speaking irrelevant, since it involves a change of topic. To speak of an internal alterity is no longer to deal with the kind of Otherness discussed by Levinas. In fact, if we accept Levinas' argumentation in *Totalité et infini*, we would not even be dealing with alterity any longer, since the only kind of alterity that really deserves its name is the alterity of the Other.

In *Totalité et infini*, Levinas contests that intentionality can provide us with an encounter with true Otherness. It is true, Levinas says, that the world I am living in is a world filled with objects that differs from myself. I encounter and handle these objects with different attitudes, practical as well as theoretical. But when I study them or consume them or utilize them in work, I am constantly transforming the foreign and different into the familiar and same, and thereby making them lose their strangeness (Levinas, 1961, pp. 113, 135). Thus although intentionality does relate me to that which is foreign, it is a non-reciprocal relationship. It never makes me leave home. As Levinas puts it, the knowing subject acts like the famous stone of the alchemists: it transmutes everything it touches. It absorbs the foreign, annuls its alterity, and transforms it into the same (Levinas, 1961, p.129; 1982, pp.212-213, 239; 1991, p.52).

Against this background Levinas argues that the alterity of the world and worldly entities, as well as the alterity that can be found internally in the self, are all purely formal types of alterity. They are all differences that can be thought, assimilated and absorbed by the subject, and for that very reason they remain differences inherent in and interior to a totality dominated, controlled, and constituted by the subject (Levinas, 1961, pp. 26-28). But as long as alterity is conceived as being related to, or correlated with, or dependent upon subjectivity, as long as it is something that can be absorbed by or integrated into the subject, we are not dealing with true alterity, but merely — as he puts it — with a game of internal difference (Levinas, 1949, p. 174).

In contrast, the Other is exactly that which cannot be conceptualized or categorized: "If one could possess, grasp, and know the other, it would not be other." (Levinas, 1979, p. 83 [1987, p. 90]). My encounter with true alterity is an encounter with an ineffable and radical exteriority, which is absolutely irreducible to any interiority. It is not conditioned by anything in my power, but has the character of a visitation, an epiphany, a revelation. It is an

encounter that overwhelms me and shakes me in my very foundation (Levinas, 1949, pp. 142, 190, 193-194; 1961, pp. 61, 233). One of the characteristic moves of Levinas is then that he takes the problem of justice and injustice to provide us with an original, non-reductionistic approach to the Other. The authentic encounter with the Other is not perceptual or epistemic, but ethical in nature. It is in the ethical situation where the Other questions me and makes ethical demands of me, i.e., when I have to assume responsibility for the Other, that he is present in a non-allergic manner (Levinas, 1961, pp. 33, 89, 215, 231).

I think that Levinas is right insofar as he wishes to underline the radical alterity of the Other. In our confrontation with the Other we do encounter an irreducible type of alterity, and one should definitely distinguish the alterity in myself and the alterity of the world from the alterity of the Other, and it is important to counter the suggestion that we are simply dealing with three different variations of one and the same alterity. But I believe that one can acknowledge this and still insist that the alterity of the world and the alterity in the self are genuine types of alterity, and not merely internal differences controlled and dominated by the subject.¹ Let me in the following take a closer look at the alterity in self, and attempt to show why it should be recognized as a true type of alterity.

Alterity and temporality

Is there any reason to think that the mere fact of being conscious involves some form of alterity? According to Sartre, consciousness can only be non-positionally present to itself if it is positionally aware of something (Sartre, 1943, p. 212, 1936; pp. 23-24). To be conscious is to posit a transcendent object, that is an object, which is different from oneself. It is to be confronted with something which one is not, and it entails an awareness of this difference, i.e., a pre-reflective self-awareness of oneself as *not being* that which one is conscious of (Sartre, 1943, p. 162). But Sartre is not only claiming that our tacit self-presence cannot be understood as a self-sufficient preoccupation with self. He also claims that it is incompatible with a strict self-identity, and that the self-giveness of subjectivity is dependent on it being different from itself! What is his reason for this surprising statement?

Sartre takes the notion of *presence* to imply duality and therefore at least a virtual separation (Sartre, 1943, p. 115). This does not only hold true for our

¹Let me emphasize that this criticism is only intended as a criticism of Levinas' position in *Totalité et infini*. I am well aware of the fact that he later on, for instance in a number of articles from the seventies, advocated a more complex view and acknowledged the existence of an "internal alterity". Cf. for instance the article *De la conscience à la veille. À partir de Husserl* in Levinas (1982).

knowledge of transcendent objects, however, but, claims Sartre, even for our self-presence :

Presence to self [...] supposes that an impalpable fissure has slipped into being. If being is present to itself, it is because it is not wholly itself. Presence is an immediate deterioration of coincidence, for it supposes separation (Sartre, 1943, pp.115-116 [1956, p.77]).

That is, one will never find nonthetic consciousness as a mode of being which is not, at the same time, in some way, absence from itself, precisely because it is presence to itself. Now presence to itself presupposes a slight distance from self, a slight absence from self. It is precisely this perpetual play of absence and presence, which it may seem hard to think of as existing, but which we engage in perpetually, and which represents the mode of being of consciousness (Sartre, 1948, p.69 [1967, p.127]. Cf. 1948, p.68 ; 1943, pp.112, 115-116).

Examination of nonthetic consciousness reveals a certain type of being which we will call *existence*. Existence is distance from itself, separation. The existent is what it is not and is not what it is. It "nihilates" itself. It is not coincidence with itself, but it is *for-itself* (Sartre, 1948, p. 50 [1967, p. 114]).

Whereas the being of the object is characterized by solidity, positivity, self-sufficiency, and self-identity (a table is purely and simply a table, neither more nor less, it knows no alterity and cannot relate to that which is other (Sartre, 1943, p. 33), this is not true for the being of subjectivity. My experience does not merely exist. It exists *for-itself*, that is, it is self-aware. But to be aware of one's perception, even pre-reflectively, is no longer simply and merely to perceive, but to withdraw, wrench away from or transcend the perception. To be self-present is to exist at a distance from oneself ; it is to be engaged in an ontological self-interrogation. Self-awareness and self-identity are incompatible determinations, wherefore Sartre questions the validity of the law of identity when it comes to an understanding of subjectivity and writes that self-awareness presupposes a tiny fissure, separation, or even duality in the being of consciousness. It is exactly this fracture that gives birth to the self (Sartre, 1943, pp. 115-116 ; 1948, pp. 66, 69, Merleau-Ponty, 1964a, p. 246).

When Sartre speaks of a fissure or separation in the being of consciousness, he is obviously not talking about consciousness being separated from itself by *some-thing*, since the introduction of any substantial opacity would split it in two, replacing its dyadic unity with the duality of two separated objects. No, for Sartre consciousness is separated from itself by *no-thing*, that is, the separation in question is properly speaking an internal differentiation or negation. But Sartre also claims that the nothing that separates consciousness from itself is at the root of time, and his description of the structure of consciousness gains considerable credibility the moment we

turn to *temporality*, that is, the moment we understand the perpetual self-differentiation, self-distanciation, and self-transcendence of subjectivity in temporal terms. According to Sartre, consciousness exists in the *diasporatic* form of temporality. Spread out in all three temporal dimensions, it is always existing at a distance from itself ; its self-presence is always permeated by absence, and this unique mode of being cannot be grasped through the category of self-identity. On the contrary, temporality is a perpetual movement of self-transcendence which from the very beginning prevents absolute self-coincidence (Sartre, 1943, pp. 116, 141, 144, 175-177, 182, 197, 245 ; 1948, p. 76).²

If we now turn to Husserl's analysis of time-consciousness, we encounter a related emphasis on the differentiated infrastructure of lived experience. In his account of how we are able to intend temporally extended objects, we come across his crucial distinction between the *primal impression*, the *retention* and the *protention*. Husserl's well-known thesis is that a perception of a temporal object (as well as the perception of succession and change) would be impossible if consciousness merely provided us with the givenness of the pure now-phase of the object, and if the stream of consciousness were a series of unconnected points of experiencing, like a string of pearls. In fact, Husserl does have a name for our consciousness of the narrow now-phase of the object. He calls this consciousness the *primal impression*. But as he argues, this alone cannot provide us with consciousness of anything with a temporal duration, and it is in fact only the abstract core-component of the full structure of experiencing. The *primal impression* is imbedded in a twofold temporal horizon. On the one hand, it is accompanied by a *retention* which provides us with consciousness of the phase of the object which has just been, i.e., which allows us to be aware of the phase as it sinks into the past and, on the other hand, by a *protention* which in a more or less indeterminate fashion anticipates the phase of the object yet to come.

In this way, it becomes evident that concrete perception as original consciousness (original givenness) of a temporally extended object is structured internally as itself a streaming system of momentary perceptions (so-called *primal impressions*). But each such momentary perception is the nuclear phase of a continuity, a continuity of momentary gradated retentions on the one side, and a horizon of what is coming on the other side : a horizon of "protention", which is disclosed to be characterized as a constantly gradated coming (Husserl, 1962b, p. 202)

The concrete and full structure of the lived experience is *primal impression-retention-protention*. It is "immediately" given as an ecstatic unity, and is not a

²Despite his emphasis on time, and despite taking the dyadic structure of pre-reflective self-awareness to constitute the origin of temporality, Sartre nevertheless conceives of the structure itself as being atemporal (Cf. Seel, 1995, pp.141-142).

gradual, delayed or mediated process of self-unfolding. It consequently proves necessary to distinguish the pure primal impression, which is a theoretical limit-case, and the phenomenological present, which only appears to itself as genetically complex. The primal impression is an opening toward multiple otherness: it is open to the hyletic affection;³ it "geht der Zukunft entgegen, mit offenen Armen" (Husserl, 1973d, p. 349), and it is accompanied by a retention, which provides us with "a direct and elementary intuition of otherness in its most primitive form" (Sokolowski, 1976, p. 699). Inner time-consciousness, as the absolute dimension of manifestation, is consequently an ecstatic unity of presencing (primal impression) and absencing (retention-protection).⁴ This is what allows it to constitute objects with temporal duration, but this is also what allows it (in a quite different way) to reveal itself in its very stretching. Thus every lived experience is haunted by the alterity of the absent and always presupposes an othering (Bernet, 1994, pp. 216, 235, 283). As Derrida writes in *Le problème de la genèse dans la philosophie de Husserl*:

Dans l'identité absolue du sujet avec lui-même la dialectique temporelle constitue a priori l'altérité. Le sujet s'apparaît originairement comme tension du Même et de l'Autre. Le thème d'une intersubjectivité transcendente instaurant la transcendance au cœur de l'immanence absolue de l'"ego" est déjà appelé. Le dernier fondement de l'objectivité de la conscience intentionnelle n'est pas l'intimité du "Je" à soi-même mais le Temps ou l'Autre, ces deux formes d'une existence irréductible à une essence, étrangère au sujet théorique, toujours constituées avant lui, mais en même temps seules conditions de possibilité d'une constitution de soi et d'une apparition de soi à soi (1990, pp. 126-127).

Since lived experience is characterized by this inner articulation, it is no wonder that a number of phenomenologists have chosen to speak of the existence of a pre-temporal distance, absence, or even of a *proto-reflection* in the core of it. Brand, for instance, speaks of a "Reflexion-im-Ansatz", (1955, p. 74) and Derrida has argued that a subjectivity defined in this way, cannot possibly be undifferentiated and self-enclosed, since it entails a minimal self-differentiation and division (1967, pp. 89, 92). In contrast to the solid self-identity of objects, the conscious self-presence of subjects already contains an incipient distance or absence. Ultimately this should come as no surprise. As will be shown below, recollection and reflection confront us with forms of *self-fission*, and it is obviously necessary to explain how something like that can rise out of lived experience. As Sartre poignantly reminds us, the problem is not to find examples of the pre-reflective, for it is everywhere, but to understand how one can pass from this level which constitutes the being of consciousness to the

³Unfortunately a closer analysis of this notion would lead too far. For an extensive discussion cf. Zahavi (1998 and 1999).

⁴Fink (1966, p. 22) speaks of retention and protention in terms of an "Entgegenwärtigung".

reflective knowledge of self, which is founded upon it (1948, p. 63). Sartre insists that the two modes must share a certain affinity, a certain structural similarity. Otherwise it would be impossible to explain how the pre-reflective cogito could ever give rise to reflection. To phrase it differently, it is no coincidence that we do exactly speak of a pre-reflective consciousness. The choice of words indicates that there remains a connection. The reason why reflection remains a permanent possibility is exactly that the reflexive scissiparity exists already *in nuce* in the structure of the pre-reflective cogito (Sartre, 1943, pp. 113, 194). Due to its intrinsic temporal articulation and differentiated infrastructure, pre-reflective consciousness cannot be conceived as a pure and simple self-presence. The primal impression is not an independent source of presencing, but is always already furnished with a temporal density, always already accompanied by a horizon of protentional and retentional absencing. Only this temporal ecstasis explains the possibility of temporal self-awareness, of reflection and recollection. As Derrida (1967, p.76 [1973, pp. 67-68]) puts it: "How can it be explained that the possibility of reflection and re-presentation belongs by essence to every experience, without this nonself-identity of the presence called primordial?"

We consequently end up with the insight that lived experience must be conceived not as a simple, static and self-sufficient self-presence, but as a dynamic and differentiated openness to alterity. Rather than confronting us with a motionless self-identity, inner time-consciousness can be said to confront us with a basic restlessness and non-coincidence. It is a process of exposure and differentiation, not of closure and totalization.

Is there any way to relate the alterity inherent in temporality with the alterity of the Other? According to Husserl there is in fact a structural similarity between empathy and recollection (Cf. Husserl, 1973a, p. 144; 1976, p. 325; 1959, p. 175, 1962a, p.189; 1973b, p. 188; and 1973d, pp. 416, 447, 641). Recollection entails a self-displacement or self-distanciation, qualities that are needed if I am to be capable of empathy, if I am to meet the Other as a self. This line of thought is continued when Husserl speaks of the affinity between the de-presentation effectuated by original temporalization and the self-alienation taking place in empathy:

Self-temporalization through de-presentation [*Ent-Gegenwärtigung*], so to speak (through recollection), has its analogue in my self-alienation [*Ent-Fremdung*] (empathy as a de-presentation of a higher level — de-presentation of my primal presence [*Urpräsenz*] into a merely presentified [*vergegenwärtigte*] primal presence). (1962a, p. 189 [1970, p.185]. Cf. 1973d, pp. 634, 642).

Thus, Husserl appears to regard the step from de-presentation to self-alienation as an intensification of alterity, and more generally he seems to consider the

ecstatic-centered self-differentiation which is due to the process of temporalization to be a condition of possibility for empathy, for an openness toward the Other.

Alterity and body

If we now turn to the body, are there then any reasons to believe that our very incarnation, our very subjective embodiment, confronts us with some kind of alterity? One of the issues explicitly emphasized by Husserl in his phenomenological account of the body, is its peculiar two-sidedness (1962b, p. 197; 1973c, pp. 414, 462; 1952, p. 145). My body is given to me as an interiority, as a volitional structure, and as a dimension of sensing (1973c, p. 540; 1962b, p. 391), but it is also given as a visually and tactually appearing exteriority, and as Claesges puts it, "Dadurch hat den Leib im Sinne des Begriffes der "Doppelrealität" zugleich ichlichen und ichfremden Charakter." (Claesges, 1964, p. 110). What is the relation between that which Husserl calls the "Innen-" and the "Aussenleiblichkeit"?(1973c, p. 337). In both cases I am confronted with my own body. But why is the visually and tactually appearing body at all experienced as the exteriority of my body? When I touch my own hand, the touched hand is not given as a mere object, since it feels the touch itself, and the decisive difference between touching one's own body and everything else, be it inanimate objects or the body of Others, is exactly that it implies a *double-sensation*. It presents us with an ambiguous setting in which the hand alternates between two roles, that of touching and that of being touched. It provides us with an experience of the dual nature of the body, since it is the very same hand which can appear in two different fashions, as alternately touched and touching. The relation between the touching and the touched are reversible, since the touching is touched, and the touched is touching. It is exactly this reversibility that testifies that the interiority and the exteriority are different manifestations of the same (Husserl, 1973b, p. 263; 1973c, p. 75).

We find a very similar position in Merleau-Ponty whose own position is quite unequivocal. Merleau-Ponty claims that the self-manifestation of subjectivity *must* be contaminated by Otherness. Otherwise, intersubjectivity would be impossible. Thus, Merleau-Ponty takes self-coincidence and the relation with an Other to be mutually incompatible determinations. If the self-manifestation of subjectivity were in fact characterized by a pure and unbroken self-presence, if I were given to myself in an absolutely unique way, I would not only lack the means of ever recognizing the embodied Other as another subjectivity. I would also lack the ability to recognize myself in the mirror, and more generally be unable to grasp a certain intersubjectively describable embodied person as myself.

If the sole experience of the subject is the one which I gain by coinciding with it, if the mind, by definition, eludes "the outside spectator" and can be recognized only from within, my *cogito* is necessarily unique, and cannot be "shared in" by another. Perhaps we can say that it is "transferable" to others. But then how could such a transfer ever be brought about? What spectacle can ever validly induce me to posit outside myself that mode of existence the whole significance of which demands that it be grasped from within? Unless I learn within myself to recognize the junction of the *for itself* and the *in itself*, none of those mechanisms called other bodies will ever be able to come to life; unless I have an exterior others have no interior. The plurality of consciousness is impossible if I have an absolute consciousness of myself (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, pp. 427-428 [1962, p. 373]).

For Merleau-Ponty, subjectivity is essentially incarnated. To exist embodied is, however, neither to exist as pure subject nor as pure object, but to exist in a way that transcends the opposition between *pour-soi* and *en-soi*. It does not entail losing self-awareness; on the contrary, self-awareness is intrinsically embodied self-awareness, but it does entail a loss or perhaps rather a release from transparency and purity, thereby permitting intersubjectivity. "The other can be evident to me because I am not transparent for myself, and because my subjectivity draws its body in its wake" (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 405 [1962, p.352]. Cf. 1945, p. 402).

Since intersubjectivity is in fact possible, there must exist a bridge between my self-awareness and my awareness of Others; my experience of my own subjectivity must contain an anticipation of the Other, must contain the seeds of alterity (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, pp. 400-401, 405, 511). If I am to recognize other embodied subjects as foreign subjects, I have to be in possession of something that will allow me to do so. When I experience myself and when I experience an Other, there is in fact a common denominator. In both cases I am dealing with *incarnation*, and one of the features of my embodied self-awareness is that it per definition comprises an *exteriority*. When my left hand touches my right, or when I gaze at my left foot, I am experiencing myself, but in a way that anticipates the manner in which I would experience an Other, and an Other would experience me. Thus, Merleau-Ponty can describe embodied self-awareness as a presentiment of the Other—the Other appears on the horizon of this self-experience—and the experience of the Other as an echo of one's own bodily constitution. The reason why I can experience Others is because I am never so close to myself that the Other is completely and radically foreign and inaccessible. I am always already a stranger to myself and therefore open to Others (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 406; 1960a, pp. 213, 215, 221; 1960b, p. 35; 1964a, pp. 74, 278; 1969, pp. 186, 188).

In both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty we consequently find reflections that seek to relate our ability to encounter the alterity of the Other with the internal

manifestation of alterity that is intrinsic to our incarnation. In contrast to the self-manifestation of, say, an act of judging, my bodily self-givenness permits me to confront my own exteriority, and it is this very experience of the interplay between *ipseity* and *alterity* that makes it comprehensible how something like a recognition and experience of another embodied subjectivity is possible.

Alterity and reflection

Let me finally turn to reflection, since both Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty have argued that it presents us with some kind of *self-alteration*. Qua thematic self-experience reflection does not simply copy or reproduce the lived experience. When we reflect upon the experience, it is transformed. The degree and kind of transformation depend upon the type of reflection we are dealing with. Obviously, to argue in this way raises the specter of skepticism. Can we at all trust reflection, or does it rather falsify its subject-matter? Again, the answer will depend upon the type of reflection we are confronted with.

According to Sartre it is necessary to make a fundamental distinction between two types of reflection, the *pure* and the *impure* reflection. Let us first take a look at the pure reflection. This is the ideal form of reflection since it presents us with a pure (unfalsifying) thematisation of the reflected. But according to Sartre it is very hard to attain since it never emerges by itself, but must be won by a sort of purifying *catharsis*. In pure reflection, reflected consciousness does not appear as an object and is not given perspectively as a transcendent entity existing *outside* reflecting consciousness. In pure reflection everything is given at once in a sort of absolute proximity (Sartre, 1943, p. 195). Quite in keeping with this, Sartre claims that pure reflection never learns or discovers anything new, but always discloses and thematizes that which it was already familiar with beforehand, namely, the original non-substantial streaming of pre-reflective consciousness (Sartre, 1943, p. 197; 1936, p. 48).

Although Sartre at one point admits that his entire ontology is based upon the work of this type of reflection, and that only it can disclose consciousness as it truly is (Sartre, 1943, pp. 190, 203), he unfortunately does not say very much more about it, and he never explains how we can achieve it.⁵

If we instead turn to Husserl, he usually takes reflection to be the method for investigating consciousness, and consequently rejects skeptical reservations concerning its performance (1976, pp. 165, 168, 175). This is not to say that he denies the existence of types of reflection that do indeed reify consciousness, but as he says, to claim that *every* type of reflection necessarily falsifies lived

experience and that the latter completely elude reflection is absurd, since this claim presupposes knowledge of those very same lived experiences, and the only way to gain that is through reflection (1976, p. 174, cf. Merleau-Ponty 1945, p. 412).

But although reflection, rather than being necessarily a reification or falsification of consciousness, might be nothing but an intensification or accentuation of the primary experience, it nevertheless cannot be denied that it changes the givenness of the experience reflected upon—*otherwise there would be no need for reflection*. Reflection does not merely copy or repeat the original experience. As Husserl explicitly admits, it *alters* it. The experience is now given thematically and no longer just lived pre-reflectively (1973a, p. 72). As Husserl puts it in a lecture from 1917:

Das aktuelle Leben und Erleben ist zwar immer bewußt, aber es ist darum nicht schon erfahren und gewußt. Dazu bedarf es eines neuen Pulses aktuellen Lebens, der sogenannten reflektiven oder immanenten Erfahrung. Diese tritt aber nicht bloß summatorisch zu dem früheren Leben hinzu, etwa zu dem jeweiligen äußeren Erfahren oder Erfahrungsdenken, sondern sie wandelt es eigentümlich (1987, p. 89).

One form this transformation might take is spelled out in *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins*. There Husserl writes that the experience to which we turn attentively in reflection acquires a new mode of being. It becomes “differentiated”, and he claims that this differentiatedness is nothing other than its being-grasped (1966a, p. 129). Husserl also speaks of reflection as a process that discloses, disentangles, explicates, and articulates all those components and structures of meaning which were contained implicitly in the pre-reflective experience (1966a, p. 128; 1966b, pp. 205, 236). As Husserl puts it, in the beginning we are confronted with the so to speak dumb experience which must then be made to articulate its own sense (1973a, p. 77; 1966a, pp. 116, 161). Thus, at its best the reflection is simply an accentuation of the structures inherent in the lived experience rather than a process which adds new components and structures to it. And in this case, the persistent fear that reflection is somehow prevented from attaining true subjectivity seems unfounded.

However, Husserl still insists that reflection presents us with a form of self-alteration, and not merely with some kind of *attentional modification*. Attention is, as Husserl pointed out in *Logische Untersuchungen*, a particular feature or mode of our primary act; it is not a new act (1984, p. 425, cf. 1976, p. 76). Reflection, in contrast, is exactly a new (founded) act, and reflective self-awareness therefore a *relation* between two different experiences (1976, p. 78). It is exactly for this reason, that it entails a kind of doubling or fracture or, as Fink

⁵He even admits this quite explicitly (cf. Sartre, 1971).

formulates it, a kind of *self-fission*, since it confronts me with another aspect of myself. Reflection entails the coexistence of a double(d) subject: a reflected and a reflecting. Following Husserl, Fink even speaks of reflection as a *self-multiplication*, where I exist together or in communion with myself (Fink, 1987, p. 62, cf. Husserl, 1959, p. 93; 1952, p. 253).⁶ This self-multiplication is in play in all acts involving re-presentation (*Vergegenwärtigung*). When it, for instance, comes to recollection Husserl writes:

Ich bin nicht nur und lebe nicht nur, sondern ein zweites Ich und ein zweites ganzes Ichleben wird bewußt, spiegelt sich gleichsam in meinem Leben, nämlich vergegenwärtigt sich in meinen gegenwärtigen Erinnerungen (1966b, pp. 309-310).

Of course, this should not be taken too literally. Reflection (and recollection) does not split me into two different egos; it does not turn me into a true Other to myself (Fink, 1987, pp. 55-57, 62; Husserl, 1952, p. 212). Reflection is neither a kind of empathy, nor a case of schizophrenia or multiple personality disorder. It is a kind of self-awareness. But it is a kind of self-awareness which is essentially characterized by an internal division, difference and distance. To some extent it is even distinguished by a certain detachment and withdrawal, since it deprives the original experience of its naivety and spontaneity. To put it differently, even if reflective self-awareness does not confront us with ourselves as transcendent objects, it does not merely differ from the pre-reflectively lived experience by its intensity, articulation and differentiation, but also by its quality of othering. Reflective self-awareness is characterized by a type of self-fragmentation which we do not encounter on the level of lived experience.

One of the significant consequences of this is that there will always remain an un-thematic spot in the life of the subject. It is, as Husserl says, evident that the very process of thematisation does not itself belong to the thematized content, just as a perception or description does not belong to that which is perceived or described (1962b, p. 478). Even a universal reflection will contain a moment of naivety, since reflection is necessarily prevented from grasping itself. In a regular intentional act, I am directed at and preoccupied with my intentional object. Whenever I am intentionally directed at objects I am also self-aware. But when I am directed at and occupied with objects I am not thematically conscious of myself. And when I do thematize myself in a reflection, the very act of thematization remains unthematic. When subjectivity functions it is self-aware, but it is not thematically conscious of itself, and it therefore lives in anonymity.⁷ As Merleau-Ponty would say, our temporal

⁶Frequently Husserl also speaks of recollection as a "Mit-sich-selbst-in-Gemeinschaft-Sein" (Ms. C 7 8a. Cf. Ms. C 7 25a; 1973c, p. 359; 1973d, pp. 398, 519).

⁷Thus it is worth emphasizing that anonymity and self-givenness are by no means

existence is both a condition for and an obstacle to our self-comprehension. Temporality contains an internal fracture that permits us to return to our past experiences in order to investigate them reflectively, but this very fracture also prevents us from fully coinciding with ourselves. There will always remain a difference between the lived and the understood (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, pp. 399, 76, 397, 460).

That there is a connection between reflection and alterity, that reflection involves a self-alteration (or even self-alienation), is even more obvious if we now turn from the pure to the impure reflection. According to Sartre, the impure reflection is the type of reflection which we encounter daily. It operates with an epistemic duality, and it is called impure because it transcends the given and interprets the reflected in an objectifying manner (1943, pp. 194, 199, 201). Let me illustrate this process by way of Sartre's classical analysis of *pain*. Assume that you are sitting late at night trying to finish a book. You have been reading most of the day and your eyes are hurting. How does this pain originally manifest itself? According to Sartre, not yet as a thematic object of reflection, but by influencing the way in which you perceive the world. You might become restless, irritated, have difficulties in focusing and concentrating. The words on the page may tremble or quiver. Even though the pain is not yet apprehended as a psychical object, it is not absent or unconscious. It is not yet thematized, but given as a vision-in-pain, as a pervasive affective atmosphere that influences and colors your intentional interaction with the world (Sartre, 1943, pp. 380-381). As Sartre writes, "I exist the pain in such a way that it disappears in the ground of corporeality as a structure subordinated to the corporal totality. The pain is neither absent nor unconscious; it simply forms a part of that distance-less existence of positional consciousness for itself." (Sartre, 1943, p.383 [1956, p. 334]). So far the pain has only been given pre-reflectively, but of course this can change. You can start to pay attention to the pain, that is, you can reflect upon it. If you do this, you adopt, according to Sartre, a distancing and objectifying attitude to the experience in question, and as a result the experience is transformed. You transcend the lived pain and posit the pain as an object, that is as a transcendent unity: Different isolated twinges of *pain* are apprehended as manifestations of one and the same *suffering* (Sartre, 1943, pp. 385-386). But apart from turning the pain into a psychical object, the reflection also situates it within an egological context. That is, the pain is henceforward given as being owned by or belonging to an ego. More generally, when experiences are reflected upon, they are interpreted as manifesting states, traits, and qualities which belong to an egological totality. Sartre actually takes

incompatible notions.

this distancing transformation to be so radical that he describes ordinary reflection as an attempt to capture the experience as if it were the experience of somebody else. That is, in reflection we adopt the perspective of another on ourselves, and it is for that reason that Sartre can write: "The reflective attitude is correctly expressed in this famous sentence by Rimbaud (in the letter of the seer): "I is an other." "(Sartre, 1936, p.78 [1957, p. 97]). This description might gain credibility if we follow Sartre yet another step in his analysis of pain. After all you might not only apprehend the concrete pains as the manifestation of a suffering. You can also classify and characterize the suffering through concepts acquired from Others: It is a case of glaucoma. At this stage, the pain has become accessible to Others. They can describe it and diagnose it as a *disease*. And when you conceive of it in a similar manner, you adopt an alienating third-person perspective on your pain (Sartre, 1943, pp. 405-407).

Strictly speaking, we have now left behind the issue of *internal* alterity, since we at this point is confronted with a type of reflection which is intersubjectively mediated. Thus, for both Husserl and Sartre there are forms of reflection which entail a self-apprehension from the perspective of the Other, and which therefore have the encounter with the Other and the Other's intervention as their condition of possibility. There are, in other words, types of self-apprehension which do not have their origin in the self but depend upon *radical alterity*. When I experience the Other as experiencing myself and when I take over the Other's objectifying and alienating apprehension of myself, a type of self-awareness is made possible wherein I apprehend myself as seen in the midst of the world, as a person among persons, and as an object among objects. Thus Husserl claims that my personhood is intersubjectively constituted (1973c, p. 175; 1962a, p. 315; 1952, pp. 204-205; 1973d, pp. 177, 603), and it is no wonder that he often asserts that the personal reflection, in contrast to the pure reflection, is characterized by a complex and indirect intentional structure (1952, pp. 242, 250).

Let me briefly summarize the results: To claim that reflection necessarily implies a falsification of lived experience is problematic since it seems to lead to a kind of self-refuting skepticism. When this is said, it must be admitted however that reflection necessarily implies some form of transformation and alteration. Subjectivity seems to be constituted in a way that allows it to relate to itself in an othering way. This self-alteration is something inherent in reflection. It is not something that reflection can ever overcome.⁸

⁸Levinas has argued that it is the encounter with the Other which conditions and makes possible the unnatural movement of reflection. Reflection is a suspension of the natural spontaneity. It makes my thought detach from itself and join itself as if it were Other to itself. But this movement cannot arise out of nothing. It needs an impulse from without. This impulse comes from the Other, who interrupts and disrupts my dogmatic slumber by putting me into question.

Conclusion

If we return to the question posed at the beginning of the article: Does it still make sense to speak of a dependency of self upon alterity if one chooses to operate with a much more primitive notion of self, than the one employed by Levinas? — the answer has turned out to be affirmative.

When I first spoke of the need for a recognition and acknowledgment of an internal or intrasubjective alterity and even used the term self-alteration, the expectation might have been that I was about to engage in an investigation of some rather extreme limit-phenomena such as depersonalization, fugue or multiple-personality disorder. But as we have just seen, it was in fact something far more commonplace and pervasive I had in mind. When I remember a past experience, or reflect upon an occurrent one, or simply touch myself, I am already confronted with alterity, and ultimately, I would argue that it is necessary to recognize alterity in the form of not only 1) other self, and 2) self as other, but also in the form of 3) non-self (world) — although the limitations imposed by this article has forced me to ignore the last type completely.

To speak in this way is certainly to employ the term "alterity" in a far broader sense than Levinas does in *Totalité et infini*. In fact, the term seems to cover the entire spectrum: From the *different, absent, exterior, and transcendent* to the *foreign, alien, incomprehensible, and ineffable*. One obvious objection to this broad use might be that it completely drains the concept from content. However, there is at least one important common denominator that remains. Whereas it was claimed that the internal alterity remains inherent in and interior to a totality dominated, controlled, and constituted by the subject, I think this must be questioned. It is simply not true that the forms of internal alterity I have described above are controlled by the subject. 1) The differentiated infrastructure we find in temporality is not domesticated by subjectivity, and for a very simple reason: It constitutes the very core of subjectivity itself. Thus, it is no coincidence that Husserl argues that a fundamental investigation of time will lead us to a level of egoless streaming (1973d, p. 598). At the bottom level, time-consciousness is egoless in the sense that it is not carried out or influenced by the ego. I am not unifying the experiences, this is taken care of by the very process of temporalization, which is regulated by strict and rigid laws beyond my control. 2) The reversibility we find in double-sensation is not a simple identity. The difference between inferiority or exteriority of the body is not something that can be "aufgehoben".

Thus, it is the non-epistemic, ethical encounter with the Other which disturbs the subject in its tranquil primordiality, and makes possible both reflection and reduction (Levinas, 1991, p.61; 1982, p. 224).

3) And finally, the self-alteration we encounter in reflection does certainly not testify to the mastery of a sovereign ego. There is a difference between the lived and the reflected that can never be overcome.

Perhaps it could nevertheless be maintained that it is unfortunate to broaden the term alterity in the way I have done, since it will inevitably make it lose its distinctness. Since my concern is ultimately with the phenomena and not with the terminology, I do not want to press the matter any further, but just refer back to the argumentation given above. Let me instead conclude with briefly summarizing the two reasons for not accepting Levinas' argumentation *Totalité et infini*.

First, if one downplays the alterity of the world and the alterity in the self, and argues that both of these are dominated and controlled by the subject, one does not only appear to overestimate the power of the subject. One also seems to reinstate a highly problematic notion of self, which prior to the overwhelming encounter with the other is completely caught up in a self-sufficient and self-enclosed presence. Second, by denying that there prior to the encounter with the Other is any alterity at play in the subject, one is obviously also denying that the encounter with the Other might in some way be prepared by and made possible through an alterity internal to the self. This is of course crucial if one wants to emphasize the absolute and radical alterity of the other. But there is a price to pay for this choice: The encounter with the Other is turned into a mystery. The question is whether this price is not too high.⁹

⁹For a clear outline and discussion of the two dominant phenomenological approaches to the encounter with the Other — the first chosen by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty who insist that the encounter with the Other is prepared by an alterity internal to the self, the second by Levinas who exactly denies this — see Bernet (1998). For an extended investigation of the relation between self and other, cf. Zahavi (1999).

At the source of time : Valence and the constitutional dynamics of affect

Francisco J. Varela and Natalie Depraz

The question, the background : How affect originally shapes time

This paper represents a step in the analysis of the key, but much-neglected role of affect and emotions as the originary source of the living present, as a foundational dimension of the moment-to-moment emergence of consciousness. In a more general sense, we may express the question in the following terms: there seems to be a growing consensus from various sources — philosophical, empirical and clinical — that emotions cannot be seen as a mere "coloration" of the cognitive agent, understood as a formal or unaffected self, but are immanent and inextricable from every mental act. How can this be borne out, beyond just announcing it? Specifically, what is the role of affect-emotion in the self-movement of the flow, of the temporal stream of consciousness?

Affect and the constitution of time : a new approach

The hypothesis developed here is that the key to address this question effectively has to be searched for in the dynamics of what we will hereinafter call the *fold*: the detailed transition from the pre-reflexive to the reflexive (or synonymously: pre-noetic / noetic, pre-egological / egological, pre-attentive / attentive). The hither side of the fold is pre-noetic; its far side intentional content (Fig. 1). The fold, in our analysis, has a double axis: one based on the emergence of reflection itself, leading to cognitive content; the other based on self-affectation and leading to basic predispositions and a specific palette of emotions. In the sense taken here the fold, beyond the specific three-part structure of the living present, includes in its immediate description, what can be called a short-term (working or performative) memory of the habitual lived body. When iterated this micro-temporality forms the basis of a narrative- or macro-temporality which we do not address in this text. What we propose in this text is a detailed and layered description of such an embodied *temporal dynamics*, which can be found at work in all instances of ordinary, daily life.