

FEELINGS, EMOTIONS, AND TRULY PERCEIVING THE VALUABLE

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1. *Introduction.*

A helpful clue to understanding the role of feelings and emotions in the perception of the valuable is provided by the common root of the German terms *wahrnehmen* and *wertnehmen*.¹ *Wahrnehmen* means to apprehend perceptually, that is, in a manner that involves a sensorial dimension, and thereby to take something as true. *Wertnehmen* means to apprehend in a manner involving feelings and thereby to take something as valuable. The commonality of the root *nehmen* reveals that our “takings” must be broadly understood as experiences that apprehend both the physical (or non-axiological) properties of the things and situations experienced as well as their value-attributes. Our ordinary experience, in other words, *from the beginning* comprises both cognitive and affective moments. Things and situations affect us; they evoke feelings in us, and we thereby “take” them as valuable just insofar as we take their properties to be *x*, *y*, and *z*. In our *Wertnehmungen*, things and situations appear to us *from the beginning* as likable or not, useful or not, pleasurable or not, safe or dangerous, joyous or sad, and so on. Actions and agents *from the beginning* appear as noble, virtuous, generous, honest, just, compassionate, hospitable, friendly, base, vicious, rancorous, spiteful, mean-spirited, treacherous, and so on. And they appear so precisely because a single experience encompasses the *Wertnehmung* of the axiological attributes of the thing or situation as well as the *Wahrnehmung* of the thing or situation as possessing particular non-axiological properties that underlie our affective response

to that thing. In such an experience, in other words, reason and feeling penetrate one another so as to produce an evaluation of the sort that Philippa Foot (see, for example, [1995] 2002, 207–8; 2003, 24; see also [1958]; [1958–59]; [1961]) suggests is a “matter of fact” that commands assent precisely to the extent that reasons—appeals to the thing’s or situation’s possessing particular non-axiological properties—can be given for it.

Our full-bodied “takings” of things and of situations are intentional, and intentionality is the proper theme of phenomenology.² My approach to these experiences will, therefore, be phenomenological. In the light of this broad understanding of “takings,” we can appreciate both the descriptive and the anti-naturalistic character of phenomenology (Glendinning 2007; Drummond 2008a).³ Phenomenology is not concerned to provide causal explanations of the neurophysiological underpinnings of the feelings and emotions. To discern the causalities operative in the world, including the causalities operative between objects and subjects as particular entities in the world, presupposes a “pre-scientific” experience of the world on the basis of which one posits causal relations between worldly existents, including subjects. The causal explanations of psychology and neurophysiology cannot give an account of the world as it is already present to a subject before he or she begins to frame causal explanations. Naturalistic explanations, in other words, can account for the subject that is an entity among other entities *in* the world, but cannot alone reveal the subject *of* the world, the subject whose intentional experience first discloses a world as having the kinds of properties that lend themselves to naturalistic explanations.

Intentionality is both interesting and puzzling precisely because in intending objects the subject is not primarily in a causal relation with them, but is instead directed to them in their determinate significance for us. To experience fear, for example, is to take a certain situation as

dangerous. This kind of experience cannot be adequately understood if we think of fear as nothing more than a causal sequence of electrical impulses between various parts of the brain ending in the stimulation of the amygdala or if we think of these brain states as somehow that to which our affective experiences are directed (Roberts 2003, 43).

Phenomenology involves a particular kind of non-naturalistic reflection that describes, rather than explains, the intentional correlation between (a) the subjective performances and achievements in which objects are disclosed as having a certain sense and (b) these objects precisely as disclosed. It thereby identifies the intentional structures that make it possible for things and a world to be experienced—to disclose themselves—as having the sense they do. Phenomenology explores the correlation of subject and object as experienced rather than taking subject and object as externally, that is, causally, related entities. This does not entail that phenomenological reflection is introspective. It is concerned not to identify the features of the reflecting subject's experience, but to identify the *essential* structures of experience and of objects as disclosed by the intentionalities at work in different kinds of experiences as lived by any experiencing subject, not just the reflecting subject. The phenomenologist, without presupposing naturalistic explanations that cannot get off the ground apart from the more fundamental experience of the world that naturalistic explanations take for granted, must describe how a world filled with physical, affective, practical, and cultural significance is disclosed by any experiencing subject.

None of this is meant to deny the role of science in coming to an understanding of the emotions, but a full understanding of their place in human life cannot be reductive in the way that naturalistic explanations are. This is because what is central to our emotional experience is that it grasps everyday objects in an affective light; it is directed, in other words, to the affective

and axiological significance that those objects have for us in our emotional grasp of them. The emotions are, as Peter Goldie (2000, 19–20, 71–74) puts it, a “thinking with feeling” that displays an object in a particular manner and involves perception, imagination or memory, or, as Robert Roberts (2003, 2) puts it, “a kind of eye for value and the import of situations,” or, as I am suggesting, an eye for the axiological sense of a thing or situation. But ‘significance’ or ‘sense’ is not an empirical concept, and to explicate our apprehension of things in their significance for us is a task that acknowledges but also transcends our best scientific understandings. It is this full-bodied “taking” of things and situations as having both cognitive and affective sense that is the subject of my concern in this paper. We “take” *S as p* and we take *S as p as v* in pre-predicative experiences prior to the judgments in which we articulate the claim that *S is p* or *Sp is v* (cf. Drummond 2003). I shall focus on these pre-predicative takings that anticipate judgments of value and shall sketch what a phenomenological approach can tell us of them.

2. *The intentional structure of feelings and emotions.*

It is in the context of this preliminary discussion of full-bodied “takings” that we should understand the views of those phenomenologists—but not all phenomenologists—who claim (1) that valuing a thing or situation necessarily involves feeling or emotions and (2) that this feeling is rooted in a “presentation” of the thing or situation, that is, that the feeling comprises some information about the object (see, for example, Husserl [1984, 402–10, 496–518] 1970, 569–76, 636–51; cf. also Husserl 1988, 252–54).⁴ This view already stands in sharp contrast to a common view of the emotions that understands them as the unity of belief and desire. The belief-desire account holds that the emotions are a conjunction of beliefs grounding a desire and

that only the believing and desiring aspects of an emotion have intentional content (Kenny 1963, Alston 1967, Davidson 1976, Taylor 1976; 1985). On the belief-desire view, feelings are non-essential to the intentionality of the emotions, mere supplements to emotional episodes that do not bear directly upon their intentional content. Such “add-on views,” as Peter Goldie (2000, 4) calls them, fail to capture the important role that feelings play in the emotions and in their intentionality (Goldie 2000, 18–28, 37–47, 72–81). They also fail to capture an important difference between valuation and volition, since it is possible to have a positive feeling or emotion toward something—and thereby positively value it—without desiring it. Moreover, the same emotion can ground different desires—fear, for example, can motivate a desire to flee or a desire to stand one’s ground and fight, or it can simply freeze us in fright—and the desire, therefore, does not form part of the definition of the emotion.

The basic phenomenological view, then, is that value-attributes are the correlates of intentional feelings or emotions that are the affective response of a subject with a particular experiential history—that is, particular beliefs, cares, concerns, emotional states, dispositions, commitments, practical interests, cultural inheritances, and so forth—to the non-axiological properties of a thing or situation. In brief, the valued or disvalued feature of a thing or situation is disclosed precisely as valued or disvalued by an affective intentionality that comprises a presentational moment. The affective moment builds upon and unites itself with the presentational moment directed to the descriptive, non-axiological properties of the thing or situation such that the overall character of the experience is an affective response to the worth of the thing or situation having those non-axiological properties (Husserl [1952, 8–11] 1989, 10–13; 1988, 252). Within the concrete valuing experience, the descriptive or non-axiological

properties of the valued object or situation are the correlates of the presentational moments and the value-attributes are the correlates specifically of the moment of feeling or emotion (Husserl 1988, 255–57, 260–62).

This basic view should be understood against the background of a distinction between two senses of “feeling”: feeling-sensations and intentional feelings (Husserl [1984, 401–10] 1970, 569–75). The former are merely sensory experiences, for example, the visceral feelings such as the tightening of the abdominal and neck muscles associated, say, with anger and fear. On the other hand, an intentional feeling—what we might call with Reinach an “apprehending feeling” (Reinach 1989, 1:298) or with Goldie a “feeling towards” the object (Goldie 2000, 19, 51–62; Goldie 2002, 236–42)—refers to some thing or situation as its object and discloses that object, broadly speaking, as likeable or not. So, for example, liking and disliking are the liking and disliking of something; joy and sadness are joy and sadness in something, and so forth. The objective reference of the feeling is derived, however, from the underlying presentation of a thing or situation. That is, the intentional feeling necessarily contains within itself a moment that presents its object—the thing or situation valued—as having certain non-axiological properties.⁵ The value-attributes intended are neither separable from nor reducible to the non-axiological properties on which they are founded, but our valuations—precisely insofar as they are grounded on presentations—track these non-axiological properties. Put another way, non-axiological properties provide both rational motivation and evidence for the valuation accomplished in the affective response.

The intentional feeling, however, does not exhaust the nature of an emotion. We must distinguish emotions, both in the sense of episodic emotions and dispositional emotions, from the

intentional feeling. I might, for example, dislike the taste of a particular food, but this experience remains at the level of the intentional feeling and does not rise to that of an emotional episode. But disliking the taste of a food I normally like, I might fear that the food is tainted and that I have been poisoned. The episode of fear (perhaps paranoia!) is more determinate in identifying the grounds for the dislike and in characterizing the situation in which the episode occurs. This episodic emotion, however, does not rise to the level of a dispositional emotion and must be distinguished therefrom. In an emotion like jealousy, for example, we can clearly distinguish the jealous disposition which leads one to interpret certain situations and actions in determinate ways from the particular episodes in which jealousy, as it were, rears its head and which generally involve intense feelings not proper to the disposition itself. Whereas the episode is just that—episodic and transitory—the emotion is complex, dynamic and enduring, involving many different episodes, periods of intensity and of dormancy, different perceptions, beliefs, images, and feelings (Goldie 2000, 12–13, 68–69).

Hence, the basic view—expanded and clarified—identifies (at least) five dimensions in the emotions:

- (1) the underlying presentation of the non-axiological properties of the thing or situation;
- (2) the sensuous, non-intentional feelings caused by the thing or situation;
- (3) the intentional feeling directed toward the value-attributes of the thing or situation;
- (4) in some cases, an “emotional episode” that
 - (a) intends the underlying properties of the thing or situation more determinately;
 - (b) intends the particular affective or evaluative attributes of the object or situation beyond its merely being likeable or dislikable, and

(c) also discloses something about ourselves; and

(5) again, in some cases, an emotion understood as a long-lasting state that disposes us toward certain affective understandings and motivates episodic emotions.

Moreover, insofar as intentional experience in general discloses things in their significance for us, we can say that the presentational significance disclosing the merely descriptive or non-axiological properties of the thing or situation grounds an additional meaning-aspect disclosing the affective or valuable characteristics of the thing or situation (Drummond 2002a, 17–20; 2002b, 175–89; 2004).⁶

We can illuminate this structure with an example. Suppose I am walking in my neighborhood. I turn a corner, hear a dog growling, and see a very large, powerful looking dog with its ears pulled back and its teeth bared charging toward me. That, of course, does not exhaust my “taking” of the situation. My immediate experience is fear of the dog, an experience that goes beyond merely what is seen and that turns out to be rather complex:

- (1) I see the charging dog with its ears pulled back and its teeth bared, and hear its growling (this is the presentational moment of the experience),
- (2) I feel my body tense up; in particular, I feel a tightening of muscles in the area of the stomach and neck (these are the bodily feelings),
- (3) I negatively value the situation in which I have found myself as bad (the intentional or apprehending feeling), and
- (4) I experience fear (the emotional episode) in response to the non-axiological features identified in (1).

The episodic emotion of fear is distinguished from the simple intentional feeling insofar as it intends in a more determinate way the affective aspect of the thing or situation intended; the fear of the dog, for example, apprehends the situation not merely as negative, as distressing and unlikable, but more specifically as dangerous. If, moreover, I am a fearful person, that is, a person with

(5) a disposition to fear dogs (the dispositional emotion), my negative reaction to the dog will be immediate and intensified. If, on the other hand, I am not a fearful person, I might more easily and quickly recognize, say, that the dog is chasing a squirrel rather than charging at me, and my fear will quickly pass. And if I am a dog trainer or dog handler or dog whisperer, I might not experience fear at all.

In the combination of unpleasant feelings and fear of the charging dog—as in all those cases wherein the pleasantness of the bodily feelings motivates a corresponding positive emotion and evaluation and the unpleasantness of the bodily feelings motivates a corresponding negative emotion and evaluation—the valences of the bodily feelings (painful or uncomfortable) and the intentional feeling (a negative evaluation of the situation) are the same. This reminds us that we must not too sharply separate the intentional feeling from the bodily feelings. Nevertheless, we must distinguish them. The bodily feelings are considered in two different relations, once in relation to the body and once in relation to the thing or situation. These feelings, in other words, are at work simultaneously in pre-reflective bodily self-awareness and in object-awareness. That is why we name them differently—pleasure or pain in the former relation and like or dislike of the thing or situation apprehended in the latter relation. The bodily feelings, then, are first of all pleasant or painful states of the organism. They also, however, turn our attention back toward

the thing or situation that causes them, motivating our apprehension of it as valuable or not on the basis of its non-axiological properties.

The intentional feeling, however—that is, our evaluative apprehension of things and situations—is not simply a function of bodily feelings. Our interests, concerns, cares, and commitments as well as inherited, cultural understandings of emotional and evaluative concepts play a role in determining our affective response to the thing or situation. Hence, it is possible that the bodily feelings and the intentional feeling might have different valences. For example, last summer in rehabilitating my surgically replaced knee and this summer in rehabilitating my surgically repaired shoulder, I experienced pain in response to exercises I was assigned to do and to certain movements and manipulations of my leg and shoulder by my physical therapist. Nevertheless and despite these painful bodily feelings, I positively appraised the manipulations and exercises insofar as they served the end of rehabilitation.

Similarly, we must not too sharply separate the intentional feeling from the emotional episode. This is the case because the valence of the intentional feeling and the emotion are the same. As we have seen in the example of the charging dog, the intentional feeling intends a thin axiological attribute (unpleasant and unlikable) whereas the episodic emotion intends a thick axiological attribute (dangerous). I do not merely dislike the displeasing situation, but I am fearful of the danger. Once again, however, we must maintain the distinction between the two, for the thin intentional feeling can be present while the thicker emotional episode is not. In the case of the physical therapy, for example, I have a positive apprehending feeling of my physical therapy. I appreciate it and approve my undergoing it. This feeling of approbation falls short, however, of taking joy in that therapy, although I might very well experience joy in its success.

3. *Feeling, emoting, and valuing.*

The claim here is that our affective experiences, which involve a range of responses extending from “thin” feelings to “thick” emotions, simply are valuations and that our valuations simply are our affective responses to non-axiological properties. Objections to this view challenge the equivalence between feeling or emotion and valuation. In particular, one might argue that so unified an account cannot do justice to the wide range of phenomena that we include under the heading of emotions. So, for example, one might argue while there are emotionally constituted values, there are also both (i) value-directed emotions where the value is not emotionally constituted and (ii) emotions without evaluative content.⁷

Take, for example, the case of fear and its correlate danger. The objection is that danger, which is the object of fear, is not constituted by fear. The concept of danger, in other words, does not entail that of fear, even though fear is always directed to danger. Suppose, the argument goes, that *S* is dangerous for *A* if and only if there is a significant probability of *A* coming to harm in or as a result of *S*. If that is true, then ‘dangerous’ is conceptually independent of ‘fear.’ That is, the applicability of the concept of danger is emotion-independent. However, this account of danger imports another evaluative concept in ‘harm,’ and it is impossible to explicate this concept apart from a reference to feeling, namely, pain or distress. If the harm is actual, then pain is felt; if the harm is probable—and the subject recognizes the harm is probable—then there is distress at the prospect of a physical or psychological harm and its accompanying pain. Incorporating the notion of harm into the definition of the value-concept ‘danger’ acknowledges this phenomenological point; it does not defeat it. This is not to say that I must experience a

feeling or emotion to understand the concept ‘danger.’ It is to say, however, that to understand the concept ‘danger’ is to understand that the dangerous is apprehended as dangerous in fear; it is to say, in other words, that actually to experience danger is to experience a feeling of a particular kind of distress at the presence of a set of non-axiological properties that could cause my physical or psychological harm, the kind of distress we call “fear.”

Let us reconsider the example of the charging dog. For me to apprehend the growling, charging dog with its ears pulled back and its teeth bared as probably harmful is to feel distress at the potential bodily injury and pain I might suffer; it is to feel fear. If you are on an apartment balcony overlooking the dog charging at me, you do not feel this distress, since the dog is not in a position to cause you bodily injury, and you do not evaluate the situation as dangerous for you. You might, however, experience fear *for me*. That is, you might be distressed for my sake at the prospect of my suffering physical injury. You might, in other words, experience an empathic fear, but this empathic fear has a different intentional structure: the charging dog is fearsome *to* me (I experience it as fearsome) as fearsome *for* me (the probable danger exists for me), whereas the charging dog for you on the balcony is fearsome to you as fearsome for me. Your fear for me involves the same kind of distress (although less intense) and empathically apprehends the situation as dangerous for me. In other cases, where there is a certain kind of attachment, say, familial, between the person towards whom the dog charges and the person on the balcony, the person on the balcony might experience the dog as fearsome for the person below and thereby as fearsome for me. So, for example, if I am on the balcony and the dog is charging my young child, I feel fear. I experience the dog as fearsome to me and fearsome for both my child and myself. In this case, the attachment of parent to child is such that any harm to the child is also

harm to my own well-being insofar as my special attachment to my child is threatened. But in any of these cases, my recognizing the fearsome and the danger it involves is accomplished only insofar as certain bodily and intentional feelings are motivated by the non-axiological features of the situation.⁸

Conversely, one might argue that there are instances of feeling or emotion that do not involve valuing. Supposing that one defines jealousy as a “particularly unpleasant feeling on the basis of a perception or belief concerning another person’s capacities relative to something wanted and as generating a desire that the other person lose that capacity.”⁹ I think this is an unsatisfactory account of jealousy. Indeed, in many ways it is closer to envy, since it involves only a two-person relation where *A* is envious of *B* because *B* has something (a capacity, possession, or the like) that *A* wants or thinks he or she deserves. Jealousy, on the other hand, is an even more complicated emotion involving four-terms: (i) the jealous person; (ii) the beloved; (iii) the affection of the beloved; and (iv) the rival (or suspected rival) for the beloved’s affection, which is usually a person but might be, say, a job. On this more complicated view, jealousy might involve anger both at the beloved (for his or her betrayal and abandonment) and the rival (for attracting the beloved’s affection), as well as fear at the loss of the beloved’s affection, and perhaps resignation or grief if the situation is thought to be beyond repair. On this view, then, jealousy clearly has an evaluative content: the beloved and the rival (if a person) are both negatively valued as having wronged the jealous person, the beloved is still positively valued in the love of the jealous person; the prospect of harm, i.e., loss of the beloved and his or her affection, is negatively valued, and so forth.

Let us consider the weaker definition, however. Even here, I claim, there is valuing at work in the jealousy. The desire that the rival lose the capacity relative to what the jealous person wants cannot but be motivated by a negative evaluation of the situation in which the rival has that capacity. This is precisely the work of the “unpleasant feeling.” This feeling does intentional work; it discloses the negative affective attributes belonging to the situation. To deny this is to fall back into a simple belief-desire account of jealousy that denies the intentionality of feeling. Such a denial makes incomprehensible the intensity of jealous episodes in which our “taking” of a harmless situation as one in which our beloved is engaged in acts of betrayal. Moreover, the denial of intentional work to the feelings makes incomprehensible the strength of the jealous person’s love for the beloved and his or her resolve to maintain his or her affection. In general, the denial of an intentional role to the feelings and emotions denies the role they play in focusing our attention on those features of the thing or situation that are evaluatively salient and in our registering these features with the “sort of resonance and importance that only emotional involvement can sustain” (Sherman 1991, 47).

The intentional or phenomenological connection between feeling or emotion and value is to be distinguished from the logical or conceptual connection between an emotion-concept and a value-concept. While it is true that the value of a thing or situation depends, at least in part, on the affective response of a subject, that does not entail that the value is to be defined *simply* in terms of feelings and emotions. The value is dependent upon both a constellation of non-axiological properties and the subject’s affective responses. While we value things or situations on the basis of recognizing particular non-axiological properties, the recognition of these non-axiological properties does not *necessitate* the valuation. The valuation also depends upon the

subject's past experiences and upon her particular beliefs and cultural inheritances, her dispositions, concerns, commitments, practical interests, and so forth. Different subjects, therefore, might experience the same non-axiological features without having the same affective response or without an affective response at all.

4. *Appropriate emotions and "truthful" valuations.*

The involvement of feelings within an emotional experience means that both the emotions and the valuations involved therein necessarily involve a first-person perspective. Fear of the charging dog cannot be understood apart from the fact that the situation is dangerous *to me* (even if not always *for me*) who experiences these feelings and this emotion. While Goldie recognizes that feeling towards "is part of one's consciousness of the world with which one is emotionally engaged" (Goldie 2000, 64), he claims that this is an "unreflective emotional engagement with the world beyond the body; it is not a consciousness of oneself, either of one's bodily condition or of oneself *as* experiencing an emotion" (Goldie 2002, 241). He distinguishes this unreflective object-directed consciousness from what he calls reflective consciousness, my "being aware that I feel afraid" (Goldie 2000, 64). Goldie's concern, I take it, is to stress the fact that our emotional encounters are often focused exclusively on the intended things or situation without any thematizing of our own condition. This is true. Nevertheless, in grasping the situation as dangerous, I feel the tensing of *my* muscles, and I am pre-reflectively and non-thematically aware of *my* fearing the dog. I am aware, in other words, of *my* fearing the dog without my attention being turned explicitly either to my bodily feelings or to my fear. Goldie is correct that we can be unreflectively engaged with the world without reflective self-awareness, but we

cannot be unreflectively engaged with the world without a pre-reflective awareness of that engagement (Drummond 2006). I cannot fear the dog without being pre-reflectively aware of *my fearing* it.

To say that an emotional experience is first-personal is also to say that it is related to a particular person with determinate instincts, interests, personal history, communal traditions and inheritances, and so forth. What is important here is both the individuality and the intersubjectivity involved in this first-personal relatedness. The manner in which I grasp a situation, the non-axiological and affective properties to which I direct my attention, depend in part on my instincts and interests and personal history. But this personal history is never just personal, and my grasp of the situation depends also on shared understandings of what affective responses are appropriate to particular non-axiological properties, that is, shared understandings of emotion-concepts and their related value-concepts. We are raised within familial, social, and cultural contexts, and these affect our manner of experiencing the world and our manner of thinking. Indeed, learning to experience correctly certain features of the world is tied to learning what one's culture considers appropriate emotional responses to those same features (Goldie 2000, 30–31). In learning about the world, I learn which situations merit fear and which do not, which situations merit anger and which do not, which situations merit compassion and which do not, and so forth. I thereby become habituated to have certain emotions upon encountering certain objects or situations. These emotional states shape new encounters we have and inform our experiences such that we immediately recognize what is evaluatively salient in an object or situation. When I round that corner and encounter the dog in its agitated state, I immediately experience fear and recognize the danger. But I not only *do* fear the dog in its agitated state, I

ought to recognize the danger and experience fear. If I do not, I am impervious to the “true” character of the situation (Goldie 2000, 30–31).

Despite the first-personality of the emotions and their partial grounding in the subject’s instincts and interests, there is a “truth” to our affective “takings” of the world—our *Wertnehmungen*—and our judgments of value just as there is a veridicality to perception and a truth of cognitive judgments. How is it that I recognize that the emotion I experience does or does not satisfy the norm for a particular emotion? What are the grounds *in the lived experience itself* for distinguishing between warranted and unwarranted responses? Or, to put the matter differently, what constitutes the “truthfulness” of the emotions? Following Husserl ([1952, 9] 1989, 10), I want to suggest that there is a special kind of evidence that confirms the “truthfulness” or “rationality” or “appropriateness” of our emotional experiences. However, we must distinguish two senses of “evidence.” The first is the ordinary sense of a datum that counts for a belief and thus provides a reason for accepting that belief as true. The second, more fundamental sense is the intentional experience that takes something *as* such a datum. This means that evidential experiences are always paired with mere intendings, say, judging (without evidence) that *S* is *p*. The evidencing experience then intuitively grasps in a modification of the simple perception of *S* as *p* the fact that *S* is actually *p* and thereby confirms the judgment, or it directly grasps in a modification of the simple perception of *S* as *r* that *S* is, in fact, *r*—a disconfirming experience for the merely intended judgment *S* is *p*. In the case of emotional experiences, the case is similar. An emotive evidence directly grasps that *S* is actually, say, fearsome and dangerous or not. The direct experience confirms or disconfirms the non-intuitive judgment regarding the affective property of the object.

Insofar as emotional experiences involve presentational and affective moments, we must in considering the “evidence” for the “truthfulness,” “rationality” or “appropriateness” of our emotional responses consider not only the presentational dimension but the affective. In confirming our emotional experiences, we evidentially encounter at the presentational level the veridicality of our grasp of the thing’s non-axiological properties or the truth of the judgments underlying the emotion, and we evidentially experience at the affective level the appropriateness of our emotional grasp of the thing’s affective properties. The feeling or emotional episode, in other words, along with the evaluative experience that it is, can go wrong in two ways. First, the underlying presentation can be false or unjustified. For example, I might discover that the person at whom I am angry for misleading me did not, in fact, mislead me. I might then, in a moment of reflection, feel remorse or shame for my original anger. The normative character of certain emotional responses is revealed in these critical reflections upon our emotional experiences and our intersubjective working out of what emotions are appropriate for what circumstances.¹⁰

There are also instances, however, when the underlying presentation is true and justified and the emotion is nevertheless unjustified and inappropriate. This inappropriate affective response will sometimes be corrected in a way that is similar to the correction of cognitive mistakes. The affective response might change over time as, for example, I learn better what constitutes rude behavior or when someone disagrees with my assessment of a thing or a situation. This introduces discordance into the stream of evaluative experience and motivates a critical reflection that appeals both to the particulars of the circumstances and to our intersubjective understanding of evaluative concepts and their relation to non-axiological properties.

In other cases, however, this kind of critical reflection might be both insufficient and beside the point. Someone might, for example, have an inordinate fear of heights and refuse to go out on an observation deck she knows to be safe. She truly and justifiably grasps the non-axiological features of the situation and knows it is most unlikely that she will fall, but she nevertheless fears to go out on the deck. This fear might, in one respect, be perfectly intelligible. She might have previously fallen from a height and suffered severe injuries. Nevertheless, she herself might in this case recognize that her fear is unjustified and inappropriate. She perfectly well understands the concept of danger and accurately sizes up the situation as safe but continues to experience fear. It is, therefore, neither the cognitive dimension nor reflection on one's feelings that accounts for the inappropriateness of her episodic emotion. It is the affective dimension itself, and she intuitively grasps this inappropriateness in a moment of pre-reflective self-awareness that has its own affective and evaluative moment. In fearing to go out on the observation deck, she is pre-reflectively aware of herself as experiencing fear. In having and recognizing this emotional reaction, she is, say, embarrassed by her fear. Her embarrassment is a negative appraisal of that fear, and it highlights the fact that one aspect of her knowledge of the situation—that is, that the observation deck is safe—fails to justify her fear even as another aspect of her knowledge—that is, that the observation deck is high—motivates it. The normal concurrence of motivation and justification has been severed. Nevertheless, her intuitive, affective self-awareness discloses the underlying emotional episode as inappropriate.

If, therefore,

- (1) *E* is an intentional feeling or episodic emotion whose base *p* is either a perceptual (or memorial or imaginative) or judgmental presentation of an object or situation *O* and its non-axiological properties *x*, *y*, and *z*,

and

- (2) “justification” in this context means prima facie, non-inferential, and defeasible justification,

then,

- (3) *E* is appropriate to *O* and its non-axiological properties *x*, *y*, and *z* if and only if
- (a) *p* is a veridical or true presentation of *O* and of its properties *x*, *y*, and *z*, and
 - (b) *p* is justified, and
 - (c) *p* is a (motivating and evidentiary) reason for *E*, and
 - (d) *F*, a (pre-reflectively or reflectively) self-assessing feeling or emotion (such as approbation or pride) positively appraises and justifies *E*, and
 - (e) no relation of justification mentioned is defeated.¹¹

Conditions (3a) and (3b) jointly address the truth of the underlying presentational or informational content, ensuring that *p* is both true and justified. To say that *p* or any presentational content is justified means that it is directly presented to consciousness in a perception—a seeing of *O* as *x*—or a categorial modification of perception—a seeing that *O* is *x*. Conditions (3c) and (3d) jointly address the correctness of the affective response. Condition (3c) involves our (shared) understanding of evaluative concepts and their basis in non-axiological properties, and condition (3d) brings into play the self-assessing emotions that justify the affective dimension of the object-

directed feeling or emotional episode. To have an appropriate emotion is to have this structure of justification.

In summary, we can identify three points where reason—understood in the broad, Husserlian sense as the achievement of evidencing experiences—enters our experience of the emotions. Reason enters, first, in confirming the presentational content of the emotional experience; we evidentially experience the veridicality of the presentations or beliefs underlying the affective response. Reason enters, second, in our evidentially experiencing the fitness of the emotional condition experienced to the underlying descriptive properties. This experience of fitness is, as we have seen, related to the context in which we experience the value and to the education of the emotions handed down to us by the traditions in which we were raised. Reason enters for a third time in our evidentially experiencing our own emotional condition in a feeling of approbation or disapprobation.

I have suggested earlier that the emotions disclose not only the axiological sense and value-attributes of things and situations but also something about ourselves. Our emotive apprehension of things and situations involves a pre-reflective self-awareness in which the subject is aware of its own emotional state and of its appropriateness or justification. Error, as we have discussed, can arise in the object-directedness of the emotion either because the underlying cognitive presentation is false or because the feeling or emotion is inappropriate. However, precisely because we are pre-reflectively self-aware, we are also susceptible to (and, in some cases, prone to) self-deception. This self-deception can again take two forms (Roberts 2003, 317). First, I can be mistaken about the object of the emotion. For example, I might feel angry at my son for wrecking our car, but I am really angry at my wife for letting him use the car. Second, I might be

mistaken about the emotion I am feeling. I might, for example, feel compassion for a fired colleague, when I am actually relieved that my job will be less in danger. These kinds of self-deceptive errors, however, are the topic of another paper. It has been the purpose of this paper solely to provide a descriptive account of our “takings” in which we take things to be truly valuable.

NOTES

1. Husserl (1988) uses the term *wertnehmen* to name what some, in a play on “perception,” translate as “value-ception.” This translation suggests passivity—a reception—in the experience of value, and is perhaps more representative of the views of Max Scheler ([1913–16] 1973). The emphasis on “taking” suggests a greater role for background beliefs, interests, commitments and the like that enable the “perceiver” to pick out what is salient in the thing or situation. Hence, the language of “taking” suggests a greater degree of activity on the part of the subject in those experiences wherein we “perceive” things as valuable.
2. I use the term “phenomenology” in the sense derived from Husserl. “Phenomenology” is also used in a narrower sense in contemporary philosophy of mind to denote the study of the subjective, introspectively available features—the “what-it’s-like”—of mental states. I have argued elsewhere (Drummond 2008b) that this narrower sense of “phenomenology” cannot stand alone in the moral sphere, although I also think the argument is generalizable to all spheres of experience (cf. Horgan and Tienson 2002). Phenomenology (in the narrow sense), in other words, entails intentionality; phenomenology must be understood in the broader, Husserlian sense.
3. By “naturalism” I mean the view that claims that the world is, and is nothing more than, the world as described by the physical and biological sciences.
4. Where two references to Husserl’s work are found and one is in square brackets, the reference in brackets is to the German text and the second reference is to the English translation; where only one reference occurs, it is to an untranslated German text.
5. Although more complicated cases wherein the feeling or emotion is rooted in another axiological property are also possible, these in turn will point back to simpler apprehensions of an object’s or situation’s non-axiological properties.
6. For Husserl, a presentation can be a complete experience—a perception or a judgment—that presents the object in a determinate manner, that is, with a particular set of descriptive properties. Husserl calls such experiences “objectifying acts” (Husserl 1984, 500–501 [1970, 639]). But the term “presentation” can also refer more narrowly to the content or “matter” of an experience that accounts for the object being presented in a determinate manner by that experience (Husserl 1984, 474–76, 514 [1970, 620–21, 648]).

The significance of this narrower sense of “presentation” is that experiences that are not themselves objectifying acts must be founded not on another act, but on a matter—a presentational or descriptive content—of the sort that belongs to an objectifying act. Put another way, then, the foundational claim states that any act founded on a presentation comprises a matter identical to that of the objectifying intention that presents the merely descriptive features of the object in just that determinate manner present in the founded act as well. Since in Husserl’s later, explicitly transcendental philosophy, the “matter” of a presentation becomes the “sense” belonging to the intentional correlate of the experience (Husserl 1976, 298 [1983, 310]), we can state the claim as it appears in the main text.

7. Professor Neil Roughley of Duisburg-Essen University has pressed this and the following objections upon me in comments on an earlier version of this paper delivered at the September 2009 meeting of the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für phänomenologische Forschung* and in private, written communications.

8. There are interesting discussions of fear in relation to this point in Nussbaum 2001, 28–33 and Tappolet 2009, 341–42.

9. This is Roughley’s definition.

10. I have elsewhere suggested, but did not develop, this idea of axiological intuitions as complex experiences involving both cognitive and emotional legitimation and as confirming value-judgments in the moral sphere; cf. Drummond 2002a, 40; an earlier statement of the idea can be found in Drummond 2002b, 184–86.

11. This modifies a position taken by Mulligan (1998).

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