What do Weather Watchers See? Perceptual Intentionality and Agency

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearch

Standard

What do Weather Watchers See? Perceptual Intentionality and Agency. / Grünbaum, Thor; Overgaard, Søren.

In: Cognitive Semiotics, 2007, p. 8-31.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearch

Harvard

Grünbaum, T & Overgaard, S 2007, 'What do Weather Watchers See? Perceptual Intentionality and Agency', Cognitive Semiotics, pp. 8-31. <http://www.cognitivesemiotics.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/05/cognitive-semiotics-0.pdf>

APA

Grünbaum, T., & Overgaard, S. (2007). What do Weather Watchers See? Perceptual Intentionality and Agency. Cognitive Semiotics, 8-31. http://www.cognitivesemiotics.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/05/cognitive-semiotics-0.pdf

Vancouver

Grünbaum T, Overgaard S. What do Weather Watchers See? Perceptual Intentionality and Agency. Cognitive Semiotics. 2007;8-31.

Author

Grünbaum, Thor ; Overgaard, Søren. / What do Weather Watchers See? Perceptual Intentionality and Agency. In: Cognitive Semiotics. 2007 ; pp. 8-31.

Bibtex

@article{e974ef9077d011dcbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "What do Weather Watchers See?: Perceptual Intentionality and Agency",
abstract = "This paper defends a twofold thesis. First, contra Galen Strawson's recent claims, we argue that a subject's ability to perceive spatial objects essentially presupposes that the subject has an experience of her own voluntary movements. Second, we argue that while there is good reason to say that this subjective movement is a kind of agency, it would, pace certain other authors, be wrong to use the term {"}action{"} for it.",
keywords = "Faculty of Humanities, Galen Strawson, perception, kropsbev{\ae}gelse, Husserl, intentionel handling",
author = "Thor Gr{\"u}nbaum and S{\o}ren Overgaard",
year = "2007",
language = "English",
pages = "8--31",
journal = "Cognitive Semiotics",
issn = "1662-1425",
publisher = "Mouton de Gruyter",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - What do Weather Watchers See?

T2 - Perceptual Intentionality and Agency

AU - Grünbaum, Thor

AU - Overgaard, Søren

PY - 2007

Y1 - 2007

N2 - This paper defends a twofold thesis. First, contra Galen Strawson's recent claims, we argue that a subject's ability to perceive spatial objects essentially presupposes that the subject has an experience of her own voluntary movements. Second, we argue that while there is good reason to say that this subjective movement is a kind of agency, it would, pace certain other authors, be wrong to use the term "action" for it.

AB - This paper defends a twofold thesis. First, contra Galen Strawson's recent claims, we argue that a subject's ability to perceive spatial objects essentially presupposes that the subject has an experience of her own voluntary movements. Second, we argue that while there is good reason to say that this subjective movement is a kind of agency, it would, pace certain other authors, be wrong to use the term "action" for it.

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - Galen Strawson, perception, kropsbevægelse, Husserl, intentionel handling

M3 - Journal article

SP - 8

EP - 31

JO - Cognitive Semiotics

JF - Cognitive Semiotics

SN - 1662-1425

ER -

ID: 1268558