In contemporary consciousness studies, a central question concerns the nature
of the most primitive and fundamental features of phenomenal consciousness.
Some authors (e.g., Zahavi) have argued that for-me-ness (or minimal selfhood)
is a fundamental and necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness.
The concept of for-me-ness articulates that experiences are first-personally
manifest, i.e. they are always given to the subject of experience in a way in
which they are not given to anybody else. Several authors have challenged
this claim by presenting what they take to be counter examples, i.e. experiences,
which, in their view, lack for-me-ness, thereby seemingly rebutting the
claim that for-me-ness is a necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness.
In this study, (i) we present the account of for-me-ness, (ii) present three alleged
counter examples that come from the domains of psychopathology and
psychedelics, and (iii) critically discuss these examples and eventually refute
them all. Thus, we maintain that for-me-ness is a necessary, ineliminable feature
of phenomenal consciousness.