HUSSERL'S INTERSUBJECTIVE TRANSFORMATION
OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY

If one interprets transcendental subjectivity as an isolated ego and in the spirit of the Kantian tradition ignores the whole task of establishing a transcendental community of subjects, then every chance of reaching a transcendental self- and world-knowledge is lost. *Krisis (Ergänzung)*, 120.

A dominant trait in the philosophy of our century has been the critique of the philosophy of subjectivity. Among transcendental philosophers this critique has been taken into consideration most conspicuously by K.-O. Apel, who explicitly calls for an intersubjective transformation of transcendental philosophy. Not the single, isolated, self-aware ego, but language community, that is intersubjectivity, has to be regarded as the reality-constituting principle.

It is possible to find a similar interest in and treatment of intersubjectivity in Husserl. From the winter 1910/11 and until his death, he worked thoroughly with different aspects of the problem of intersubjectivity, and left behind an almost inestimable amount of analyses, that from a purely quantitative point of view by far exceeds the treatment given this topic by any of the later phenomenologists. In the following, I will try to provide a systematic outline of Husserl’s investigations, and at the same time argue that Husserl, whose position has often been regarded as solipsistic, was actually occupied with the elaboration of a transcendental theory of intersubjectivity.

I.

The easiest way to introduce Husserl’s analysis of intersubjectivity is through his concept of the *lifeworld*, since Husserl claims that it is intersubjective through and through. This is not merely to be understood as an accentuation of the fact that I, in my being in the world, am constantly confronted with intersubjective meaning, understood as meaning-formations (such as social institutions, cultural products etc.), which have their origin in community and tradition, and which therefore refer me to my fellowmen and ancestors. Husserl also advocates the more fundamental view, that already my perceptual experience is an experience of intersubjectively accessible being, that is being which does not exist for me only, but for everybody. I *experience* objects, events and actions as public, not as private, and consequently Husserl claims that an ontological analysis, insofar as it unveils the being-sense (*Seins Sinn*) of the world as intersubjectively valid, leads to a disclosure of the transcendental relevance of foreign subjectivity and thus to an examination of transcendental intersubjectivity; and as he ultimately formulates it: Transcendental intersubjectivity is the absolute ground of being (*Seinsboden*) from which the meaning and validity of everything objectively existing originate.

Thus, Husserl characterizes the intersubjective-transcendental sociality as the source of all real truth and being, and occasionally he even describes his own project as a *sociological* transcendental philosophy, and writes, that the development of phenomenology necessarily implies the step from an egological to a transcendental-sociological phenomenology. In other words, a radical implementation of the transcendental reduction leads with necessity to a disclosure of transcendental intersubjectivity.

Given this background, it is fairly easy to establish why Husserl occupied himself so intensively with the issue of intersubjectivity. He was convinced that it contained the key to a philosophical comprehension of reality, and since Husserl considered this problem, or more exactly, an account of the *constitution* of objective reality and transcendence, as one of the most important concerns of transcendental phenomenology, it should be obvious what kind of systematic importance his analyses of intersubjectivity possess, and how much is actually at stake. If transcendental phenomenology for some principal reasons were prevented from accounting for intersubjectivity (eventually due to its alleged methodical solipsism or subjective idealism) the consequence would not merely be its inability to carry out an ambitious and detailed investigation, but its failure as a fundamental philosophical project.

Husserl’s phenomenological investigation of intersubjectivity is an analysis of the *transcendental*, that is, constitutive function of intersubjectivity, and the aim of his reflections is exactly the formulation of a theory of transcendental intersubjectivity and not a detailed examination of the concrete sociality or the specific I-Thou relation. Thus, Husserl’s interest is directed towards *transcendental intersubjectivity*, and not...
towards mundane intersubjectivity, which for instance A. Schütz has analyzed in detail. This must be stressed, since most of the critical estimations of Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity have so far been focused on exactly those aspects. Thus, it has been customary to discuss either whether Husserl’s concept of empathy implies a direct or an indirect experience of the Other, and whether this account is phenomenologically sound; or whether Husserl’s (idealistic) model of constitution could at all establish a symmetrical relation between the I and the Other. A discussion, which was often quite inadequate, since one did not at the same time analyze the actual meaning of constitution, but simply presupposed a (faulty) interpretation of it.\textsuperscript{12}

It would be wrong to claim that these problems are completely irrelevant. Especially since Husserl’s concept of intersubjectivity is in fact a concept of inter-subjectivity, that is, of the relation between subjects, and consequently implies an examination of empathy: how can I experience another subject? According to the phenomenological approach intersubjectivity cannot be examined adequately from a 3. persons view, but must be analysed in its manifestation in the life of the individual subject. As Husserl writes in \textit{Krisis}: intersubjectivity can only be treated as a transcendental problem through a radical ‘mich-selbst-befragen’\textsuperscript{13}. Only my experience of and relation to another subject, and those of my experiences which presuppose the Other, really merit the name ‘intersubjective’.

The reason why it is still problematic to do what has most often been done, is that one confuses the way to and the aim of Husserl’s analysis of transcendental intersubjectivity. Furthermore, it will be shown that Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity is more complex than normally assumed. He operates with several kinds of intersubjectivity and is for that reason able to guard himself against the type of critique, which by questioning his account of the bodily mediated intersubjectivity assumed that the entire foundation of his analysis would break down.\textsuperscript{14}

The purpose of this article is not to deliver, once again, an analysis of the often discussed problems, but to demonstrate that Husserl’s phenomenology implies an intersubjective transformation of transcendental philosophy, and to present some of the more radical (and less well known) consequences of this transformation. For that reason I will not go into a more detailed account of Husserl’s analysis of the complex structure of the concrete bodily mediated experience of the Other, but simply assume that it exists one way or the other, and instead go directly to what I take to be the core in Husserl’s reflections on intersubjectivity.\textsuperscript{15}

It is well known that Husserl claimed that the objectivity and transcendence of the world is constituted intersubjectively and that a clarification of this constitution consequently demands an analysis of transcendental intersubjectivity, and more concretely an examination of my experience of another subject. Why is it, however, that a subject can only constitute objectivity after having experienced an Other? Why is the Other a necessary condition of possibility for my experience of an objective world; why is my experience of objects changed radically the moment I experience foreign subjectivity? Husserl’s thesis is that my experience of objective validity is made possible by my experience of the transcendence (and inaccessibility) of foreign subjectivity, and that this transcendence, which Husserl designates as the first real alterity and as the source of all kinds of real transcendence, endows the world with objective validity.\textsuperscript{16}

Here we have the only transcendence which is really worth its name, and anything else that is also called transcendent, as the objective world, depends upon the transcendence of foreign subjectivity.\textsuperscript{17}

The transcendence in which the world \textit{is} constituted consists of the following: It is constituted through the Others and the generatively constituted co-subjectivity.\textsuperscript{18}

All Objectivity, in this sense, is related back constitutionally to what does not belong to the Ego proper, to the other-than-my-Ego’s-own in the form, ‘someone else’ - that is to say: the non-Ego in the form, ‘another Ego’.\textsuperscript{19}

Why is foreign subjectivity so central a condition of possibility for the constitution of transcendent objects? Why are objects only able to appear as transcendent through the Other? The explanation is that the objects cannot be reduced to being merely my intentional correlates if they can be experienced by Others. The intersubjective experienceability of the object guarantees its real transcendence,\textsuperscript{20} and my experience (constitution) of it is consequently mediated by my experience of its givenness for another transcendent subject, that is, by my experience of a foreign world-directed subject. (It is exactly for that reason, that the Other’s transcendence is so vital. If the Other were only an intentional modification or an eidetic variation of myself, the fact that he experienced the same as me would be just as conclusive as if
one found the same report in several copies of the same newspaper). Only insofar as I experience that Others experience the same objects as myself, do I really experience these objects as objective and real. Only then do the objects appear with a validity, that makes them into more than mere intentional objects. Now they are real (that is objective, that is intersubjectively valid) intentional objects.  

Even if one is willing to concede that there is a connection between intersubjectivity and reality - which can be stated negatively in the following way: That which in principle is incapable of being experienced by Others cannot be ascribed transcendence and objectivity - there is, however, an unsolved problem. Under normal circumstances, I still experience that which I accidentally experience alone (for instance the IBM, that I am writing on now) as transcendent, objective and real, although I am not simultaneously experiencing that it is being experienced by Others. And this is even implicitly admitted by Husserl, who writes that, even if I knew with absolute certainty that a universal plague had destroyed all life but my own, my worldly experience would still be dependent upon co-functioning transcendental intersubjectivity.  

The problem can be solved, however, if one differentiates between our first primal experience of Others, which once and for all makes the constitution of objectivity, reality, and transcendence possible, and thus permanently transforms our categories of experience, and all subsequent experiences of Others. This does not mean that all these subsequent experiences are insignificant, but their contribution is of a different nature. They no longer make the constitution of the categories objectivity and transcendence possible, they fulfill them. To phrase it differently: although my solitary experience of the IBM is an experience of it as real and objective, these components of validity are at first only given signitively. Only the moment I experience that Others are also experiencing it, is the validity-claim of my experience fulfilled intuitively, that is, in essence.

As I have indicated, it is important that my experience of another subject is an experience of another experiencing subject, and Husserl even claims that the validity of the other subject's experience is accepted along with my experience of that subject. This can be illustrated by reference to Husserl's analysis of the body, since Husserl claims that the experience of another as incarnated subject is the first step towards the constitution of an objective (intersubjectively valid) shared world. The reason he gives is that my experience of something as the body of another must be accompanied by another's experience of the same as her own body. In the experience of the body of another, one is confronted with a congruity between one's own experience and the Other's experience, — a congruity, which according to Husserl is the foundation of every subsequent experience of intersubjective objects, that is objects which are also experienced (experienceable) by Others.

Husserl continues his analyses by describing a special kind of experience of the Other, namely those situations where I experience the Other as experiencing myself. This kind of 'original reciprocal co-existence' where I take over the Other's objectifying apprehension of myself, that is, where my self-apprehension is mediated by the Other, and where I experience myself as alien, is of decisive importance for the constitution of an objective world. When I realize that I can be an alter ego for the Other just as he can be it for me, a marked change in my own constitutive significance takes place. The absolute difference between self and Other disappears. The Other conceives of me as an Other, just as I conceive of him as a self. I realize, that I am only one among many, that my perspective on the world is only one among several, wherefore my privileged status in relation to the objects of experience is suspended to a certain degree. Whether I or an Other is the subject of experience makes no difference for the validity of that experience. As Waldenfels formulates it: the experience of the Other implies an alienation of one's own experience.

Husserl claims that my experiences are changed when I experience that Others experience the same as I, and when I experience that I myself am experienced by Others. From then on, my object of experience cannot any longer be reduced to its mere being-for-me. Through the Other, it has been constituted with a subject-transcendent validity. No longer do I experience it as being dependent upon me and my factual existence. Quite to the contrary, as an intersubjective object it is endowed with an autonomy of being that transcends my finite existence.

To summarize: Husserl claims that the sense and the categories transcendence, objectivity and reality are constituted intersubjectively. These categories can only be constituted by a subject that has experienced other subjects. Husserl also stresses, however, that the same is the case for the categories immanence, subjectivity and appearance. His line of thought is the following: when I realize that my object of experience can also be experienced by Others, I also realize that there is a difference between the thing in itself and its being for me. The same object can appear for different subjects, and when I realize this, I understand that what I earlier took to be the object itself, is in reality merely an appearance of something objectively (that is, intersubjectively) existing. Thus, it only makes sense to speak and designate something
as a mere appearance, as merely subjective, when I have experienced other subjects and thus acquired the concept of intersubjective validity.\textsuperscript{33}

The structures that have been emphasized so far (my experience of the world-directed transcendent foreign subject, and my experience of the Other’s experience of myself) take up a decisive place in Husserl’s account of the transcendental-constitutive function of intersubjectivity. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that Husserl understands intersubjectivity as something which is exclusively attached to concrete bodily mediated interaction. If this had been the case, it would have been easy to criticize him, by pointing to the fact that exactly this kind of experience seems to be both contingent and fallible - which Husserl himself occasionally admits\textsuperscript{34} - and exactly for that reason, not the best foundation for a transcendental philosophy.\textsuperscript{35} Husserl, however, does not operate with only one kind of transcendental intersubjectivity, which has been the common assumption, but with three different kinds. Apart from the kind which has already been described, he not only claims that the being of the subject as an experiencing and constituting subject implies a reference to other subjects, already prior to its concrete experience of them, that is a priori. He also claims that one should ascribe a constitutive function to the anonymous community, which manifests itself in our inherited linguistic normality (in our tradition).

To account in detail for the two last kinds of intersubjectivity would by far exceed the limits of this article, but let me briefly outline Husserl’s leading ideas.\textsuperscript{36} Concerning the first and most fundamental kind of intersubjectivity, Husserl writes that the analysis of the transcendental ego ultimately leads to a disclosure of its \textit{apodictic} intersubjective structure.\textsuperscript{37} Each and every one of my experiences does not only imply a reference to myself as experiencing subject, but also to the Others as co-subjects:\textsuperscript{38,39}

\begin{quote}
My experience as mundane experience (that is already each of my perceptions) does not only entail Others as mundane objects, but also and constantly in existential co-validity as co-subjects, as co-constituting, and both are inseparably intertwined.\textsuperscript{39}
\end{quote}

In order to understand this chain of reasoning, it is necessary to take a look at Husserl’s theory of perception.

Husserl claims that our perceptual experience of objects to a certain degree is an experience of an adumbration of the object, but that it is nevertheless true to say that we are intending and perceiving the object itself, which in its transcendence always possesses a plurality of (simultaneous) adumbrations. If one analyses this horizon of simultaneous co-existing adumbrations, it is revealed that they cannot be actualized by a single subject, since it at any given time is restricted to a single perspective. Since, however, the ontological structure of the object implies a simultaneous plurality of adumbrations, Husserl is forced to refer to a plurality of possible subjects, who are to be understood as the noetic correlate of the object’s noematic plurality of co-existing aspects. Provided that the subject as subject is directed towards objects, provided that every experience of objects is characterized by the horizontal appearance of the object, where a certain aspect is present and the others are absent, and provided that this horizontal intentionality, this interplay between presence and absence can only be accounted for phenomenologically through a reference to a plurality of possible subjects, the consequence is, that I in my being as subject is referred to Others, regardless of whether I experience them concretely or not, regardless of whether they actually exist or not. My intentionality is \textit{a priori} dependent upon something, which Husserl calls ‘open intersubjectivity’. Thus, in \textit{Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität II} he writes:

\begin{quote}
Thus everything objective that stands before me in experience and primarily in perception has an apperceptive horizon of possible experience, own and foreign. Ontologically speaking, every appearance that I have is from the very beginning a part of an open endless, but not explicitly realized totality of possible appearances of the same, and the subjectivity belonging to this appearance is open intersubjectivity.\textsuperscript{40}
\end{quote}

If these considerations are combined with Husserl’s account of the actual, \textit{horizontal}, experience of another bodily mediated subject, it is obvious that the a priori reference to the open intersubjectivity is already presupposed. Prior to my concrete encounter with the Other, intersubjectivity is already present as co-subjectivity, for which reason Husserl’s analysis of perceptual intentionality can be said to demonstrate the untenability of a solipsistic position. Perhaps Husserl was referring to this when he in the manuscript C 17 wrote: “When empathy occurs, is the community, the intersubjectivity there already in advance, and is empathy merely a disclosing performance?”\textsuperscript{41} This is a question which he answers positively shortly after.

So far we have been dealing with two types of intersubjectivity, and it is important to emphasize that the concrete experience of the Other, although it presupposes the intersubjectivity at work in horizontal
intentionality, is still transcendental, that is, constitutive. Thus, the concrete experience of the bodily Other is not a mere intra-mundane episode, since it is only here that I can experience the true alterity and transcendence of the Other, only here that I can take over his objectifying apprehension of myself, and according to Husserl, precisely these experiences are conditions of possibility for the constitution of objectivity.

Husserl, however, also operates with a third type of transcendental intersubjectivity, which is different in kind from the previous two, although it presupposes both. Thus, as I will show in more detail at the end of part II, Husserl also claims that certain types of self- and world-apprehension are only made possible by a linguistically sedimented and traditionally handed down normality. Thus, normality qua anonymous community possesses constitutive implications.

II.

So far it has been amply demonstrated that Husserl took intersubjectivity very seriously. Thus, when he claims that the subject can only be world-experiencing insofar as it is a member of a community, that the ego is only what it is as a socius, that is, as a member of a sociality, and that a radical self-reflection necessarily leads to the discovery of absolute intersubjectivity, the general line of thought has been indicated. In its being as experiencing and constituting, the subject is dependent upon intersubjectivity. That this is not only the case for the empirical, mundane subject has already been shown, and can be further confirmed by numerous passages in Husserl’s work. In Erste Philosophie II, for instance, he writes that transcendental subjectivity in its full universality is exactly inter-subjectivity, and in a research manuscript from 1927, which has been published in Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität I, Husserl writes that the absolute reveals itself as the intersubjective relation between subjects. Thus, Husserl’s recurrent point is that a sufficiently radical carrying out of the transcendental reduction leads not only to subjectivity, but also to intersubjectivity, and it is no coincidence, that he in periods with reference to Leibniz called his own theory a transcendental monadology.

It is obvious that Husserl believed the notion of a plurality of transcendental subjects to be coherent, that is, possible. Ultimately, he would even strengthen this assertion, and claim that it is necessary, insofar as “subjectivity is what it is - an ego functioning constitutively - only within intersubjectivity.” The claim that subjectivity only becomes fully constitutive, that is, fully transcendental, through its relation with Others, is in striking contrast with any traditional Kantian understanding of transcendental subjectivity. Curiously enough, it is exactly this traditional understanding which A. Schütz tacitly accepts in his well-known critique of Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity. Thus Schütz writes:

...it must be earnestly asked whether the transcendental Ego in Husserl’s concept is not essentially what Latin grammarians call a ‘singulare tantum,’ that is, a term incapable of being put into the plural. Even more, it is in no way established whether the existence of Others is a problem of the transcendental sphere at all, i.e. whether the problem of intersubjectivity does exist between transcendental egos [...] or whether intersubjectivity and therefore sociality does not rather belong exclusively to the mundane sphere of our life-world.

Husserl however takes issue with this position in a manuscript now published in the supplementary volume to Krisis, where he explicitly states that the possibility of a transcendental elucidation of subjectivity and world is lost if one follows the Kantian tradition in interpreting transcendental subjectivity as an isolated ego and thereby ignores the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity.

This remark could easily have been ascribed to K.-O. Apel. It is however of utmost importance to notice, that Husserl in contrast to the philosophers of language does not conceive of his own phenomenology of intersubjectivity as a break with (a correctly understood) philosophy of subjectivity. It is moreover, characteristic that it is possible to find reflections concerning the fundamental significance of intersubjectivity in his manuscripts side by side with remarks concerning the importance of the transcendental ego, and even statements saying that the transcendental primal ego (Ur-Ich) cannot be pluralized.

To say the very least, this seems to imply an inconsistency in the very core of Husserl’s reflections. Two dominant solutions have consisted in claiming either that Husserl changed his mind within a few years, and alternately attributed priority to the ego (in Cartesiansche Meditationen) and to intersubjectivity (in Krisis); or, alternatively, that Husserl never abandoned his egological point of departure, for which
reason his treatment of intersubjectivity remained superficial and without any real fundamentality. Both of these interpretations are, however, encumbered with some obvious problems. The first because it is possible to find the alleged alternatives within both *Cartesianische Meditationen* and *Krisis*. In both works Husserl speaks about the fundamental importance of both ego and intersubjectivity. The second since it is confronted with a large number of passages (some already quoted), where Husserl seems quite unambiguously to ascribe a fundamental and decisive function to intersubjectivity.

A closer reading reveals that the inconsistency is only seeming. It disappears the moment it is realized that Husserl’s emphasis on the singularity of the primal ego does not clash in any way with his intersubjective transformation of the transcendental philosophical project. Quite to the contrary. Once more the exceptional in Husserl’s phenomenonology of intersubjectivity has to be stressed. The transcendental intersubjectivity is not an objectively existing structure in the world, which can be described and analysed from a third-person view, but a relation between subjects, where the ego itself participates. To phrase it differently: transcendental intersubjectivity can only be disclosed through a radical explication of the ego’s structures of experience. This does not only indicate the intersubjective structure of the ego, but also the egological attachment of intersubjectivity.54 Husserl’s accentuation of the fundamental importance of the ego must be seen as an accentuation of the fact, that intersubjectivity, my relation to an Other, always passes through my own subjectivity. Only from this point of view is intersubjectivity and the plurality of constitutive centers phenomenologically accessible.

The remaining problem is to explain how Husserl can keep on designating the transcendental primal ego as singular and unique. An examination of the manuscript B I 14, however, can solve the problem. Husserl writes that ‘I’ does not admit of any plural as long as the word is used in its original sense. Others can experience themselves as I, but I can only experience myself as I. Beside myself there is no other I, about which I can say, ‘this is me’. Precisely for that reason it is impossible to speak about an I, as long as ‘I’ really means I. I is absolutely singular and individual.55 When Husserl mentions the absolute singularity of the ego, and denies that it can be put into plural, he is obviously referring to the unique egocentric givenness of my own consciousness. I am only self-aware of myself and can never ever be self-aware of anybody else. This singularity is of a kind, which admits of Others: “The singular I - the transcendental. In its singularity it posits ‘other’ singular transcendental egos - as ‘others’, who then in turn as singular posit Others.”56

This is offered merely as a demonstration of the consistency of Husserl’s position. When he speaks about the absolute priority of the ego, this does not contradict his reflections concerning transcendental intersubjectivity as the absolute field of being. Transcendental intersubjectivity is the transcendental foundation, but as Husserl says, it possesses a necessary 1-centering.57 Intersubjectivity can only unfold itself in the relation between singular subjects, and it is for this reason, that Husserl writes, that the disclosure of transcendental subjectivity effectuated by the reduction is ambiguous, since it leads to subjectivity as well as to intersubjectivity.58

Now, it would have been appropriate to provide a more detailed investigation of the role played by intersubjectivity on the most fundamental level, namely when it concerns the self-temporalisation of the subject. On the one hand, it is important to emphasize the significance of intersubjectivity when it comes to the subject’s self-constitution. But, on the other hand, it is also important to insist on the fact that each single subject has to possess a certain amount of ontological autonomy - since a complete elimination of this would make the very concept of intersubjectivity impossible. If the difference between the subjects were negated, there would not be any plurality and consequently no intersubjectivity.59 Thus, if one wants to preserve intersubjectivity, and keep the plurality of individual and transcendent subjects, it is necessary to reject the proposal that they have their ground of being in a prior unity.60 However, a detailed analysis of Husserl’s complex account of the ego’s many structural moments (including a differentiation between those, which are intersubjectively constituted, and those, which must be presupposed *sui generis* in order for the notion of intersubjectivity to be coherent) would lead too far. Let me only mention that Husserl’s position apparently is that the very temporal flow of consciousness, which merely constitutes the most basic level of subjectivity, is a process, which does not depend upon the relation to the Other.61 At the same time, however, he would probably claim that the relation to the Other can be traced back to and is made possible by the ecstatic self-alteration taking place in this process of temporalisation.62

I will turn instead towards some aspects of Husserl’s thinking, which can illustrate the radical implications that his treatment of transcendental intersubjectivity had for his own understanding and elaboration of phenomenology.

If one accepts Husserl’s conviction that reality is intersubjectively valid and that my reality-positing acts are dependent upon my experience of Others, one is bound to take not only the consensus but also the dissent of the world-experiencing subjects seriously. Husserl’s extended analyses of this problem eventually
made him enter fields that have traditionally been reserved for psychopathology, sociology, anthropology and ethnology. Whereas a strict Kantian transcendental philosophy would have considered such empirical and mundane domains as without any transcendental relevance, due to his interest in transcendental intersubjectivity, Husserl was forced to consider these from a transcendental point of view. Thus, I believe that Husserl’s late thinking is characterized by a decisive expansion of the transcendental sphere; an expansion which was brought about by his interest in intersubjectivity, and which ultimately forced him to consider the transcendental significance of generativity, tradition, historicity, and normality.

Let me focus on the problem of normality, with which Husserl has dealt intensively in different contexts, and which he considers a constitutional core-concept. Basically, Husserl claims that our experiences are guided by anticipations of normality. We apprehend, experience and constitute in accordance with the normal and typical structures, models and patterns which our earlier experiences have sedimented in our mind. If that which we experience happens to clash with our earlier experiences - if it is different - we have an experience of anormality, which subsequently leads to a modification and specification of our anticipations. Originally Husserl examined this process in connection with his analysis of the passive synthesis, but it is not only at work in the solitary subject. As Husserl says, I have been together with people as long as I remember, and my anticipations are therefore structured in accordance with the intersubjectively handed-down forms of apperception. Normality is also conventionality, which in its being transcends the individual. Thus, already in Ideen II Husserl pointed to the fact that there, next to the tendencies originating from other persons, also exist indeterminate general demands made by custom and tradition: ‘One’ judges thus, ‘one’ holds the fork in such and such a way etc. What is normal I learn from Others (and first and foremost from my closest relatives, that is by the people by whom I am brought up, and who educate me), and I am thereby involved in a common tradition, which through a chain of generations stretches back into a dim past.

As I have just mentioned, one consequence of Husserl’s treatment of intersubjectivity is that he also has to take the disagreement between world-experiencing subjects seriously. If my constitution of objectivity is dependent upon my assurance that Others experience or can experience the same as I, it is a problem, if they claim to be experiencing something different - although the fact that we can agree upon there being a disagreement already indicates a common ground. It is, however, in this context that Husserl emphasizes that only the (dis)agreement between the normal members of the community are of relevance. When it is said that real being has to be experienceable by everybody, we are dealing with a certain averageness and idealization. ‘Everybody’ is the person who belongs to a normality of subjects, and who is exactly normal in and through the community. Only with her do we fight about the truth and falsity, being and non-being of our common lifeworld. Only the normal is apprehended as being co-constitutive, whereas my disagreement with an anormal is (at first) considered inconsequential.

It is here necessary to differentiate between at least two fundamental types of normality. First of all, we speak of normality when we are dealing with a mature, healthy, and rational person. Here the anormal will be the infant, the blind, or the schizophrenic. Secondly, we speak of normality when it concerns our own homeworld, whereas anormality is attributed the foreigner, which, however, if certain conditions are fulfilled can be apprehended as a member of a foreign normality.

It is precisely in this context that the disagreement gains a vital constitutive significance. According to Husserl, the experience of discrepancy between normal subjects (including the experience of a plurality of normalities, each of which has its own notion of what counts as true) does not merely lead to a more complex world-comprehension insofar as we, if we are able to synthesize the standpoints, can gain a richer insight. The disagreement can also motivate the constitution of scientific objectivity, insofar as we aim towards reaching a truth which will be valid for us all. Thus, eventually it becomes necessary to differentiate between 1) ‘normal’ objectivity, which is correlated with a limited intersubjectivity (a community of normal subjects) and 2) ‘rigorous’ objectivity, which is correlated with the unlimited totality of all subjects. When a community of color-blind subjects jointly examine a painting, they are dealing with an intersubjectively constituted object. When people with normal vision examine the ‘same’ painting, they are also dealing with an intersubjectively constituted object. The apprehension of both groups can, however, be mediated by a geometrical description, which due to its more formal (and empty) validity, possesses a higher degree of objectivity.

In connection with the last and highest level of constitution - the constitution of theoretical scientific objectivity - Husserl touches on the significance of writing. It is not merely the case, that meaning only acquires full objectivity the moment it as written down is detached from its indexical connection to person, time and place. As written down, meaning can be handed down to later generations, and thus be incorporated into the body of knowledge, which generations of scientists are working on, and as Husserl
remarks in *Ursprung der Geometrie*, comprehensive and complex theories, which are developed through centuries, would not be possible, if it were not for the documenting, conserving function of writing.\(^7^9\) \(^8^0\)\(^8^1\)

We can establish that Husserl believed a correlation to exist between different levels of normality and different levels of objectivity.\(^8^0\) Even absolute objective being and truth is correlated with a subject-dependent normality: the normality of rational subjects.\(^8^1\)

Husserl’s treatment of normality as transcendental philosophical category throws light on some of the more far-reaching consequences of his phenomenology of intersubjectivity. For instance, the dimension of historicity in Husserl’s thinking has become visible. My own home-worldly normality is instituted through tradition and generativity and is therefore historical. Normality is a tradition-bound set of norms. Thus, Husserl designates the normal life as generative and claims that any normal person is historical as a member of a historical community.\(^8^2\) Moreover, the very constitution of objectivity and of a common objective world is a historical process.\(^8^3\) Far from being already constituted,\(^8^4\) the meaning-formations ‘objectivity’ and ‘reality’ have status as intersubjective presumptions, which can only be realized in an infinite process of socialization and horizon-fusion. To phrase it differently - and here Husserl is speaking, neither Apel nor Habermas - absolute truth (real being) is a token of an idealization; we are dealing with a regulative ideal, with a correlate to the ideal consensus of an open intersubjective community, which can be approximated in a process of permanent correction, although it can never be reached, since every factually realized consensus is in principle open for further corrections.\(^8^5\) Consequently, Husserl can write that there is no stagnant world, since it is only given for us in its relativity of normality and anormality.\(^8^6\) The being of the world is only apparently immobile, in reality it is a construction of normality, which in principle can collapse.\(^8^7\)

That Husserl tried to add a historical dimension to transcendental philosophy can also be illustrated in a different way. In a passage quoted earlier, Husserl writes that the transcendence of the world is constituted through the Others and through the generatively constituted co-subjectivity.\(^8^8\) Exactly this concept of generative intersubjectivity\(^8^9\) indicates that Husserl did no longer regard the birth and death of the subject as mere contingent facts, but as transcendental conditions of possibility for the constitution of the world.\(^9^0\) As he says in *Krisis*: the incorporation into a historical generative context belongs just as inseparably to the ego, as its very temporal structure.\(^9^1\)

What I generate from out of myself (primally instituting) is mine. But I am a ‘child of the times’; I am a member of a we-community in the broadest sense -- a community that has its tradition and that for its part is connected in a novel manner with the generative subjects, the closest and the most distant ancestors. And these have ‘influenced’ me: I am what I am as an heir.\(^9^2\)

In other words, Husserl considered the subject’s imbeddedness in a living tradition to have constitutive implications, and as I mentioned in the first part, it is consequently possible to speak of an anonymous normality as a third kind of transcendental intersubjectivity. It is not merely the case that I live in a world, which as a correlate of normality is permeated by references to Others, and which Others have already furnished with meaning, or that I understand the world (and myself) through a traditional, handed down, linguistic conventionality. The very category ‘historical reality’ implies a type of transcendence which can only be constituted insofar as I take over traditional meaning, which has its origin outside of me, in a historical past.

Is it on this background possible to conclude that Husserl in the last phase of his thinking substituted the transcendental ego as the phenomenological point of departure for the historical community of the lifeworld? No, of course not. Although the transcendental intersubjectivity is the transcendental foundation, it is vital not to forget Husserl’s phenomenological approach. There is no community without ego-centering, and consequently no generative intersubjectivity without a transcendental primal ego, where the intersubjectivity can unfold itself.\(^9^3\) As Husserl has emphasized several times, the ‘we’ stretches from me onwards to the simultaneous, past and future Others;\(^9^4\) the historically primary is our present.\(^9^5\) In other words: the transcendental analysis of the historical past, of the previous generations, and more generally, the transcendental phenomenological treatment of meaning, which transcends the finiteness of the subject, must always take its point of departure from the first-person perspective.

There is probably no one who would claim that Husserl has managed to synthesize historicity and transcendentality in a definite and systematical way. This is, nevertheless, what he attempted to do in his last analyses, and this has to be appreciated when it comes to an evaluation of the scope and comprehensiveness of his thinking. Whether it is a fruitful approach that has to be developed, or a final aporetical draft can be discussed. That Husserl did not advocate a classical Cartesian-Kantian
subject-philosophy, and that he was not a solipsist, but on the contrary, treated intersubjectivity as a
transcendental philosophical notion of utmost importance, should, however, have been demonstrated.96

Notes:
Apart from some minor changes this piece is a reprint of an article originally published in The Journal of the
British Society for Phenomenology 27/3, 1996, 228-245.

1. On several occasions, Husserl has called attention to the lecture-course Grundprobleme der
Phänomenologie from 1910/11 (now in Intersubjektivität I, 111-194), as the place where intersubjectivity
was assigned a decisive role for the first time (Logik (Hua), 250, Ideen III, 150, Intersubjektivität I, 245, Erste
Philosophie II, 433, Intersubjektivität II, 307). Although his reflections in Ideen I (from 1913) appear strictly
egological, Husserl was already at that time aware of the significance of intersubjectivity, and he later wrote,
that he originally had planned that his presentation in Ideen I were to be complemented by the reflections
on intersubjectivity to be found in Ideen II. However, these reflections were only published posthumously
(Ideen III, 150).
This study is based on research undertaken at the Husserl-
Archives in Louvain. I am grateful to
Prof. S. IJsseling for the permission to consult an
and quote from Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts.


3. Phänomenologische Psychologie, 431, Intersubjektivität II, 289, 390, Logik (Hua), 243, Krisis, 469.


5. Intersubjektivität III, 110.

6. Phänomenologische Psychologie, 344.

7. Cartesianische Meditationen, 35, 182, Erste Philosophie II, 449, Phänomenologische Psychologie,295,
474.

8. Phänomenologische Psychologie, 539.

9. This formulation, which is from Husserl’s London-lectures in 1922, can be found in K. Schuhmann,
Husserls Staatsphilosophie (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1988), p. 56.


Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 13 (1959), pp. 309-10; M.Theunissen, Der Andere (Berlin: Walter
de Gruyter, 1977), § 19-28; A. Schütz, „Das Problem der transzendentalen Intersubjektivität bei Husserl“
Rohr-Dietschi, Zur Genese des Selbstbewußtseins (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1974), pp.144-150. I will not
go into an analysis of Husserl’s concept of constitution in this article, but simply refer to my presentation in
D. Zahavi, Intentionalität und Konstitution - Eine Einführung in Husserls Logische Untersuchungen
(Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 1992), and to the detailed analysis of the constitution of the
Other in D. Zahavi: Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivität - Eine Antwort auf die sprachpragmati-

13. Krisis, 206. This approach can also be found in Sartre, who in L’être et le néant (Paris: Tel Gallimard,
1976) writes that the disclosure of our being-for-the-other takes place through a radicalized cogito-reflection


17. Erste Philosophie II, 495.

18. „Die Transzendenz, in der die Welt konstituiert <ist>, besteht darin, daß sie sich mittels der Anderen und der generativ konstituierten Mitsubjektivität konstituiert.“ Ms. C 17 32a.

19. Logik (Hua), 248; modified Eng. trans.,???

20. Whereas the guaranty in every single case is fallible—what I took to be a valid experience of another could turn out to be a hallucination—this is not the case when it comes to the fundamental connection between intersubjective experiencability and transcendence. Such an experiencability is of course not to be interpreted as a mere epistemic criterion for the assumption of a mind-independent reality, since this would be a relapse into the objectivism that was suspended by the effectuation of the epoche.


22. Cartesianische Meditationen, 125, Intersubjektivität III, 6, Krisis, 81.

23. Intersubjektivität II, 388. That every experience of an Other implies the validity of the Other’s experience should not be misunderstood. Of course, Husserl is neither claiming that it is no longer possible to speak of disagreement or dissent (but only that all disagreement presupposes a common world), nor that our experience of an Other is always accompanied by a thematic representation of the Other’s object of experience (which K. Arp claims in „Intentionality and the public world: Husserl’s treatment of objectivity in the Cartesian Meditations“ Husserl Studies 7 (1991), p. 91). Husserl’s claim is merely that the validity of the Other’s experience is implicitly accepted when we experience her, and that this furnishes our own object of experience with the validity, that it can also be experienced by another subject, that it is a common intersubjective object and consequently transcendent. This can take place without any explicit representation of the content of the Other’s experience (Krisis, 308, Intersubjektivität I, 469).


26. For a more detailed account of Husserl’s phenomenology of the body see D. Zahavi, „Husserl’s phenomenology of the body“ Études Phénoménologiques 19 (1994), pp.63-84.

27. Intersubjektivität I, 243-44.


29. B. Waldenfels, „Erfahrung des Fremden in Husserls Phänomenologie“ Phänomenologische
30. Intersubjektivität III, 218, Erste Philosophie II, 495, Intersubjektivität I, 242. This finiteness is according to Husserl hidden until the co-being (Mitsein) of the Other is taken into account (Ms. C 17 32a). Death only gains a meaning for me through the Others (Intersubjektivität III, 452).


32. Krisis, 167, Ideen II, 82.


34. Intersubjektivität II, 474-75.

35. A similar kind of argumentation can be found in D. Carr, „The ‘Fifth Meditation’ and Husserl’s Cartesianism“ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (1973), pp.14-35. Carr claims that Husserl’s incorporation of transcendental intersubjectivity led to a radical revision of his earlier concept of philosophy, insofar as the nos cogitamus does not possess the same kind of infallible apodictical certainty as the ego cogito (pp. 32-35). However, this is a truth with modifications, which will be obvious in a moment.

36. For a more extensive discussion, see D. Zahavi, Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivität - Eine Antwort auf die sprachpragmatische Kritik (1996), and D. Zahavi, “Horizontal Intentionality and Transcendental Intersubjectivity.” Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 59/2, 1997, pp.304-321

37. Intersubjektivität III, 192. This interpretation can be supported by Dorion Cairns’ account of a conversation with Husserl, June 4, 1932, cf. D. Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), pp. 82-83.

38. Krisis, 468.


41. “Wenn Einfühlung eintritt - ist etwa auch schon die Gemeinschaft, die Intersubjektivität da und Einfühlung dann bloß enthüllendes Leisten?” Ms. C 17 84b.

42. It must be emphasized that the relation between the three kinds of intersubjectivity is a relationship of founding. That something is founded on something else implies, according to Husserl’s definition in the III. Logical Investigation, neither that it can be deduced from it nor that it can be reduced to it, but merely that it cannot exist without the existence of its foundation (Logische Untersuchungen II (Hua), 281-82). In other words: The three types are hierarchically structured, but different and irreducible kinds of transcendental intersubjectivity, each with their own special constitutive function and performance.

43. Cartesianische Meditationen, 166.

44. Intersubjektivität III, 193.

45. Krisis, 275, 472.

46. Erste Philosophie II, 480.
47. *Intersubjektivität I*, 480.

48. Phänomenologische Psychologie, 344.


52. *Krisis* (Ergänzung), 120.

53. *Krisis*, 188.

54. E. Marbach (*Das Problem des Ich in der Phänomenologie Husserls* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), chap. 5) argues that it was exactly Husserl’s insight into the necessity of construing a transcendental theory of intersubjectivity, which made him abandon the non-egological theory of consciousness, which he had advocated in *Logische Untersuchungen*. As long as there were no ego as principle of unity, there were merely experiences, and it were consequently impossible to differentiate between one’s own and the Other’s experiences. In a related way, A. Gurwitsch has claimed that his own non-egological theory of consciousness made the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity superfluous. If there is no transcendental ego, but merely an empirical, then the relation between ego and Other must be an empirical-mundane problem (A. Schütz & A. Gurwitsch: *Briefwechsel 1939-1959* (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1985), p.369).


56. „Das einzige Ich - das transzendentale. In seiner Einzigkeit setzt es ‘andere’ einzige transzendental Ich - als ‘andere’, die selbst wieder in Einzigkeit Andere setzen.‘“ Ms. B I 14 138b. Cf. *Intersubjektivität II*, 212. Of course, Husserl would deny that this first-personal singularity—which refutes a number of ‘substantial’ misinterpretations of his position—is merely a contingent linguistic fact. Quite to the contrary, we are dealing with a transcendental necessity, which is ultimately connected with the problem of individuation. ‘I am’ is for the ego that thinks it, the intentional ground. It is, as Husserl says, the primal fact that I as a philosopher must never overlook (*Logik (Hua)*, 243-44, *Intersubjektivität II*, 307, *Krisis* (Ergänzung), 165).

57. *Intersubjektivität III*, 426.

58. *Intersubjektivität III*, 73-75.

59. *Intersubjektivität III*, 335, 339.


61. *Intersubjektivität II*, 170-75.

63. *Intersubjektivität III*, 391.

64. As Merleau-Ponty remarks apropos Husserl’s idea concerning the intersubjective structure of transcendental subjectivity: „Now if the transcendental is intersubjectivity, how can the borders of the transcendental and the empirical help becoming indistinct? For along with the other person, all the other person sees of me— all my facticity—is reintegrated into subjectivity, or at least posited as an indispensable element of its definition. Thus the transcendental descends into history. Or as we might put it, the historical is no longer an external relation between two or more absolutely autonomous subjects but has an interior and is an inherent aspect of their very definition. They no longer know themselves to be subjects simply in relation to their individual selves, but in relation to one another as well.” (Merleau-Ponty, *Signes* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1960), p.134). It is actually possible to find numerous similarities between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, and it is worth noticing, that Merleau-Ponty, who already before World War II gained access to Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts (cf. H.L. Van Breda, „Maurice Merleau-Ponty et les Archives-Husserl à Louvain“ *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 67 (1962), pp.410-430), often interpreted Husserl in a way which was not in accordance with the prevailing view. For instance, when he claimed that Husserl took the problem of historicity more seriously than Heidegger (Merleau-Ponty, *Merleau-Ponty à la Sorbonne* (Cynara, 1988), pp.421-422).


69. *Ideen II*, 269.

70. *Intersubjektivität III*, 428-29, 569, 602-4.

71. *Intersubjektivität III*, 47.

72. *Intersubjektivität III*, 141, 231, 629.

73. *Intersubjektivität III*, 142.


75. To give a concrete example: our constitution of colors is not impeded by the fact that there are blind people, who are unable to perceive them (Cartesianische Meditationen, 154, *Intersubjektivität III*, 48). For a more extended treatment of this problem, see for instance *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität* text 14: “Solipsistische und intersubjektive Normalität und Konstitution von Objektivität”, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität III* text 10: ‘Die Welt der Normalen und das Problem der Beteiligung der Anomalen an der Weltkonstitution’ and text 11: ‘Apodiktische Struktur der transzendentalen Subjektivität. Problem der transzendenten Konstitution der Welt von der Normalität aus’.

76. *Krisis*, 324.

77. *Intersubjektivität II*, 111.

78. Although the mathematical characterization of the object, which is valid for all rational subjects, is the most objective, Husserl emphasizes that this kind of description is completely irrelevant in our daily practical life. There we are not occupied with scientific objects, but with tools and values, with pictures, statues,
gardens, houses, tables etc. (*Ideen II*, 27). Furthermore our practical interest is led by practical concerns. That which is sufficient in our daily life, counts as the *thing in itself* (*Passive Synthesis*, 23).

79. *Krisis*, 369-74, *Logik* (*Hua*), 38, 349. In connection with his reflections on the constitutive function of language, Husserl also touches on its seductive power (*Krisis*, 372). Instead of living and acting responsibly according to evidence, we can be, and most often are, seduced by the assumptions and structures of comprehension and apperception which are imbedded in language (cf. *Ideen II*, 269). Husserl’s analysis has much in common with Heidegger’s analysis of idle talk (*Gerede*) in *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1986), § 35.

80. *Intersubjektivität III*, 155.


83. *Intersubjektivität III*, 421.

84. *Intersubjektivität III*, 220.

85. *Erste Philosophie II*, 52, *Ideen I*, 331, *Krisis*, 282, *Cartesianische Meditationen*, 138, *Intersubjektivität III*, 33. This does not imply, however, that there are no apodictical truths whatsoever, but only that that which can be corrected is always open for further corrections.


87. *Intersubjektivität III*, 214.

88. Ms. C 17 32a.

89. *Intersubjektivität III*, 199.

90. *Intersubjektivität III*, 171.

91. *Krisis*, 256.

92. *Intersubjektivität II*, 223.

93. *Intersubjektivität III*, 426.

94. *Intersubjektivität III*, 61, 139, 142, 499.

95. *Krisis*, 382.

96. Thus, S. Strasser was right, when he wrote that the publication of Husserl’s manuscripts on intersubjectivity has uncovered surprising material, which has shown, that all current views about the content of Husserl’s philosophy were inadequate (S. Strasser, „Grundgedanken der Sozialontologie Edmund Husserls“ *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 29 (1975), p.33).
Bibliography


