The Intentional Structure of Emotions

The correlational character of many of the terms used to name and describe the emotions and the circumstances in which they are experienced reveals much that is important about their intentional structure. What I have in mind are terms like "joyful" and "joyous." The analogy is with "poisoned" and "poisonous" or "nauseated" and "nauseous." The first word in each of these pairs points toward the subject in which a certain effect or state comes about, and the second word in each pair refers to that which contributes to bringing about that effect or state. A poisonous serum makes the person receiving the serum poisoned; a nauseous or nauseating meal makes the person eating the meal nauseated. This is the sense in which I am understanding the relation between the "joyful" and the "joyous." Of course, both these words can be and sometimes are used with either of the meanings I am about to identify, but I will stipulate my understanding for the purposes of this paper. "Joyful" refers to the subject experiencing an episodic emotion or emotional state of joy, and "joyous" refers to those states of affairs or events that contribute to bringing about that experience.

Not every emotion involves just these suffixes. We might think, for example, of the fearful and the fearsome, wonder and the wondrous, or the indignant and the unjust. But the structure, I suggest, is the same: there is an emotion-experiencing subject encountering a situation as affectively charged, as both motivating and correlated with the emotion — the joyful subject experiencing an event as joyous, or the fearful subject experiencing a situation as fearsome, or the person full of wonder experiencing the wondrous, or the indignant subject experiencing a situation as unjust. In all these cases there are "facts of the case" in terms of which we understand what about the situation motivates the emotion and why these emotional responses are appropriate or not. There is on the part of the subject a blending of presentation and affective response such that we encounter a situation as having both non-axiological properties and axiological attributes. There is, in other words, a complex intentionality that discloses a worldly

situation as affectively charged; the affective dimension does not belong exclusively to the subject. This invites reflection on the more general commonalities present in the intentional structures at work in the experiences to which we refer with paired terms of the sort found in these examples.

Before commencing this reflection I stipulate that these paired terms can be understood in causal terms. It is clear that causal mechanisms are at work in the emotions. The emotions include a set of bodily feelings, felt physiological reactions — the tightening of muscles in the area of the neck or abdomen, for example — that in part characterize the emotions. But the causal explanation of the bodily feelings involved in the emotions does not capture the intentionality of the emotional experience, and to provide a causal explanation is not my interest in this paper. These bodily feelings are pleasant or unpleasant states of the organism, but they also turn our attention back to the thing or situation causing them. In so doing they motivate our apprehension (the intentional feeling) of the thing or situation as valuable or disvaluable. The intentional feeling, however, is not simply a function of the bodily feelings, for one's interests, cares, and commitments, as well as inherited understandings of emotional and evaluative concepts, play a role in shaping the affective response to the thing or situation. My focus in this paper will not be on the emotions merely as passions, as effects of the world's working upon us. It will instead be on the intentionality of the emotions, on the experiencing agent's *sense* of the situation as joyous, fearsome, wondrous, unjust, and so forth. Since these are valuations, in accounting for the intentionality of the emotions we also account for the intentionality of evaluations, of things and situations as valued.

I

Brentano articulated a view of the emotions that set the framework within which many, but not all, phenomenologists have located their discussions. Brentano claims the feelings and emotions are founded on a "presentation":

> By presentation (*Vorstellung*) I do not mean that which is presented, but rather the act of presentation […] This act of presentation forms the foundation not merely

> of the act of judging, but also of desiring and of every other mental act. Nothing can be judged, desired, hoped or feared, unless one has a presentation of that thing […] [P]resentations are the foundation for the other mental phenomena. (Brentano 1874, 60–61)

Brentano here distinguishes three classes of mental phenomena: presentations, judgments, and emotions. Presentations are experiences that present an object to consciousness for affirmation or denial or for approbation or disapprobation. Presentations include perceptions (and imaginings and rememberings) presenting objects and predicative acts presenting states of affairs. Judgments, on the other hand, are the acceptance of what the perceptions and predicative acts present as veridical or non-veridical or as true or false. Emotions, finally, involve all the ways in which we may be attracted to or repelled by things. Hence, the class of emotions for Brentano includes — too generously, no doubt — not only those things ordinarily designated as feelings or emotions but also interests, wishes, desires, decisions, and intentions to act (Brentano 1874, 153).

Husserl adopts and adapts this Brentanian view. He states the claim both more economically and more tentatively: "Emotional acts (*Gemütsakte*) seem according to their essence to be founded acts, and, in fact, to be founded on intellective acts" (Husserl 1908–14, 252). By "intellective acts" Husserl means presentations or, as he comes to prefer calling them, "objectifying acts" (Husserl 1900-1901, 622, 639). Objectifying acts for Husserl include perceptions (and imaginings and rememberings) along with judgments (both entertained and asserted — a difference from Brentano — since for Husserl belief is the doxic modality of both perceptions and judgments). Husserl, like Brentano, is unclear about the scope of the emotions. On the one hand, he distinguishes axiological and practical reason (Husserl 1913, 350–51), and, given his view that intentional feelings and emotions are evaluative in character (Husserl 1908–14, 252–56),[1] one might infer that decisions and intentions to act do not belong to the

[1] I use the expression "intentional feelings and emotions" on the basis of Husserl's distinction between two senses of "feeling": feeling-sensations and intentional feelings (Husserl 1900–1901, 572–73). The former are sensory experiences, for example, feeling the muscles around the neck tighten when fearful, while the latter refer to something as their object and disclose that thing, broadly speaking, as likable or dislikable. Emotions, which are also intentional, differ from intentional feelings by virtue of a more highly determined presentational or cognitive content. I

emotions. On the other hand, when he speaks about ethics, he often runs together the axiological and the practical — easy enough to do given his subject matter (cf., e.g., Husserl 1908–14, 252), since action is ordered toward the good or apparent good. While my concern in the paper is not the extension of the term "emotions," I do note that Husserl's first instinct is the better one. It is wise to distinguish the emotive and the conative, for it is possible to experience an emotion and thereby to value something as good or bad without thereby having any inclination, desire, or will to pursue or avoid those things. I can and do, for example, value the study of physics, but I have no inclination — and certainly not the will — to pursue its study.

The two theses that intentional feelings and emotions are (1) founded on presentations and (2) are intentionally directed to the value-attributes of the presented objects make up what I shall call the priority of presentation claim (PPC). The founded experience is a *Wertnehmung* — a value-perception. The intentional content of the *Wertnehmung* can involve either an "affective-as" or a propositional content. I can fear the dog as dangerous or I can fear that the dog will bite me.

In this paper I shall consider the PPC along with two challenges to the PPC embedded in other claims about the intentionality of feelings and emotions and their relation to presentation: the equiprimordial claim (EC) and the priority of feeling claim (PFC). On the basis of this consideration I shall argue for a revised version of the priority of presentation claim (RPPC). In the next section I shall clarify features of the PPC in contrast with views that reduce the emotion to its cognitive content, and in the following two sections, I shall consider the objections of the EC and PFC.

II

The PPC, insofar as the feeling or emotion presupposes and unites with the presentational content, incorporates that presentational content into the emotions. It does not, however, entail a strongly cognitivist view of the sort found in, say, Martha Nussbaum. It is difficult to be precise

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can, for example, be vaguely distressed (an intentional feeling) while walking dark streets in a strange city, but then I notice someone following me and experience fear (an emotion).

about Nussbaum's view. She claims that emotions are "intelligent responses to the perception of value" (Nussbaum 2001, 1). This suggests both that the initial awareness of the value of the thing perceived occurs at the level of perception and that the emotion essentially involves perception and intelligence. She also claims, however, that an emotion, such as grief, "is identical with the acceptance of a proposition that is both evaluative and eudaimonistic, that is, concerned with one or more of the person's important goals and ends" (Nussbaum 2001, 41). In short, the emotion is "an evaluative appraisal of the world" (Nussbaum 2001, 125). This suggests that the original awareness of the object's value is not in perception but in the judgments that "are necessary for the emotion; […] constituent parts of what the emotion is; and […] sufficient for emotion, if they have the requisite eudaimonistic evaluative content" (Nussbaum 2001, 56–57). In neither case is there a mention of feelings in the description of the structure of the emotions.

While Nussbaum often uses the terms "perception" and "judgment" in stating her position, the focus of her view is propositional content. She assimilates perception to judgment in her view that the emotive appraisals of the world are "ways of seeing [that] will always involve some sort of combination or predication — usually of some thing or person with an idea of salience, urgency, or importance" (Nussbaum 2001, 125–26). She assumes that the perception of value has propositional content by virtue of its merely combining a perceived object with some value-attribute. Despite her recognition of the need for "a multifaceted notion of cognitive interpretation or seeing as" (Nussbaum 2001, 129), which is needed to explain emotions in animals, human infants, and young children, she fails to distinguish adequately — to translate the matter into phenomenological terms — mere combination or the hermeneutic "as" from predication or, as I prefer to call it, the apophantic "is" (cf. Heidegger 1927, 153). Thus what she sees as a difference in degree in the "level of articulateness and definiteness" of the propositional content (Nussbaum 2001, 128), I see as a difference in kind. The hermeneutic "as" (mere combination) is characterized by anticipatory, non-syntactical, but unarticulated categoriality, while the apophantic "is" (predication) is characterized by articulated, syntactical categoriality (Drummond 2003, 134–36).

In addition to these differences, the value of the thing to which the emotion is directed is experienced differently in perception and judgment. Even in beings capable of judgment, the

value of the thing perceived is enmeshed in a complex of valuations and volitions involved in our engagement with and in the world. The value-attribute's belonging to the object anticipates the possibility of predication, but such predication involves an essential change in our orientation to the object. Our attention must turn to it in a particular way in order to articulate the judgment, and in so doing we step back, at least to some extent, from the immediacy of engagement at work in the perception.

That Nussbaum does not mention feelings in defining the emotions should not be taken to mean that she ignores them. She recognizes an ambiguity in the term "feelings"; the term can refer to bodily states or to what she calls "feelings with rich intentional content." Nussbaum denies that bodily feelings and states define the emotions (Nussbaum 2001, 58), and she does so with good reason. It is clear that bodily feelings alone do not determine any particular episodic emotion, since different emotions can share the same bodily feelings. For example, in anger as well as fear the subject experiences the tightening of the muscles around the stomach and neck. Moreover, the range of bodily feelings, especially those involving visceral changes in the body, is narrower than the range of emotions. Nussbaum also claims, however, that the word "feeling" when used to refer to feelings with rich intentional content "does not contrast with our cognitive words 'perception' and 'judgment'" and is only a "terminological variant" of them (Nussbaum 2001, 60).[2] Nussbaum thereby denies any specific and essential role to feeling in the intentionality of the emotions. The emotions are *judgments* of value whose intentional content is exhausted by their eudaimonistic and evaluative cognitive content.

These features of Nussbaum's view can be seen in her discussion of compassion. Nussbaum puts it simply: "compassion is a painful emotion occasioned by the awareness of another person's undeserved misfortune" (Nussbaum 2001, 301). The more complete analysis identifies three cognitive elements characterizing compassion: "the judgment of *size* (a serious bad event has befallen someone); the judgment of *nondesert* (this person did not bring the suffering on himself

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[2] While Husserl's distinction between feeling-sensations and intentional feelings is similar to Nussbaum's distinction between bodily states and feelings rich with intentional content, Husserl does not assimilate intentional feelings to cognition. In his own words, he maintains a distinction between "objectifying acts" (perceptions and judgments) and non-objectifying acts (e.g., intentional feelings and emotions).

or herself); and the *eudaimonistic judgment* (this person, or creature, is a significant element in my scheme of goals and projects, an end whose good is to be promoted)" (Nussbaum 2001, 321). These three judgments are constituent parts of the emotion, and they are necessary and sufficient for it. While Nussbaum mentions the painful character of compassion, she claims that no particular painful bodily process or state is necessary for compassion, but if "pain" refers to a feeling with rich intentionality such that "the very character of this pain cannot be described without ascribing to it the intentionality embodied in the thought, then it is not clear after all that it is a separate element" (Nussbaum 2001, 326). In brief, compassion in particular and the emotions in general are defined by their cognitive content and to the extent that feeling enters into them, the intentional content of such feelings is nothing other than the cognitive content of the judgments making up the emotion. Feelings, even feelings with rich intentional content, have no specific and unique role to play in the intentionality of the emotions.

The PPC differs from Nussbaum's view on two points: (1) the emotional experience, as we have seen, need not rise to the level of judgment in the sense that its intentional content need not be a propositional content, and (2) the intentional directedness of the emotion is distributed between its presentational and affective moments. According to the PPC, the presentational and affective aspects of the experience have differentiated intentional roles. The founding presentation intends the non-axiological or natural properties of the thing, whereas the affective moment presents the specific axiological or value-attributes of the valued thing. Conversely, the thing and its non-axiological properties are the correlate of the presentational moment, and the axiological properties are the correlate of the feeling-moment. The emotional experience originally has the character of a perceptual experience broadly construed — a seeing-as or a seeing-that —although it can be transformed into a judgment by attending to the value-attribute and asserting it of the object having the non-axiological properties given in the presentation.

We can sharpen the contrast between Nussbaum's strong cognitivism and the PPC by considering Husserl's discussion of what he calls *Wertnehmung* — value-perception. A helpful clue to understanding the contrast is provided by the common root of the German terms

wahrnehmen and *wertnehmen* (Drummond 2009, 363).[3] *Wahrnehmen* — to perceive — is to apprehend in a manner that involves both sensation and belief and therein to take something as true. One "takes" *S* as *p* in a manner that involves the senses and incorporates the belief that *S* exists as *p*. *Wertnehmen* — to value — is to apprehend in a manner that involves both feelings and belief and thereby to take something as valuable. One "takes" *Sp* as *v* in a manner that involves feelings and incorporates the belief that *Sp* exists as *v*. The feelings involved in our taking something as valuable, feelings that can be most broadly characterized as pleasure and pain, can be considered in two relations, once as events or states in relation to the body (pleasure and pain) and once as affective in relation to the object (liking and disliking). Feelings taken in the second relation are intentional: I like *something* or I dislike *something*. The commonality of the root *nehmen* suggests that our "takings" must be broadly understood as experiences apprehending both the natural (non-axiological) properties of the things and situations experienced as well as their value-attributes.[4] We "take" *S as p* and we "take" *Sp as v* in pre-predicative experiences that ground the judgments in which we articulate the claim that *S is p* or *Sp is v*.

For an adherent of the PPC, the fact that the emotional experience has distinguishable moments with distinguishable intentional functions means that we can abstract from this concrete experience of the valued thing in such a way as to isolate its purely perceptual moment whose

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[3] Husserl (1913–25, 12) directly compares the two terms, and he uses the term *wertnehmen* to name what his translators call a "value-reception." Scheler (1913–16, 197) uses the same term, but his translators, in a more direct play on "perception," use "value-ception." Both translations suggests passivity — a reception — in the experience of value. The emphasis here on "taking" suggests a greater role for background beliefs, interests, commitments and the like that also inform and contribute to the "perceiver's" picking out what is salient in the thing or situation. Hence, the language of "taking" suggests a greater degree of activity on the part of the subject in those experiences wherein we "perceive" things as valuable.

[4] Husserl (1908–14, 255f.) speaks of the relation between "logical" predicates and axiological predicates that are, respectively, the intentional content of the perceiving and feeling dimensions of the evaluative experience. By "logical predicates" he means those features that are predicable of the object in a theoretical attitude that abstracts from what is subject-relative in the object, that is, from what is related to a subject's attitudes, interests, desires, cares, concerns, commitments, and goals.

correlate would be the perceived thing with only its non-axiological properties. This is the kind of abstraction that is made in — and indeed, required by — the move into the theoretical attitude characteristic of the natural sciences. It is precisely because the acts are layered that we can have the abstraction that we call the value-free perception of the thing. It is the possibility of such an abstraction that gives rise to the particular form of the founding relation found in the PPC, a relation between a founding presentational act and a founded feeling-act.

Even if one avoids reducing the intentionality of the emotions to their cognitive content and even if one recognizes that the value-free perception is an abstraction from concrete experience, there remains a twofold danger in this Brentanian-Husserlian formulation of the PPC. First, it allows itself to be understood as if one act — the emotional act — is piled on top of another act — the presenting act — and that there is no genuine unity in the emotional act. I see *x*; *x* affects me in a certain way, and I adopt an emotional attitude toward *x* that is somehow distinct from my seeing *x*. And this danger points toward the second: even if one avoids the temptation to read a temporal succession into the moments of the emotional act, the claim about the compounding of *acts* and the priority of the presenting *act* is in an important way counterintuitive. And for a phenomenologist a claim about acts that cannot be intuitively confirmed is a serious problem indeed.

III

The counterintuitive nature of the PPC is quickly revealed in the major objection to be raised against it: our experience from the beginning has an affective dimension, and this affective dimension is not experienced as something added onto the presentational. There are two versions of the objection. The first — the equiprimordial claim (EC) — asserts that the presentational and the affective are equiprimordial. We see this, for example, in Heidegger's claim that "attunement" (*Befindlichkeit*) and "understanding" (*Verstehen*) together — with equal primordiality — make up the "there" of *Dasein* (Heidegger 1927, 130). The term *Befindlichkeit*

refers to *Dasein*'s finding-itself-so in the world,[5] to *Dasein*'s being affectively oriented in the world such that certain things matter for *Dasein*'s being-in-the-world. *Befindlichkeit* is, in other words, an existential orientation toward the world in which certain features of things are salient just by virtue of things mattering to us in the ways that they do. Understanding, on the other hand, is a kind of uptake in which *Dasein* grasps the significance and salience of things in relation to the that-for-the-sake-of-which, in relation, that is, to *Dasein*'s project. This uptake arranges the possibilities for *Dasein*'s engagement in the world, which possibilities are opened (and closed) by *Befindlichkeit*'s disclosure of what matters.

Putting aside Heidegger's technical terminology, the EC's general view is that our experience of things is *from the beginning* mediated by affective and practical dimensions that (at least partially) determine the sense things have for us. In this the EC appears to contradict directly the PPC. What is interesting, then, is that this general view is, arguably, also held by Husserl, a supposed advocate of the PPC. To see this we need only consider Husserl's description of the natural attitude in *Ideas I*:

> This world is there for me not only as a world of mere things, but also *with the same immediacy* [my emphasis] as a *world of objects with values, a world of goods, a practical world*. Without further ado and just as with physical properties, I find the things before me endowed with value attributes such as beautiful and ugly, pleasant and unpleasant, agreeable and disagreeable, and the like. *Immediately* [my emphasis], things appear as objects of use, the "table" with its "books," the "drinking glass," the "vase," the "piano," etc. In addition, these attributes and practical characteristics belong *constitutively to the objects "on hand" as objects*, whether or not I attend to them and the objects. This is true, of course, not only for "mere things" but also for the humans and animals in my surroundings. They are my "friends" or "enemies," my "servants" or "superiors," "strangers" or "relatives," etc. (Husserl 1913, 53; translation modified)

Similarly, in *Ideas II*, Husserl speaks of

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[5] Haugeland (2000, 52) translates *Befindlichkeit* — idiosyncratically, but with a point — as "sofindingness."

> the *personalistic attitude*, the attitude we are always in when we live with one another, talk to one another, shake hands with one another, or are related to one another in love and aversion, in disposition and action, in discourse and discussion. Likewise we are in this attitude when we regard the things surrounding us precisely as our surroundings and not as "objective" nature as we do in natural science […]As a researcher the [naturalistic psychologist] sees only "nature." As a person, however, he lives like any other person and "knows" that he is always the subject of his *surrounding world* […] The naturalistic attitude is subordinate to the personalistic, and […] the former acquires a certain autonomy by means of an abstraction or, rather, by means of a kind of self-forgetfulness of the personal ego. (Husserl 1912–25, 192–93; translation modified)

Husserl's claim is not the weaker claim that the things we experience are sometimes affectively and volitionally charged. He claims that this is universally the case: "Everything that is touches our feelings; every existent is apperceived in a value-apperception and thereby awakens desirous attitudes (*begehrende Stellungnahmen*)" (Husserl 1973, 404–5). And he emphasizes in an early, unpublished manuscript that this is the *original* mode of experience: "Mere sensation-data and, at a higher level, sensory objects, as things that are there for a subject, but there as value-free, are abstractions. There can be nothing that does not affect the emotions."[6]

So our question: can the EC and the central idea of the PPC be reconciled? I believe the answer is yes, but this requires a revision to the priority claim. The key is to understand the EC as a claim about the relation among different moments in our experienc*ing* of things and the revision of the PPC — the revised priority claim (RPPC) — as a claim about the relationship between different moments in the *sense* that the things experienc*ed* have for us. I take the RPPC to mean, then, that there are distinguishable layers within the *sense* of the object such that a

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[6] Ms. A VI 26, 42a. The text is difficult to date. Ullrich Melle, the Director of the Husserl-Archief in Leuven guesses, based on the content of the manuscript and the context of the folio in which it is found, that it is from the early 1920s. However, a brief note written on the back of the page suggests that it could have been written as early as 1918. But no certainty as to the date is possible. I thank Professor Melle for permission to quote the manuscript and for his assistance in dating it.

cognitive or "presentational" layer — the sense of *O* as having non-axiological or natural properties *x*, *y*, and *z* — founds axiological layers of sense — the sense of O_{xyz} as *v.* This is true even though the presenting and affective dimensions of the experienc*ing* of the object are equiprimordial. In the unified emotional and evaluative experience, the axiological sense presupposes, builds upon, and forms a unity with the non-axiological sense.

It is part of the sense of the RPPC that our *Wahrnehmung* and our *Wertnehmung* interpenetrate one another; they are not separate experiences of the object, one piled on top of the other. Our ordinary experience, as we have indicated, *from the beginning* encompasses both cognitive and affective moments. In an experience at once cognitive and affective, we immediately "take" the thing or situation as valuable by virtue of being such and such. Certain value-attributes and their related non-axiological properties stand out as salient in the light of the interests, cares, and commitments we bring to the experience and in the light of intersubjectively shared beliefs about the meaning of evaluative concepts and the appropriateness or inappropiateness of particular emotions in specific situations. But the unity found in the equiprimordiality of the cognitive and affective negates neither the distinction nor the founding relation between the non-axiological and axiological senses belonging to the thing experienced as valuable.

In brief, a single "taking" encompasses the *Wertnehmung* of the axiological attributes of the thing or situation as well as the *Wahrnehmung* of the thing or situation as possessing particular non-axiological properties that underlie, motivate, and justify our affective response to that thing. In such an experience, reason and feeling penetrate one another so as to produce an evaluation of the sort that Philippa Foot (cf., e.g., 2003, 24) suggests is a "matter of fact" commanding assent precisely to the extent that reasons can be given for it by way of identifying the particular non-axiological properties the thing or situation possesses and that found the axiological attributes of the thing. The axiological attributes are neither separate from nor reducible to the non-axiological properties in which they are rooted, but our feelings and emotions — precisely insofar as they are grounded on the cognized non-axiological properties — track these non-axiological properties. Conversely, the non-axiological properties provide reasons for the valuation accomplished in the affective response. The layering of sense — rather than acts, as claimed by the PPC — is

sufficient to enable the abstraction that we call value-free perception of the thing. In abstraction from the affective sense, we are left with a purely presentational sense, the kind of object appropriate to the purely presentative component of our concrete experience of an object.

Our full-bodied "takings" of things and of situations in intentional feelings and emotions — what Peter Goldie (2000, 19) calls "feelings-toward" an object or a "*thinking of* with feeling" — disclose the non-axiological and axiological sense of those things and situations. An intentional feeling discloses the object, broadly speaking, as likeable or not. The intentional feeling, however, does not exhaust the nature of an emotion. Emotions, both episodic and dispositional, must be distinguished from intentional feelings. I might, for example, dislike the taste of a particular food, but this experience remains at the level of an intentional feeling and does not rise to that of an episodic emotion. But disliking the taste of a food I normally like, I might fear that the food is tainted and that it might make me ill. This episode of fear — more precisely, the presentational content of the episode of fear, say, the unusually bitter taste of the food — is more determinate in cognitively characterizing the situation in which the episodic emotion arises and, thereby, in identifying the grounds for the fear. The episode of fear, however, is not yet a dispositional emotion, a state that disposes me toward having further episodes of that emotion. The dispositional emotion of jealousy, for example, motivates one to interpret certain situations and actions in determinate ways, and in these situations particular episodes of jealousy arise. The episodic jealous emotions generally involve intense feelings not proper to the disposition itself. Whereas the episode is just that — episodic and transitory — the dispositional emotion is complex, dynamic and enduring, involving many different episodes, periods of intensity and dormancy, and different underlying perceptions, beliefs, and images (Goldie 2000, 12–13, 68–69). Of course, one should be careful not to distinguish too sharply intentional feelings, episodic emotions, and dispositional emotions, for they easily blend into one another in the course of experience. What is true is that all involve an evaluation of a thing or situation on the basis of non-axiological properties that are more or less determinately presented in the affective experience itself.

To distinguish intentional feelings and episodic emotions from mere perceptions of exclusively non-axiological properties, while also recognizing the role that a subject's

experiential history, interests, cares, and commitments play in our experience, including our affective experience, we can consider Robert Roberts's proposal to understand intentional feelings and emotions as "concern-based construals" (Roberts 2003, 64). Roberts's position in certain respects echoes the PPC and RPPC. For example, one of the "facts" in Roberts's discussion of an example of getting angry — facts that frame his discussion of the emotions in general — is that his anger is *directed at* George, *on account of* his remark. The emotions, in other words, are intentional and they are grounded in certain features of the objects and the situations in which the emotions arise (Roberts 2003, 61). Moreover, the emotions might have propositional content, even when not all of that content is believed by the subject of the emotion, whereas in other cases, some of the content might be non-propositional. Indeed, according to Roberts (2003, 62–63), there are cases where the content is partly non-propositional and partly propositional.

The distinctions in content to which Roberts is pointing slice along a different joint than the distinction between *Wertnehmungen* and judgments of value that I have made above. Nevertheless, his account does leave room for a consideration of the "perceptual" character of the emotions as is found in our description of *Wertnehmungen*. The emotions have an immediacy like that found in sense perception (Roberts 2003, 75), although they are not mere sense perceptions. They integrate a variety of elements and are highly dependent upon features of the subject. Their situational and composite character recalls, in phenomenological terms, the manner in which experiences have "horizons" that are a function not only of the object that is immediately given but also of its surroundings, the context in which it is experienced, and the experiential history of the subject along with the subject's interests, cares, concerns, and commitments. So, Roberts's claims about the intentionality of the feelings and emotions reinforce both the EC in relation to the experiencing of the emotion and the RPPC in relation to the sense of the object, and it further manifests their compatibility.

On Roberts's view, however, many, but not all, emotions are "motivational in the sense that they involve a desire to perform characteristic types of action" (Roberts 2003, 63). I have suggested, on the contrary, that the emotive and the conative ought to be kept apart. While I agree that an emotion and the evaluation it embodies *can* ground a desire to act (or not act), I do

not infer from that fact that the motivation is part of the sense of the emotion. The relation between the emotion and the desire (and its consequent action) is an extension of the founding relation that obtains between the presentation and the feeling or emotion.

Furthermore, it is hard to know how precisely to understand the expression "characteristic types of action." Roberts, for example, sees fear as directed toward "an aversive possibility of a significant degree of probability," the consequence of which is a desire (and possibly an action) to avoid this possibility or its aversive consequences (Roberts 2003, 195). Even insisting on the separation of the affective and the conative, we can allow that ordinarily the desire for the avoidance of the aversive possibility is motivated by the fear. But what is the characteristic type of action the desire for which is here motivated? Flight, fighting or resistance, freezing in fright? Is fighting against a threat to my well-being or that of loved ones an avoidance of the aversive possibility? Or is it a resistance to it? Is resistance, which seems to step directly into the danger, an instance of avoidance? The possibilities for the actions motivated by any particular intentional feeling or emotion are too broad to be so easily characterized. The important point, however, is that it is not necessary to characterize the possible responses to fear in order to understand that fear is an often intense feeling of distress in the face of danger or an aversive possibility, that is, in the face of something that would threaten to harm an element of my well-being (including harm to those who are dear to me in various ways). My understanding of fear is not dependent upon my understanding what I might do in response to such a danger or aversive possibility.

The detailed descriptions of Goldie and Roberts, despite any disagreements I might have with them, lend credence to the claim that the EC with respect to our experiencing an intentional feeling or emotion and the RPPC with respect to the sense of the things and situations experienced affectively are compatible. In the correlational terms with which I introduced this paper, let us consider the example of joy. Joy in general is the emotion evoked by the anticipated or realized well-being, success, good fortune, or the like of oneself or another to whom one is close. This definition, we should note, identifies that which affects the joyful one — well-being, success, good fortune — in terms that already involve an evaluation. This suggests that the equiprimordiality thesis could, in opposition to the revised priority claim, also be understood as a claim about the equiprimordiality of the presentational and affective senses. This seems

especially the case in dispositional emotions that affectively shape our cognition of things. The jealous husband, for example, sees ordinary behaviors — say, his spouse getting home late — as evidence of the betrayal of his love. But this evaluative way of seeing itself presupposes a set of beliefs about the spouse that are not themselves axiological. The dispositionally jealous husband, for example, believes, or merely suspects, that some third party — a co-worker, perhaps — is involved in a way that threatens his love for his wife and that his wife is acting in ways that reciprocate this co-worker's interest. The truth of the beliefs is not what is at issue; what is at issue is the fact of the beliefs underlying the affectively charged ways of interpreting the non-axiological features of events and situations subsequent to the formation of the disposition.

In the case of joy, insofar as its motivating sense includes the notions of well-being, success, or good fortune of oneself or another to whom one is close, it is important to note that these evaluative concepts are, in turn, motivated and justified by non-axiological features. So, for example, consider a father attending the graduation of his daughter from college. The situation is joyous; there are features in the situation that produce joy in the father. He experiences feelings of pleasure and takes the facts of the situation to be affectively charged. Graduating from college is a certain kind of success that means that one has performed well in college. But the evaluations involved in experiencing joy at his daughter's success and in the notion of performing well in college are themselves motivated by non-axiological considerations: the young woman is his daughter; she has earned a sufficient number of credits with an excellent grade point average sufficient for the awarding of honors; she has completed all the requirements of the University's degree program, and this completion has been certified by the faculty; she wears her cap and gown and is called to the stage to receive her diploma and have her accomplishment recognized. These non-axiological facts of the situation motivate both the evaluation of her daughter's academic career as successful and the father's joy; they make him joyful. The non-axiological features provide reasons the evaluations involved in the joy, and assuming the relevance of the factual circumstances to the affect, they also motivate and justify that joy. None of this, of course, is to deny that the father experiences other emotions at the same time: excitement at the coming events, pride in his daughter's achievements, and so forth. But it does reveal the manner in which the sense-structure indicated by the RPPC is at work in the emotions.

Consider a second example. Imagine a child walking through a neighborhood who turns a corner only to find a Doberman Pinscher in front of her. The dog pulls back its ears, bares its teeth, and growls. In a single, complex experience the child sees and hears the dog, feels the tensing of her muscles, is distressed, negatively values what produces this affect, and fears the dog as dangerous. The presentational content along with the (unpleasant) tensing of the muscles underlies the distress, the child's negative evaluation of the situation. This distress is intentional; it discloses the situation as negative, as dangerous. The presentation of the dog with its ears back, teeth bared, and growling involves the realization that the dog is capable of harming something the child who encounters the dog takes to be an ingredient of her well-being, namely, her physical well-being. On the ground of the presented non-axiological properties of the dog, the child immediately experiences the dog as fearsome. To put it in the terms of the RPPC claim: she immediately fears the dog as dangerous on the grounds of its pulled-back ears, its bared teeth, and its growling along with here awareness of the fact that the dog can harm her.

IV

I take it, then, that the equiprimordiality claim and the revised priority claim can be reconciled. There is, however, a second — and stronger — version of the objection to the priority claim, an objection that would argue even against this revised priority claim. This version reverses the priority. I call it the priority of feeling claim (PFC). The PFC grants priority to the affective, a grant which presupposes the independence of the affective from the presentational. Scheler provides an example of this version of the objection. Following Augustine and Pascal, he affirms the independence of intentional feelings and emotions from the cognitive (Scheler 1913–16, 64, 254), and he claims that "feeling *originally* intends its *own* kind of objects, namely '*values*'" (Scheler 1913–16, 258; cf. also 259). This view entails the possibility of an emotional apprehension of the value apart from the experience of particular features of the experienced object. As Scheler puts it:

> We know of a stage in the grasping of values wherein the *value* of an object is already very clearly and evidentially given *apart from* the givenness of the *bearer*

> of the value. Thus, for example, a man can be distressing and repugnant, agreeable, or sympathetic to us without our being able to indicate *how* this comes about; in like manner we can for the longest time consider a poem or another work of art "beautiful" or "ugly," "distinguished" or "common," without knowing in the least which properties of the contents of the work prompt this. Again, a landscape or a room in a house can appear "friendly" or "distressing," and the same holds for a sojourn in a room, without our knowing the *bearers* of such values […] Clearly, neither the experience of values nor the degree of the adequation and the evidence […] depends in any way on the experience of the bearer of the values. Further, the *meaning* of an object in regard to "what" it is (whether, for example, a man is more "poet" or "philosopher") may *fluctuate* to any degree *without* its *value* ever fluctuating. In such cases the extent to which values are, in their *being*, *independent* of their bearer clearly reveals itself. (Scheler 1913–16, 17–18)

Scheler makes two points here in support of the PFC: (1) the value is prior to the bearer with its properties; and (2) the value is independent of the bearer. The relevance of (1) to the PFC is obvious, but (2) also supports the PFC insofar as the independence of the value is what makes possible its givenness prior to that of the bearer. Both supports, however, are open to challenge.

Consider the first kind of example that Scheler mentions. Suppose you are at a reception. You see someone unknown to you enter the room, and you take an immediate dislike to the person for no apparent reason. This is a not uncommon experience, and it reinforces both the notion that our experience of things from the beginning has affective dimensions and — seemingly — the PFC. However, suppose also that someone who knows the person who entered the room and to whom you report your dislike presses you on your dislike and the fact that it is, in her eyes, unjustifiable. You begin to identify your reasons: "I don't know; there was just something about the way he walks and surveys the room — kind of haughty — and that ascot! It's all a bit much." Now this is precisely to appeal to non-axiological features of the situation as underlying the emotional response and its attendant evaluation.

Scheler's own text points to such considerations when he uses the examples of aesthetic attributes of a poem or work of art and says that our aesthetic judgement can stand for a long time without our "knowing in the least which properties of the contents of the work prompt this." The immediate emotional experience that seems to know nothing of the properties underlying the emotional response is simply a prompt to reflection, to thinking about what it is that brought about the particular response. The RPPC does not assert a temporal priority; it asserts a logical priority. The presentational sense is logically prior to, presupposed by, the affective sense with which it forms a unity. Scheler's examples do not so much support the PFC as point to the fact that in the original situation the presentational content is given in a highly indeterminate intention. In justifying our emotional response we, in part, determine the underlying presentational content that is the reason for the feeling or emotion and relevant to its justification.

An even more striking example, however, might better buttress the PFC. Consider an example of what Goldie refers to as "cognitively impenetrable emotions" (Goldie 2000, 74–76). Consider the case of a young boy walking in the woods. He trips on an exposed root, falls, accidentally disturbs a nest of bees, and is stung more than seventy times. Years later the now-grown man remains fearful of bees. If approached by a bee, he grows tense and anxious, and if there is a swarm of bees, his fright can grow into a mild panic. In either case, he still moves away when bees approach. It can appear to observers that his fear is out of proportion to the situation he faces when one or more bees approach. Indeed, this is how the situation appears even to him.

What makes the example forceful is that it reveals that it is possible to fear bees and yet not believe that the affective feature, say, dangerous, is ordinarily to be attributed to bees (Goldie 2000, 74). Even while fearing bees, in other words, he believes that he will not be harmed at the hands — or, rather, the stingers — of bees, except, perhaps, in special circumstances. His fear of bees is nevertheless intelligible insofar as it is motivated by past experience. When a bee approaches him, he does not need to remember that he was once stung more than seventy times in order for fear to arise in him. The sight of the bee passively re-collects that previous experience into the present and informs his present encounter of the bee. Upon seeing the bee, the vivid painfulness of the retained and re-collected experience affects him anew and motivates in the present the bodily feelings and emotion — that is, fear — appropriate to that earlier

experience. There are reasons, in other words, for his fear of bees, and these reasons coexist with true beliefs about the fact that bees are not normally dangerous. There is in this case neither false belief nor a conflict of beliefs. Hence, such an experience is not unintelligible, although everyone, even the fearful man, can recognize that his fear is, as Goldie puts it, "inappropriate or disproportionate" (Goldie 2000, 23, 74). It is in this sense that his present fear of the bee is impenetrable by his cognizing of the current situation. His fear, while intelligible in terms of his past experience, is nevertheless inappropriate or irrational given present circumstances. The inappropriateness of the emotion reflects the misfit between the underlying non-axiological properties of the situation and the experienced feelings and emotions. The historical reasons for the fear substitute for the true beliefs about the current situation in the motivation of the fear. Hence, the misfit involved in inappropriate emotions, however, itself lends further credence to the RPPC and its view of the founding relation between non-axiological properties and axiological attributes.

It is arguable that there are also emotions that are both irrational and unintelligible. Someone who has always experienced a fear of heights might lack any reasons in her life-narrative that would make intelligible that fear. It just so happens that she experiences fear whenever she is in a high place in which she can see below so as to gauge the height. Her fear is grounded solely in the non-axiological circumstance of her being in a high place. She might herself recognize the inappropriateness of her fear in the absence of a truly motivating reason, and we have, then, an even stronger example of a cognitively impenetrable emotion. But whether or not she recognizes the inappropriateness of the fear, others do. Any efforts to try to convince her of that inappropriateness would point to the kind of relevant non-axiological features, for example, the presence of safety railings on an observation deck, that reveal her fear as inappropriate. Our judgments about the rationality of emotions, their appropriateness or inappropriateness, depend on the fit between the underlying non-axiological circumstances and the affective response. They confirm, in other words, that the phenomenological structure of the emotion involves a founding relation between relevant non-axiological properties of a thing or situation and the axiological response asserts itself.

This leads our discussion to the second support that Scheler provides for the PFC: the independence of the value from the bearer of value. Recall the example from the quotation: the facts about whether a person is more a poet or a philosopher do not change the value attaching itself to that person. Scheler claims that this holds not only for persons but also for things and states of affairs. So, for example, he claims that distinguishing the value of wines "in *no* sense presupposes a knowledge of their composition, the origin of this or that grape, or the method of pressing" (Scheler 1913–16, 18). One could interpret this to mean that valuing the wines does not depend on the *determinate knowledge* of these features. If that were the case, the situation would be like that indicated in our discussion of taking immediate dislike to a person. Our indeterminate understanding of the features of the wine underlying our evaluation would be subject to further determination.

Scheler, however, emphasizes that valuing the wines "in *no* sense" presupposes a knowledge of relevant non-axiological features. If he means just the features he has named, that does not rule out that there are other relevant non-axiological properties that underlie my valuing. If he means the claim in the strongest possible sense, the claim is incomprehensible. I cannot value the wines simply by looking at unopened bottles of wine. I must taste them, and in so doing there are all sorts of non-axiological properties that come into play in my valuing. The wine has too much or not enough acidity; it is dry or sweet; the tannins are overpowering; the structure is complex, and so forth. The only value I can place on the unopened bottles is anticipatory or monetary. If the former, then the valuation depends on my ability to say something like "I have had this vintage from this vintner before, and it was excellent" or "This producer typically puts out good wines, and 2010 was a good year in the Rhône valley." If the latter, this too would depend on knowledge of the past history of the monetary value placed on the performance of the vintner, the vintage, and so forth.

Similar issues arise in the case of the poet-philosopher-person example. Scheler does not specify what value is in play here, so we must supply one for him. There are many possibilities, but we must limit ourselves to relevant ones. Certainly "handsome," for example, would remain the same whether the person was poet or philosopher, but there is no reason to attribute "handsomeness" to someone as a poet or philosopher. We need a value that makes sense of an

attribution to persons particularly as poets or philosophers in order to make sense of the point Scheler is making. An obvious candidate here is "good." On Scheler's view, then, we would have to say that the "good poet," the "good philosopher," and perhaps even the "good person" are all good in the same way. But this claim is obviously false.

The falsity of the claim comes into focus when we consider Peter Geach's distinction between logically predicative adjectives and logically attributive adjectives (Geach 1956, 33; cf. Williams 1993, 39; Drummond 2005). Consider the propositions 'Grass is green' and 'Knowledge is good.' In these examples, the adjective is grammatically predicative. We can complicate the model slightly and consider propositions naming both an individual and the class to which that individual belongs along with a "property" belonging to the individual. For example, consider 'Hecuba is a four-legged dog' and 'Aristotle is a good philosopher.' In these examples, the adjective is grammatically attributive. However, the apparent similarity in the use of the grammatically attributive adjectives masks an important logical difference.

From 'Hecuba is a four-legged dog,' I can validly conclude both 'Hecuba is a dog' and 'Hecuba is four-legged.' Moreover, given the additional proposition 'All dogs are animals,' I can correctly infer 'Hecuba is a four-legged animal.' The adjective "four-legged" is carried from the species to the genus in the inference; four-leggedness belongs to Hecuba both as dog and as animal. On the other hand, from 'Aristotle is a good philosopher,' I cannot validly conclude both 'Aristotle is a philosopher' and 'Aristotle is good.' Similarly, given the additional proposition 'All philosophers are persons,' I cannot correctly infer 'Aristotle is a good person.' The "value-predicate" cannot be transferred from 'philosopher' to 'person'; being good does not necessarily belong to Aristotle both as philosopher and as person (cf. Williams 1993, 38–47). From the logical point of view, then, according to Geach, those adjectives that name properties that can be predicated not only of different species and genera but that can be transferred from a single species to its genus are logically predicative. By contrast, those adjectives that name value attributes and that cannot be transferred from species to genus are logically attributive.

Non-axiological predicates that determine the sense of an object, whether grammatically predicative or attributive, for example, color-predicates, are logically predicative without regard to the kind of substantive they determine and without regard to the subject experiencing them.

While they might be limited in their literal application to a particular region of being, say, physical things, it is also true that within that region they are applicable to multiple genera and species. They are class terms that name a property-species, one that can be instantiated without equivocation in objects of different kinds. When, for example, the non-axiological determining adjective "green" is grammatically predicated of or attributed to an object, the object is thereby characterized as instantiating the property-species 'green,' a species that can be instantiated without equivocation in any kind of visually perceptible substance — in, say, both landscapes and houses.

Axiological, grammatically attributive adjectives, on the other hand, are related to their substantives in a different manner. They further determine the sense of an object only in relation to a particular kind. When the adjective "good" is used in relation to a house, it means one thing, and when it is used in relation to a person, it means another. There is no single property-species 'good' that is instantiated in both houses and persons. Logically attributive adjectives do not refer to instances of property-species; instead they attribute something to the object as an instance of a kind. That the logically attributive adjective does not name a property-species is the reason why inferences permissible with logically predicative adjectives are impermissible with logically attributive adjectives. This is why one cannot validly infer 'Aristotle is good' from 'Aristotle is a good philosopher,' and it why, when given the additional proposition 'All philosophers are persons,' one cannot correctly infer 'Aristotle is a good person.' Being good does not necessarily belong to Aristotle both as philosopher and as person (cf. Williams 1993, 38–47).

We can state the difference in the manner of presentation between properties named by logically predicative adjectives and the value-attributes named by logically attributive adjectives schematically: the presentation underlying the judgments '*X* is a *pY*' displays *X* (an object instantiating a kind and named by a substantive) as *p* (a property instantiating a property-species and named by a logically predicative adjective) for all *S* (that is, for all subjects). Since I can, for example, be interested solely in the perceptible property, I can attend to *pY* simply as *p* without attending to its being a *Y* (that is, I can perceive, say, a house simply as green without attending to its being a house). This underlies the logically predicative use of *p* and makes the inference to '*X* is *p*' possible.

By contrast, the evaluative experience in an intentional feeling or emotion underlying the judgment '*X* is a *vA*' displays *X* (an object instantiating a kind and named by a substantive) as *v* (valuable) in relation to *A* (a kind). I cannot, however, experience the *v* attributed to *A* without also experiencing it as an *A* (that is, as a kind); I can experience it only as a good instance of its species or as a good situation for someone starting a career, and so forth. This precludes the predication '*X* is *v*.'

This feature of logically attributive adjectives reveals the difficulty in Scheler's position. The difference between the logic of statements using logically attributive adjectives differs and the logic of statements using logically predicative adjectives points to the ontological difference between non-axiological (or natural) properties and value-attributes. The fact that value-attributes make sense only in relation to a kind underscores the RPPC claim that our evaluation of things is rooted in the non-axiological sense that belongs to the presentation of an instance of a particular kind. We can attribute *v* to *X* only to the extent that we are aware both of the descriptive properties of what is valued and of the kind it instantiates, that is, only to the extent that we are aware of *X* as an *A* and of *X* as *p*. We can say, for example, that Aristotle is a good philosopher only if we have general beliefs about what it is to be a philosopher and particular beliefs regarding Aristotle. Given the differences in our understandings of what it is to be a poet and what it is to be a philosopher and what it is to be a person, the catalog of particular properties Aristotle must have in order to be a good philosopher, a good poet, and a good person will differ. Hence, the value-attribute 'good' will not transfer if one is more a poet than a philosopher and will not transfer from being a good poet or philosopher to being a good person.

Finally, an additional point against Scheler's view is that when we want to revise someone's value-judgment, our task is to "evoke" a different sense of what is to be evaluated. We lead someone to "see" in their own experience the thing or situation in a new way. We conjure a new understanding, highlighting aspects previously absent from the other's view. Highlighting these aspects makes it possible for the other first to see and then to feel differently about the thing or situation. To be successful in this activity — to "persuade" the other person — we must evoke a different feeling grounded in a different seeing or a different imagining or a different understanding of the thing or situation in question. The other feels differently on the basis of this

new understanding; that is, the other now values the thing or situation differently on the ground of an altered cognition.

All these examples serve as a basis for rejecting the PFC in favor of the RPPC. The rootedness of an intentional feeling or emotion in certain descriptive properties and the correlation between the feeling or emotion and something's affective properties mean that at one and the same time I learn both certain features of the world and the appropriate emotional responses and evaluations (Goldie 2000, 30–31). I become habituated to have certain emotions upon encountering certain objects or situations. These habituated emotional states inform our experiences such that we immediately recognize what is evaluatively salient in the object or situation. On encountering certain objects or situations, I ought to recognize their salient features and experience a certain emotion. If I do not, I am impervious to the "true" character of the situation. In other words, the manner in which I am raised within my familial, social, and cultural contexts affects my manner of experiencing the world and my manner of thinking. My learning certain features of the world is tied to my learning what my culture considers appropriate emotional responses to those same features. In learning about the world, I learn which situations merit fear and which do not, which situations merit anger and which do not, which situations merit compassion and which do not, and so forth. This interplay between the non-axiological and the axiological and between their unity in an object and my affective experience is incorporated into my coming to an appropriate affective understanding of the world and my surroundings. And it is an interplay in which I see the foundational character, affirmed by the RPPC, of the experienced sense of things, a foundational character that in no way denies the complexity of our original experiences of things or the truth of the equiprimordiality claim with regard to the experiencing of things.

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