In his book *The Conscious Mind* David Chalmers introduced a by now familiar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of consciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question of how the mind can process information, react to environmental stimuli, and exhibit such capacities as discrimination, categorization, and introspection (Chalmers, 1996, 4, 1995, 200). All of these abilities are impressive, but they are, according to Chalmers, not metaphysically baffling, since they can all be tackled by means of the standard repertoire of cognitive science and explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. This task might still be difficult, but it is within reach. In contrast, the hard problem—also known as the problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995, 201)—is the problem of explaining why mental states have phenomenal or experiential qualities. Why is it like something to ‘taste coffee’, to ‘touch an ice cube’, to ‘look at a sunset’ etc.? Why does it feel the way it does? Why does it at all feel like anything?

Chalmers’s distinction confronts us with a version of the so-called ‘explanatory gap’. On the one hand, we have certain cognitive functions, which can apparently be explained reductively, and on the other hand, we have a number of experiential qualities, which seem to resist this reductive explanation. We can establish that a certain function is accompanied by a certain experience, but we have no idea why that happens, and regardless of how closely we scrutinize the neural mechanisms we don’t seem to be getting any closer at an answer.

In his book, Chalmers also distinguished two concepts of mind: a phenomenal concept and a psychological concept. The first captures the conscious aspect of mind: Mind is understood in terms of conscious experience. The second concept understands mind in functional terms as the causal or explanatory basis for behavior. According to the phenomenal concept, a state is mental if it ‘feels’ a certain way; according to the psychological concept, a state is mental if it plays an appropriate causal role. The first concept characterizes mind by the way it feels, the second by what it does (Chalmers, 1996, 11-12), and according to Chalmers it is the first concept that is troublesome and which resists standard attempts at explanation.1

In a later article from 1997 Chalmers seems to have modified, or at least clarified, his position slightly. He now concedes that such notions as attention, memory, intentionality etc. contain both easy and hard aspects (Chalmers, 1997, 10). A full and comprehensive understanding of e.g. intentionality would consequently entail solving the hard problem, or to put it differently, an analysis of thoughts, beliefs, categorization etc. that ignored the experiential side would merely be an analysis of what could be called pseudo-thoughts or pseudo-beliefs (Chalmers, 1997, 20). This clarification fits well with an observation that Chalmers made already in *The Conscious Mind*, namely, that one could operate with a deflationary and an inflationary concept of belief, respectively. Whereas the first concept is a purely psychological (functional) concept that does not involve any reference to conscious experience, the second concept entails that conscious experience is required for true
intentionality (Chalmers, 1996, 20). In 1997, Chalmers admits that he is torn on the issue, and that he over time has become increasingly sympathetic to the second concept, and to the idea that consciousness is the primary source of meaning, so that intentional content may in fact be grounded in phenomenal content, but he thinks the matter needs further examination (Chalmers, 1997, 21).

I welcome this clarification, but I also find it slightly surprising that Chalmers is prepared to concede this much. As far as I can see, the very distinction between the easy problems and the hard problem of consciousness becomes questionable the moment one opts for the inflationary concept. Given this concept, it seems natural to conclude that there are in fact no easy problems of consciousness. The truly easy problems are all problems about pseudo-thoughts etc., that is, about non-conscious information processing, but a treatment of these issues should not be confused with an explanation of the kind of conscious intentionality that we encounter in human beings. In other words, we will not understand how human beings consciously intend, discriminate, categorize, react, report, and introspect etc. until we understand the role of subjective experience in those processes (cf. Hodgson, 1996).

Chalmers’s discussion of the hard problem has identified and labeled an aspect of consciousness that cannot be ignored. However, his way of defining and distinguishing the hard problem from the easy problems seems in many ways indebted to the very reductionism that he is out to oppose. If one thinks that cognition and intentionality is basically a matter of information processing and causal co-variation that could in principle just as well go on in a mindless computer—or to use Chalmers’ own favored example, in an experienceless zombie—then one is left with the impression that all that is really distinctive about consciousness is its qualitative or phenomenal aspect. But this seems to suggest that with the exception of some evanescent qualia everything about consciousness including intentionality can be explained in reductive (computational or neural) terms; and in this case, epiphenomenalism threatens.

To put it differently, Chalmers’s distinction between the hard and the easy problems of consciousness shares a common feature with many other recent analytical attempts to defend consciousness against the onslaught of reductionism: They all grant far too much to the other side. Reductionism has typically proceeded with a classical divide and rule strategy. There are basically two sides to consciousness: Intentionality and phenomenality. We don’t currently know how to reduce the latter aspect, so let us separate the two sides, and concentrate on the first. If we then succeed in explaining intentionality reductively, the aspect of phenomenality cannot be all that significant. Many non-reductive materialists have uncritically adopted the very same strategy. They have marginalized subjectivity by identifying it with epiphenomenal qualia and have then claimed that it is this aspect which eludes reductionism.

But is this partition really acceptable, are we really dealing with two separate problems, or is experience and intentionality on the contrary intimately connected? Is it really possible to investigate intentionality properly without taking experience, the first-person perspective, semantics, etc., into account? And vice versa, is it possible to understand the nature of subjectivity and experience if we ignore intentionality. Or do we then run the risk of reinstating a Cartesian subject-world dualism that ignores everything captured by the phrase “being-in-the-world”?

In the following, I wish to consider some arguments in favor of opposing the separation. I will try to supply some answers to the three following questions:

1. What forms of intentionality possess phenomenal features?
2. Do all experiences possess intentional features?
3. If the intentional and the phenomenal go hand in hand, is the connection then contingent or essential?

All of the three questions call for quite substantial analyses. All I can do in the following is to provide some preliminary reflections; reflections that will incidentally suggest that analytical philosophy in its dealing with these questions might profit from looking at some of the resources found in continental phenomenology. Why? Because many of the problems and questions that analytical philosophy of mind are currently facing are problems and questions that phenomenologists have been struggling with for more than a century. Drawing on their results would not only help avoiding unnecessary repetitions, it might also bring the contemporary debate to a higher level of sophistication.

1. Is there a ‘what it is like’ to intentional consciousness?

It is relatively uncontroversial that there is a certain (phenomenal) quality of ‘what it is like’ or what it ‘feels’ like to have perceptual experiences, desires, feelings, and moods. There is something it is like to taste an omelette, to touch an ice cube, to crave chocolate, to have stage fright, to feel envious, nervous, depressed, or happy. However, is it really acceptable to limit the phenomenal dimension of experience to *sensory or emotional* states alone? Is there nothing it is like simply to think of (rather than perceive) a green apple? And what about abstract beliefs, is there nothing it is like to believe that the square root of 9 ‘is 3’? Many contemporary philosophers have denied that beliefs are inherently phenomenal (cf. Tye, 1995, 138, Jacob, 1998, O’Shaughnessy, 2000, 39, 41).

I think they are mistaken.

Back in the *Logical Investigations* (1900-01) Husserl argued that conscious thoughts have experiential qualities, and that episodes of conscious thoughts are experiential episodes. In arguing for this claim, Husserl drew some distinctions that I think are of relevance in this context. According to Husserl, every intentional experience possesses two different, but inseparable moments. Every intentional experience is an experience of a specific type, be it an experience of judging, hoping, desiring, regretting, remembering, affirming, doubting, wondering, fearing, etc. Husserl called this aspect of the experience, the *intentional quality* of the experience. Every intentional experience is also directed at something, is also about something, be it an experience of a deer, a cat, or a mathematic state of affairs. Husserl called the component that specifies what the experience is about, the *intentional matter* of the experience (Husserl, 1984, 425-426). Needless to say, the same quality can be combined with different matters, and the same matter can be combined with different qualities. It is possible to doubt that ‘the inflation will continue’, doubt that ‘the election was fair’, or doubt that ‘one’s next book will be an international bestseller’, just as it is possible to deny that ‘the lily is white’, to judge that ‘the lily is white’, or to question whether ‘the lily is white’. Husserl’s distinction between the intentional matter and the intentional quality consequently bears a certain resemblance to the contemporary distinction between propositional content and propositional attitudes (though it is important to emphasize that Husserl by no means took all intentional experiences to be propositional in nature). But, and this is of course the central point, Husserl considered these cognitive differences to be *experiential* differences. Each of the different intentional qualities has its own phenomenal character. There is an *experiential* difference between affirming and denying that Hegel was the greatest of the German idealists, just as there is an *experiential* difference between expecting and doubting that Denmark will win the 2002 FIFA World Cup. What it is like to be in one type of intentional state differs from what
it is like to be in another type of intentional state. Similarly, the different intentional matters each have their own phenomenal character. There is an experiential difference between believing that ‘thoughts without content are empty’ and believing that ‘intuitions without concepts are blind’, just as there is an experiential difference between denying that ‘the Eiffel Tower is higher than the Empire State building’ and denying that ‘North Korea has a viable economy’. To put it differently, a change in the intentional matter will entail a change in what it is like to undergo the experience in question. And these experiential differences, these differences in what it is like to think different thoughts, are not simply sensory differences.

In the same work, Husserl also called attention to the fact that one and the same object can be given in a variety of different modes. This is not only the case for spatiotemporal objects (one and the same tree can be given from this or that perspective, as perceived or recollected etc.), but also for ideal or categorial objects. There is an experiential difference between thinking of the theorem of Pythagoras in an empty and signitive manner, i.e., without really understanding it, and doing so in an intuitive and fulfilled manner, i.e., by actually thinking it through with comprehension (Husserl, 1984, 73, 667-676). In fact, as Husserl points out, our understanding of signs and verbal expressions can illustrate these differences especially vividly: “Let us imagine that certain arabesques or figures have at first affected us aesthetically, and that we then suddenly realize that we are dealing with symbols or verbal signs. In what does this difference consist? Or let us take the case of a man attentively hearing some totally strange word as a sound-complex without even dreaming it is a word, and compare this with the case of the same man afterwards hearing the word, in the course of conversation, and now acquainted with its meaning, but not illustrating it intuitively. What in general is the surplus element distinguishing the understanding of a symbolically functioning expression from the uncomprehended verbal sound? What is the difference between simply looking at a concrete object A, and treating it as a representative of ‘any A whatsoever’? In this and countless similar cases it is the act-character that differ.” (Husserl, 1984, 398).

More recently, Galen Strawson has argued in a similar fashion, and in his book Mental Reality he provides the following neat example. Strawson asks us to consider a situation where Jacques (a monoglot Frenchman) and Jack (a monoglot Englishman) are both listening to the same news in French. Jacques and Jack are certainly not experiencing the same, for only Jacques is able to understand what is being said; only Jacques is in possession of what might be called an experience of understanding. To put it differently, there is normally something it is like, experientially, to understand a sentence. There is an experiential difference between hearing something that one does not understand, and hearing and understanding the very same sentence. And this experiential difference is not a sensory difference, but a cognitive one (Strawson, 1994, 5-6). This is why Strawson then concludes as follows: “the apprehension and understanding of cognitive content, considered just as such and independently of any accompaniments in any of the sensory-modality-based modes of imagination or mental representation, is part of experience, part of the flesh or content of experience, and hence, trivially, part of the qualitative character of experience.” (Strawson, 1994, 12).

Every conscious state, be it a perception, an emotion, a recollection, an abstract belief etc., has a certain subjective character, a certain phenomenal quality, a certain quality of ‘what it is like’ to live through or undergo that state. This is what makes the mental state in question conscious. In fact, the reason we can be aware of our occurrent mental states (and distinguish them from one another) is exactly because there is something it is like to be in those states. The widespread view that only sensory and emotional states have phenomenal qualities must consequently be rejected. Such a view is not only simply wrong,
phenomenologically speaking. Its attempt to reduce phenomenality to the “raw feel” of sensation marginalizes and trivializes phenomenal consciousness, and is detrimental to a correct understanding of its cognitive significance.⁵

2. An intentionalistic interpretation of phenomenal qualities

It is one thing to argue that there is a phenomenal side to all conscious forms of intentionality, but what about the claim that all experiences have intentional features. Is that really true, or are there not a manifold of experiences which lack intentionality, say, feelings of pains or nausea, or moods like anxiety or nervousness?

The usual way to handle this problem in phenomenology has been by distinguishing two very different kinds of intentionality. In a narrow sense, intentionality is defined as object-directedness, in a broader sense, which covers what Husserl called operative [fungierende] intentionality, intentionality is defined as openness towards alterity and includes for instance our non-objectifying being-in-the-world. In both cases, the emphasis is on denying the attempt to understand consciousness as some kind of self-enclosed immanence.

If we go to the alleged non-intentional experiences with this distinction in mind, then it is true that pervasive moods such as sadness, boredom, nostalgia, or anxiety must be distinguished from intentional feelings like the desire for an apple, or the admiration for a particular person. But although the moods in question are not types of object-intentionality, although they all do lack a specific intentional object, they are not without a reference to the world. They do not enclose us within ourselves, but are lived through as pervasive affective atmospheres that deeply influence the way we encounter entities in the world. Just think, for example, of moods like curiosity, nervousness, or happiness. In fact, it has occasionally even been argued that moods rather than being merely attendant phenomena are rather fundamental forms of disclosure. We are always in some kind of mood. Even a neutral and distanced observation has its own tone, and as Heidegger famously wrote, “Mood has always already disclosed being-in-the-world as a whole and first makes possible directing oneself toward something.”(Heidegger, 1996, 129).

What about something like pain then? Well, Sartre’s classical analysis in L’être et le néant is, I think, illuminating. Assume that you are sitting late at night trying to finish a book. You have been reading most of the day and your eyes are hurting. How does this pain originally manifest itself? According to Sartre, not yet as a thematic object of reflection, but by influencing the way in which you perceive the world. You might become restless, irritated, have difficulties in focusing and concentrating. The words on the page may tremble or quiver. At this point, the pain is not yet apprehended as an intentional object, but that does not mean that it is either cognitively absent or unconscious. It is not yet reflected-upon as a psychic object, but rather given as a vision-in-pain, as an affective atmosphere that influences your intentional interaction with the world (Sartre, 1943, 380-381).

The divide and rule strategy, the attempt to separate intentionality and phenomenality, the attempt to deny that intentional states have any intrinsic phenomenal properties, and that phenomenal states have any intrinsic intentional properties, and the attempt to treat each topic as if it could be understood in isolation from the other, does not only very easily lead to a kind of “consciousness inessentialism,” to the view that phenomenal consciousness is cognitively epiphenomenal. As mentioned earlier, the strategy also seems to reinstate a traditional concept of subjectivity that runs foul of everything that has been captured by the phrase
‘being-in-the-world’. According to such a traditional (empiricist) concept, phenomenal consciousness has in and of itself no relation to the world. It is like a closed container filled with experiences that have no immediate bearing on the world outside. Typically, this internalist position has then been given a representationalist slant: On its own, our mind cannot reach all the way to the objects themselves. It is therefore necessary to introduce some kind of representational interface between the mind and the world if we are to understand and explain intentionality, i.e., the claim has been that our cognitive access to the world is mediated by mental representations.

In contrast, for the phenomenologists, subjectivity—the experiential dimension—is not a self-enclosed mental realm; rather, subjectivity and world are, as Merleau-Ponty puts it in his *Phénoménologie de la perception*, co-dependent and inseparable (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, 491-492). Subjectivity is essentially oriented and open toward that which it is not, and it is exactly in this openness that it reveals itself to itself. What is disclosed by the cogito is, consequently, not a self-contained immanence or a pure interior self-presence, but an openness toward alterity, a movement of exteriorization and perpetual self-transcendence. Since the phenomenological theories of intentionality are unfailingly non-representationalist, they also reject the view according to which phenomenal experiences are to be conceived of as some kind of internal movie screen that confronts us with mental representations. We are ‘zunächst und zumeist’ directed at real existing objects, and this directedness is not mediated by any intra-mental objects. The so-called qualitative character of experience, the taste of a lemon, the smell of coffee, the coldness of an ice cube are not at all qualities belonging to some spurious mental objects, but qualities of the presented objects. Rather than saying that we experience representations, it would be better to say that our experiences are *presentational*, and that they *present* the world as having certain features.8

Reflections like these can also be found in analytical philosophy. Recently a number of analytical philosophers have criticized the view that phenomenal qualities are in and of themselves non-intentional, and have instead defended what might be called an *intentionalistic* interpretation of phenomenal qualities. The point of departure has been the observation that it can often be quite difficult to distinguish a description of certain objects from a description of the experience of these very same objects. Back in 1903, G.E. Moore called attention to this fact, and dubbed it the peculiar *diaphanous* quality of experience: When you try to focus your attention on the intrinsic features of experience, you always seem to end up attending to what the experience is of. And as Tye argues, the lesson of this transparency is that "*phenomenology ain't in the head.*" (Tye, 1995, 151). To discover what it is like, you need to look at what is being intentionally represented.9 Thus, as the argument goes, experiences do not have intrinsic and non-intentional qualities of their own, rather the qualitative character of experience consists entirely, as Dretske writes, in the qualitative properties objects are experienced as having (Dretske, 1995, 1). Or to put it differently, the phenomenal qualities are qualities of that which is represented. Differences in what it is like are actually intentional differences. Thus an experience of a red apple is subjectively distinct from an experience of a yellow sunflower in virtue of the fact that different kinds of objects are represented. Experiences simply acquire their phenomenal character by representing the outside world. As a consequence, all phenomenal qualities are as such intentional. There are no non-intentional experiences. Thus, for Tye pain (and I assume that he is only talking about physical pain) is nothing but a sensory representation of bodily damage or disorder (Tye, 1995, 113).

Dretske’s and Tye’s intentionalistic interpretation of phenomenal qualities has the great advantage of staying clear of any kind of immanentalism. As already mentioned, it also bears a certain resemblance to views

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found in phenomenology. This is in particular the case for the analysis offered by Sartre. Sartre is renowned for his very radical interpretation of intentionality. To affirm the intentionality of consciousness is, according to Sartre, to deny the existence of any kind of mental content (including any kind of sense-data or qualia) (Sartre, 1943, 26, 363). There is nothing in consciousness, neither objects nor mental representations. It is completely empty. Thus, for Sartre, the being of intentional consciousness consists in its revelation of transcendent being (Sartre, 1943, 28). Sartre consequently takes the phenomenal qualities to be qualities of worldly objects, and certainly not to be located within consciousness. However, from the fact that consciousness is nothing apart from its revelation of transcendent being (or as Tye and Dretske would probably say, from the fact that it exhausts itself in its representation of external reality), Sartre would never infer that intentional consciousness is therefore no problem for reductionism. On the contrary, in his view, it is exactly the emptiness (or non-substantiality) of consciousness, that demonstrates its irreducibility.

Both Tye and Dretske explicitly criticize the attempt to draw a sharp distinction between the intentional or (re)presentational aspects of our mental lives and their phenomenal or subjective or felt aspects. But interestingly enough, their reason for attacking the separation is exactly the opposite of my own. By proposing an intentionalistic interpretation of phenomenality they hope to avoid the hard problem altogether. Why? Because if phenomenality is basically a question of intentionality, and if intentionality can be explained reductively in terms of functional or causal relations, one can accept the existence of phenomenality (neither Dretske nor Tye are eliminativists) and still remain a physicalist (Tye, 1995, 153, 181).

I think this conclusion is wrong. The decisive difficulty for reductionism is not the existence of epiphenomenal qualia, qualia in the sense of atomic, irrelational, ineffable, incomparable, and incorrigible mental objects. And the hard problem does not disappear if one (rightfully) denies the existence of such entities, and if one, so to speak, relocates the phenomenal from the ‘inside’ to the ‘outside’. The hard problem is not about the existence of non-physical objects of experience, but about the very existence of subjective experience itself, it is about the very fact that objects are given to us (cf. Rudd, 1998).

When asked to exemplify the ‘what it is like’ quality of experience, one will often find references to what has traditionally been called secondary sense qualities, such as the smell of coffee, the color of red silk, or the taste of a lemon. However, this answer reveals an ambiguity in the notion of ‘what it is like’. Normally, the ‘what it is like’ aspect is taken to designate experiential properties. However, if our experiences are to have qualities of their own, they must be qualities over and above whatever qualities the intentional object has. But it is exactly the silk which is red, and not my perception of it. Likewise, it is the lemon that is bitter and not my experience of it. The taste of the lemon is a qualitative feature of the lemon, and must be distinguished from whatever qualities my tasting of the lemon has. Even if there is no other way to gain access to the gustatory quality of the lemon than by tasting it, this will not turn the quality of the object into a quality of the experience. But in this case a certain problem arises. There is definitely something it is like to taste coffee, just as there is an experiential difference between tasting wine and water. However, when one asks for this quality and for this qualitative difference, it seems hard to point to anything beside the taste of coffee, wine, and water, though this is not what we are looking for. Should we consequently conclude that there is in fact nothing in the tasting of the lemon apart from the taste of the lemon itself?

However, this conclusion is overhasty, and it overlooks that there are two sides to the question of ‘what it is like’. In Ideas I, Husserl distinguishes between the intentional object in ‘the how of its determinations’ (im Wie seiner Bestimmtheiten) and in ‘the how of its givenness’ (im Wie seiner Gegebenheitsweisen) (Husserl, 1973,
303-304). Although this distinction is introduced as a distinction that falls within the noematic domain (rather than being a distinction between the noetic and the noematic domain), it nevertheless points us in the right direction: There is a difference between asking about the property the object is experienced as having (what does the object feel like to the perceiver) and asking about the property of the experience of the object (what does the perceiving feel like to the perceiver). Both questions pertain to the phenomenal dimension, but whereas the first question concerns a worldly property, the second concerns an experiential property. 

Contrary to what both Dretske and Tye are claiming, we consequently need to distinguish between 1) what the object is like for the subject and 2) what the experience of the object is like for the subject (cf. Carruthers, 1998, McIntyre, 1999). However, insisting upon this distinction is not enough. The tricky part is to respect the lesson of transparency and to avoid misconstruing the experiential properties as if they belong to some kind of mental objects. It is not the case that worldly properties such as blue or sweet are matched one by one by experiential doublets of an ineffable nature (let us call them *blue or *sweet) and that both kind of properties are present in ordinary perception. So again, how then is the distinction to be cashed in phenomenologically?

We are never conscious of an object simpliciter, but always of the object as appearing in a certain way (as judged, seen, described, feared, remembered, smelled, anticipated, tasted, etc.). We cannot be conscious of an object (a tasted lemon, a smelt rose, a seen table, a touched piece of silk) unless we are aware of the experience through which this object is made to appear (the tasting, smelling, seeing, touching). But this is not to say that our access to, say, the lemon is indirect, namely mediated, contaminated, or blocked by our awareness of the experience, since the given experience is not itself an object on a par with the lemon, but instead constitutes the very access to the lemon. The object is given through the experience, and if there is no awareness of the experience, the object does not appear at all. If we lose consciousness, we (or more precisely our bodies) will remain causally connected to a number of different objects, but none of these objects will appear. In short, my experience of a red cherry or a bitter lemon is the way in which these objects are there for me. The red cherry is present for me, through my seeing it. I attend to the objects through the experiences. Experiences are not objects; rather they are accesses to objects. These accesses can take different forms; one and the same object (with the exact same worldly properties) can be given in a number of different modes of givenness, it can for instance be given as perceived, imagined, or recollected. Experiential properties are not properties like red or bitter; rather they are properties pertaining to these different types of access.

Although the different modes of givenness differ from one another, they also share certain features. One common feature is the quality of mineness, the fact that the experiences are characterized by a first-personal givenness. When I am aware of an occurrent pain, perception, or thought from the first-person perspective, the experience in question is given immediately, non-inferentially and non-criterially as mine.

Whereas the object of John’s perception, along with all its properties, is intersubjectively accessible in the sense that it can in principle be given to others in the same way that it is given to John, John’s perceptual experience itself is only given directly to John. Whereas John and Mary can both perceive the numerically identical same red cherry, each of them have their own distinct perception of it, and can share these just as little as Mary can share John’s bodily pain. Mary might certainly realize that John is in pain, she might even sympathize with John, but she cannot actually feel John’s pain the same way John does. Mary has no access to the first-personal givenness of John’s experience.

This first-personal givenness of experiential phenomena is not something quite incidental to their being, a mere varnish that the experiences could lack without ceasing to be experiences. On the contrary, it is this first-
personal givenness that makes the experiences subjective. To put it differently, with a slightly risky phrasing, their first-personal givenness entails a built-in self-reference, a primitive experiential self-referentiality.\(^{13}\)

In contrast to the redness of the tomato or the bitterness of the tea (both of which are worldly properties) the mineness characterizing the perception of the redness or bitterness is not a worldly property, but an experiential property. When asked to specify 'what the experience of the object is like for the subject', this is exactly one of the features to mention. In short, the experiential dimension does not have to do with the existence of ineffable qualia, it has to do with this dimension of first-personal experiencing.

The 'what it is like' question has two sides to it: 'what is the object like for the subject' and 'what is the experience of the object like for the subject'. But although these two sides can be conceptually and phenomenologically distinguished, distinguishability is not the same as separability. It is not as if the two sides or aspects of phenomenal experience can be detached and encountered in separation from each other. When I touch the cold surface of a refrigerator is the sensation of coldness that I then feel a property of the experienced object, or rather a property of the experience of the object? The correct answer is that the sensory experience contains two different dimensions to it, namely a distinction between the sensing and the sensed, and that we can focus upon either. Phenomenology pays attention to the givenness of the object. But it does not simply focus on the object exactly as it is given, it also focuses on the subjective side of consciousness, thereby becoming aware of our subjective accomplishments and the intentionality that is at play in order for the object to appear as it does. When we investigate appearing objects, we also disclose ourselves as datives of manifestation, as those to whom objects appear.

To put it differently, when speaking of a first-person perspective, when speaking of a dimension of first-personal experiencing, it would be a mistake to argue that this is something that exclusively concerns the type of access that a given subject has to its own experiences, whereas the access to objects in the common world is independent of a first-person perspective, precisely in that it involves a third-person perspective. This line of thought will not do, and for the following reason: Obviously, I can be directed at intersubjectively accessible objects, but although my access to these objects is of the very same kind as the access of other persons, this does not imply that there is no first-person perspective involved. Rather, intersubjectively accessible objects are intersubjectively accessible precisely in so far as they can in principle be accessed directly from each and every first-person perspective. They thereby differ from experiences, which are in principle only directly accessible from the very same first-person perspective that they themselves constitute. Phrased differently, every givenness, be it the givenness of mental states, or the givenness of physical objects, involves a first-person perspective. There is no pure third-person perspective, just as there is no view from nowhere. To believe in the existence of such a pure third-person perspective is to succumb to an objectivist illusion. Of course, this is not to say that there is no third-person perspective, but merely that such a perspective is exactly a perspective from somewhere. It is a view that we can adopt on the world. It is a perspective that is founded upon a first-person perspective, or to be more exact it emerges out of the encounter between at least two first-person perspectives, that is, it involves intersubjectivity.\(^{14}\)

To summarize: The phenomenal dimension covers both domains: 1) what the object is like for the subject, and 2) what the experience of the object is like for the subject. The moment we are dealing with manifestation or appearance we are faced with the phenomenal dimension. In fact, the 'what it is like' is exactly a question of how something appears to me, that is, it is a question of how it is given to and experienced by me. When I imagine a unicorn, desire an ice-cream, anticipate a holiday, or reflect upon an economic crisis, all of
these experiences bring me into the presence of different intentional objects. What this means is not only that I am phenomenally acquainted with a series of worldly properties such as blue, sweet, or heavy, it also involve that the object is there for me in different modes of givenness (as imagined, perceived, recollected, anticipated etc). Both the worldly properties of the appearing object and the experiential properties of the modes of givenness are part of the phenomenal dimension. They are not to be separated, but neither are they to be confused.

In short, the wrong conclusion to draw from an intentionalistic interpretation of phenomenal qualities is that there is no hard problem of consciousness but only the easy problem of intentionality (information processing). The right conclusion to draw is that intentionality has a first-person aspect to it that makes it part of the hard problem, and that it resists reductive explanation just as much as phenomenality does.

3. The Janus-face of experience

Even if it is true that intentionality and phenomenality are related, the nature of this relation still remains open for discussion. Is it intrinsic or extrinsic? Is it essential or merely contingent? To claim that it is contingent, that is, to claim that intentionality is indifferent to whether it takes place in a conscious or unconscious medium is to subscribe to something McGinn has called the Medium Conception. According to this view, the relation between consciousness and intentionality is like the relation between a medium of representation and the message it conveys. On one side, we have the medium of sound, shape, or experience, and on the other, the content of meaning and reference. Each side can be investigated in separation from the other since their relation is completely contingent. Thus, according to this view, consciousness is nothing but a (rather mysterious) medium in which something relatively mundane, namely intentionality, is contingently embedded (McGinn, 1991, 35). But is this really convincing?

On the face of it, what the experience is like and what it is of are by no means independent properties. Phenomenologists have typically argued that every appearance is an appearance of something for someone. Every appearance always has its genitive and dative. More recently, McGinn has made the same point, and has argued that experiences are Janus-faced: They have a world-directed aspect, they present the world in a certain way, but at the same time they also involve presence to the subject, and hence a subjective point of view. In short, they are of something other than the subject and they are like something for the subject, and as McGinn then continues: ”But these two faces do not wear different expressions: for what the experience is like is a function of what it is of, and what it is of is a function of what it is like. Told that an experience is as of a scarlet sphere you know what it is like to have it; and if you know what it is like to have it, then you know how it represents things. The two faces are, as it were, locked together. The subjective and the semantic are chained to each other.”(McGinn, 1991, 29-30). In other words, the intentional and semantic content of an experience stands in an intimate relation to its phenomenal character and vice versa. But if what we are aware of is inextricably bound up with how it appears to us, phenomenal consciousness is not epiphenomenal, but rather cognitively indispensable.

Of course, it is possible to find a variety of different views on the matter. Some would say that intentionality is only a feature of conscious states, i.e., that only consciousness is in possession of genuine intentionality, and that any other ascription of intentionality is either derived or metaphorical (Searle, 1998, 92-
One line of argumentation in favor of such a view would be a line stressing the intrinsic connection between experience, meaning, and intentionality. As Strawson puts it: "[M]eaning is always a matter of something meaning something to something. In this sense, nothing means anything in an experienceless world. There is no possible meaning, hence no possible intention, hence no possible intentionality, on an experienceless planet [...]. There is no entity that means anything in this universe. There is no entity that is about anything. There is no semantic evaluability, no truth, no falsity. None of these properties are possessed by anything until experience begins. There is a clear and fundamental sense in which meaning, and hence intentionality, exists only in the conscious moment [...]" (Strawson, 1994, 208-209). Strawson consequently claims that experience is a necessary condition for genuine aboutness, and he suggests that there is an analogy between the sense in which a sleeping person might be said to be in possession of beliefs, preferences, etc. and the sense in which a CD might be said to contain music when it is not being played by a CD player. Considered merely as physical systems neither of them are intrinsically about one thing rather than another, neither of them have any intrinsic (musical or mental) content. Strictly speaking, "it is no more true to say that there are states of the brain, or of Louis, that have intrinsic mental content, when Louis is in a dreamless and experienceless sleep, than it is true to say that there are states of a CD that have intrinsic musical content as it sits in its box." (Strawson, 1994, 167).

However, apart from outright denying the existence of genuine non-conscious intentionality, there is also another option open. One might accept the existence of a non-conscious form of intentionality, but still argue that non-conscious intentionality and conscious intentionality has nothing (or very little) in common, for which reason an elucidation of the first type of intentionality throws no light upon the kind of intentionality that we find in conscious life. It is not possible to account for the intentionality of my experience without accounting for the phenomenal aspect of the experience as well, and it is impossible to account for the phenomenal aspect of the experience without referring to its intentionality. Any discussion of intentional consciousness that left out the question of phenomenal consciousness (and vice versa) would be severely deficient. In short, when it comes to conscious intentionality we need an integrated approach. For this reason, Chalmers’s distinction between the hard and the easy problems of consciousness is problematic. What he calls the easy problems of consciousness are either part of the hard problem or not about consciousness at all.

4. Conclusion

This article has had three aims: To problematize Chalmers’s distinction between the hard and easy problems of consciousness; to offer some reflections on the relationship between intentionality and experience; and finally to point to some of the convergences between contemporary analytical philosophy of mind and phenomenology.

As for the first aim, I don’t think anything needs to be added. As for the second, all that I have been able to offer have been some preliminary reflections, and there are course many additional problems that have been left untouched. To mention a few: There is the question about the existence of the unconscious, and about so-called dispositional beliefs. How do they fit into the framework presented above? There is also the entire discussion between internalism and externalism. Externalists typically claim that differences in thought can be extraphenomenally fixed. If this is true, what implications does it have for the relation between intentionality and experience? Then there is the question of how an intentionalistic interpretation of phenomenal qualities can handle cases of hallucinations. And finally, what about the objection that the attempt to argue for an intimate
A phenomenon of consciousness that is bound to provoke the Wittgensteinians. But how should one defuse their criticism? All of these questions are topics in need of further treatment.

Let me spend some more time on the third issue, however. In recent years the issues of subjectivity, phenomenal consciousness, and selfhood have once again become central and respectable topics in analytical philosophy. This change in orientation has in general made analytical philosophers much more receptive to phenomenology. In fact, it is now almost commonplace to argue that any convincing theory of mind has to take phenomenology into account. However, this ready use of the term ‘phenomenology’ is to some extent rather misleading. When speaking of phenomenology the vast majority of analytical philosophers are simply referring to a first-person description of what the ‘what it is like’ of experience is really like. Phenomenology is in other words identified with some kind of introspectionism. But for anybody familiar with Continental philosophy, this notion of phenomenology will appear as both tame and lame. Given the recent developments in analytical philosophy of mind it would make much more sense to engage in a discussion with the kind of phenomenology that was inaugurated by Husserl, and developed and transformed by, among many others, Scheler, Heidegger, Fink, Gurwitsch, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, and Henry. The fact that subjectivity has always been of central concern to phenomenologists, and that they have devoted much time to a close scrutiny of the first-person perspective, the structures of experience, time-consciousness, body-awareness, self-awareness, intentionality, and so forth, makes them into obvious interlocutors.16

In my discussion of the relationship between intentionality and experience I have tried to show that contemporary analytical philosophy of mind and (Continental) phenomenology have a number of common concerns.17 However, in the beginning of the article I briefly mentioned that a more open exchange between the two traditions might not only help prevent further unintended repetitions, but that it might also bring the contemporary debate to a higher level of sophistication. I am not sure that I have already succeeded in demonstrating the later claim. This is in part because I chose to focus on a number of existing similarities and overlaps. This choice was propaedeutically motivated: If an exchange is to be encouraged, it is first necessary to show that the much discussed gap between analytical philosophy and continental philosophy, a gap which has often been taken to be so wide that it prevents any kind of dialogue, is a fiction. However, although the mere existence of overlaps might be fascinating, if the discussion is to move forward it is not the overlaps that are of real interest, it is the (relevant) differences. In other words, the reason why analytical philosophers should pay more attention to phenomenology is not because the latter tradition contains analyses that are fully up to date with what is currently going on in analytical philosophy of mind. No, the real reason is of course that phenomenology is still way ahead of analytical philosophy when it comes to the investigation of certain aspects of consciousness. In contrast to many analytical philosophers, the phenomenologists have never taken the problem of consciousness to be first and foremost a question of how to relate consciousness to the brain, first and foremost a question of how to reduce consciousness to mind- and meaningless matter. Not only have they considered this enterprise to be futile for various conceptual reasons, but they have also typically argued that such a take completely overlooks the urgent need for a thorough investigation of phenomenological consciousness on its own terms. To put it differently, although the phenomenologists have typically conceived of the experiential dimension as being so fundamental that no non-circular explanation of it is possible, they would deny that such an outlook puts a hold on further analysis. After all, there is much more to the question of phenomenal consciousness than a mere recognition of its irreducibility. A thorough elucidation of its structures requires a closer investigation of such issues as selfhood, first-person givenness, attention, thematic and
marginal consciousness, reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness, inner time-consciousness, body-awareness, etc.

Given the richness of the phenomenological analyses of consciousness, and given that many of the conclusions that have lately been reached by analytical philosophers are in fact rediscoveries; the habitual stance of analytical philosophy towards phenomenology – which has ranged from complete disregard to outright hostility – can only be characterized as counterproductive. But just as phenomenology has something to offer analytical philosophy, phenomenology can certainly also profit, not only from the analytical discussions of, for instance, indexicality, the first-person perspective, internalism vs. externalism, and the possibility of pre-linguistic experience, but also from the conceptual clarity and problem-oriented approach found in analytical philosophy. Thus, the very attempt to engage in dialogue with analytical philosophy might hopefully force phenomenology to become more problem-oriented and thereby counteract what is currently one of its greatest weaknesses: its preoccupation with exegesis. One concrete step would be for those trained in phenomenology to make more of an attempt to formulate their reflections in a relatively non-technical manner. Much could be achieved by such a gesture. It would be bound to facilitate constructive discussions with those figures in analytical philosophy that more or less on their own have started to work on phenomenological themes. And it would be a pity to miss the opportunity for dialogue that is currently at hand.18

NOTES

1 Chalmers insists that the phenomenology and the psychology of mind are systematically related. The phenomenal structure is mirrored by the psychological structure and vice versa. Whenever there is conscious experience, there is also some corresponding information processing going on, and whenever there is information available in the cognitive system for control of behavior, there will also be a corresponding conscious experience. Consciousness and cognition consequently coheres in a systematic and intimate way, and Chalmers speaks of an isomorphic relation, which he calls the principle of structural coherence (Chalmers, 1995, 212-213, 1996, 218-225).

2 Using a decidedly Husserlian jargon, Siewert has recently spoken of noetic phenomenal features (Siewert, 1998, 284). Sticking to the distinction between propositional content and attitude, one could argue that there is what one could call a qualitative feel to the different propositional attitudes.

3 However, this does not entail that two experiences that differ in their ‘what it is like’ cannot intend the same object, nor does it entail that two experiences that are alike in their ‘what it is like’ must necessarily intend the same object.

4 When we think a certain thought, for instance the thought ‘Paris is the capital of France’, the thinking will often be accompanied by a non-vocalized utterance, an aural imagery or auralization, of the very string of words used to express the thought. When we think the thought, we frequently ‘hear’ the sentence for our inner ear. At the same time, the thought will also frequently evoke certain ‘mental images’, say, visualizations of the Eiffel Tower, of baguettes, etc. It could be argued that abstract thoughts are accompanied by mental imagery and that the phenomenal qualities to be encountered in abstract thought are in fact constituted by this imagery. However, as
Husserl already made clear in *Logical Investigation* this attempt to deny that thinking has any distinct phenomenality to it, is problematic. As Husserl points out, there is a marked difference between what it is like to auralize a certain string of meaningless noise, and what it is like to auralize the very same string, but this time understanding and meaning something by it (Husserl, 1984, 46-47, 398). Since the phenomenality of the auralization is the same in both cases, the phenomenal difference must be located elsewhere, namely in the thinking itself. The case of homonyms and synonyms also clearly demonstrate that the phenomenality of thinking and the phenomenality of aural imagery can vary independently of each other. As for the attempt to identify the phenomenal quality of thought with the phenomenal quality of visualization a similar argument can be employed. Two different thoughts, say, ‘Paris is the capital of France’, and ‘Parisians regularly consume baguettes’ might be accompanied by the same visualization of baguettes, but what it is like to think the two thoughts remain very different. Having demonstrated this much, Husserl then proceeds to criticize the view according to which the imagery actually constitutes the very meaning of the thought: To understand what is being thought is to have the appropriate ‘mental image’ before one’s inner eye (Husserl, 1984, 67-72). The arguments he employs bear a striking resemblance to some of the ideas that were subsequently used by Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations*: 1. From time to time, the thoughts we are thinking, for instance thoughts like ‘every algebraic equation of uneven grade has at least one real root’ will in fact not be accompanied by any imagery whatsoever. If the meaning were actually located in the ‘mental images,’ the thoughts in question would be meaningless, but this is not the case. 2. Frequently, our thoughts, for instance the thought that ‘the horrors of World War I had a decisive impact on post-war painting’ will in fact evoke certain visualizations, but visualizations of quite unrelated matters. To suggest that the meanings of the thoughts are to be located in such images is of course absurd. 3. Furthermore, the fact that the meaning of a thought can remain the same although the accompanying imagery varies also precludes any straightforward identification. 4. Absurd thoughts like the thought of a square circle is not meaningless, but it can never be accompanied by a matching image, since a visualization of a square circle is impossible in principle. 5. Finally, referring to Descartes famous example in the 6. Meditation, Husserl points out that we can easily distinguish thoughts like ‘a chiliagon is a many sided polygon’, and ‘a myriagon is a many sided polygon’, although the imagery that accompany both thoughts might be indistinguishable. Thus, as Husserl concludes, although imagery might function as an aid to the understanding, it is not what is understood, it does not constitute the meaning of the thought (Husserl, 1984, 71). As Siewert later concludes (having independently covered much of the same ground as Husserl): Wittgenstein has “long warned us off the error assimilating thought and understanding to mental imagery. But we ought not to correct Humean confusion on this point, only to persist in the empiricist tradition’s equally noxious error of supposing thought and understanding to be *experiential*, only if *imagistic.*” (Siewert, 1998, 305-306).

\(^5\) As Siewert has argued convincingly, the phenomenality of thinking is not a single phenomenally unvarying or monotonous experience. It is not as if the ‘what it is like’ to have conscious thoughts is the same, no matter what these thoughts are about; rather the phenomenal character of thinking is in continual modulation (Siewert, 1998, 278-282).

This might sound like externalism. But actually, it is questionable whether the very choice between internalism and externalism, an alternative based on the division between inner and outer—is reference determined by factors internal to the mind, or by factors external to the mind?—is at all acceptable to the phenomenologists. Already in *Logical Investigations* Husserl argued that the notions of inner and outer, notions which he claimed expressed a naive commonsensical metaphysics, were inappropriate when it came to understanding the nature of intentionality (cf. Husserl, 1984, 673, 708). This rejection of a commonsensical split between mind and world is even more pronounced after Husserl’s transcendental turn. In *Cartesian Meditations*, for instance, Husserl writes that it is absurd to conceive of consciousness and true being as if they were merely externally related, when the truth is that they are essentially interdependent and united (Husserl, 1976, 117. Cf. Husserl, 1959, 432). If we pass on to Heidegger, he is also famous for having argued that the relation between Dasein and world could not be grasped with the help of the concepts ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ As he writes in *Being and Time*: In directing itself toward...and in grasping something, Da-sein does not first go outside of the inner sphere in which it is initially encapsulated, but, rather, in its primary kind of being, it is always already ‘outside’ together with some being encountered in the world already discovered. Nor is any inner sphere abandoned when Da-sein dwells together with a being to be known and determines its character. Rather, even in this ‘being outside’ together with its object, Da-sein is ‘inside’ correctly understood; that is, it itself exists as the being-in-the-world which knows.” (Heidegger, 1996, 58). In my view, the phenomenological analyses of intentionality (be it Husserl’s, Heidegger’s, or Merleau-Ponty’s) all entail such a fundamental rethinking of the very relation between subjectivity and environment that it no longer makes sense to designate them as being either internalist or externalist. This claim might be relatively uncontroversial when it comes to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, but it is controversial when it comes to Husserl, since he (at least by Anglo-American philosophers) is frequently interpreted as a prototypical internalist and methodological solipsist. However, I believe that this interpretation is based on something that approaches a complete misunderstanding of what Husserl is up to (including a misinterpretation of his concept of noema, and of his notion of phenomenological reduction), but it would lead too far to argue for this claim here. See however Zahavi, 2003a.

This also happens to be Putnam’s view (cf. Putnam 1999, 156). For a discussion of some of the many affinities between Putnam’s recent reflections and views found in phenomenology, cf. Zahavi, 2003b.

In contrast to the phenomenologists, however, both Tye and Dretske are representationalists; they have no qualms speaking of experiences as representing the outside world.

To speak of worldly properties in this context should not be misunderstood. It does not entail any metaphysical claims concerning the subject-independent existence of the said properties. The claim being made is merely that the properties in question are properties of the experienced objects, and not of the experience of the objects.

Carruthers further argues that Dretske’s and Tye’s first-order representational theories of consciousness are incapable of accounting for the difference between these two aspects, and that a kind of higher-order representational theory is called for (Carruthers, 1998, 209). I disagree with this view, but it would lead too far to

12 It could be objected that it is misleading to suggest that experiences can be given in more than one way. Either an experience is given from a first-person perspective, or it is not given at all. But I think this is mistake. It is correct, that experiences must always be given from a first-person perspective, otherwise they wouldn’t be experiences, but this doesn’t prevent them from being given from a second-person perspective as well. Let us assume that I crash, and that I am being scolded by the driver whose car I have just damaged. That the driver is angry is not something I infer on the basis of an argument from analogy, it is something I immediately experience (cf. Scheler, 1973, 254, Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 52-53). That I experience the anger of the other, doesn’t imply that my experience is infallible (perhaps the driver is actually happy about the accident, since he can now finally get a new car, but he simply doesn’t want to show his real feelings), nor that the anger of the other is given to me in the same way that it is given to the driver himself. The anger is exactly given from a second-person perspective to me. If one denies that experiences can be given in this way, if one, in other words, categorically denies that we can experience other’s experiences, one is confronted with the threat of solipsism (cf. Zahavi, 2001a).


15 Does it make sense to speak of an unconscious tasting of coffee? An unconscious hearing and appreciation of Miles Davis? An unconscious desiring for chocolate? If an unconscious experience is to deserve its name, and not merely be an objective, physical process, it must presumably be subjective. After all, we do not call a stone, a table or the blood in our veins unconscious. But where is this subjectivity to manifest itself? Supposedly in the particular first-person givenness of the experience. But it is difficult to imagine how an unconscious experience should possess such a feature. Unconscious experiences are per definition without a first-person givenness; there is nothing it is like for the subject to have them. But can one really abstract the peculiar subjective givenness of the experience from the experience and still retain an experience, or is the ontology of experiencing not rather a first-person ontology? If it is a defining feature of an experience that there is necessarily something it is like for the subject to have it, it will be just as non-sensical to speak of an unconscious experience as to speak of an unconscious consciousness (something that even Freud refrained from doing, cf. Freud, 1945, 434). Of course, this does not exclude that there might be different non-conscious states and processes that play a causal role in our experience, but to speak of such non-conscious processes is not per se to speak of unconscious experiences. Flanagan has recently introduced a distinction between <experiential sensitivity> and <informational sensitivity>. Somebody may be experientially insensitive but informationally sensitive to a certain difference. When we are merely informationally sensitive to something, we are not conscious of it, that is, pure informational sensitivity, or to use a better expression, pure informational pickup and processing is non-conscious. It is a processing without phenomenal awareness (Flanagan, 1992, 55-56, 147). Subjectivity has to do with experiential sensitivity, and it is only the latter that lets us have phenomenal access to the object. But although it might be appropriate to operate with a notion of non-conscious informational processing, I think one should be careful not to assume that the informational sensitivity
provides us with a non-phenomenal version of the exact same information as the experiential sensitivity. To suggest something like that is once again to flirt with the view that consciousness is cognitively epiphenomenal.

16 Back in 1995, in a book entitled *Approaches to Intentionality*, William Lyons gave a detailed overview of a number of contemporary theories of intentionality. He distinguished between an ‘instrumentalist approach’ (Dennett), a ‘representationalist approach’ (Fodor), a ‘teleological approach’ (Millikan), an ‘information-processing approach’ (Dretske), and a ‘functionalist approach’ (Loar). In the introduction prefacing his discussion of these different approaches, Lyons briefly remarked that contemporary theories deny the claim of Brentano and Husserl: That consciousness is essential to intentionality (Lyons, 1995, 4). This appraisal provokes three critical questions: The first is whether Lyons account is already outdated. As part of the general ‘consciousness boom’, the relation between consciousness and intentionality is currently once again up for discussion. The second is whether Lyons account was already outdated when he wrote it: Not only does it seem rather strange that Lyons ignored Searle’s theory of intentionality, but even more to the point: Lyons apparently thought that theories of intentionality were an exclusive concern of analytical philosophy. Thus, he made no reference whatsoever to the theories of intentionality found in twentieth century German and French thought. A final critical comment concerns Lyons’s repeated tendency to place Brentano and Husserl side by side. Lyons is not alone in making them two of a kind (though it is rather strange to see Husserl’s theory of intentionality described as nineteenth century theory [Lyons, 1995, 3]), but that Lyons’s view is shared by many other analytical philosophers does not make it any more true. Not only are there absolutely crucial differences between Brentano’s and Husserl’s theory of intentionality (this is the case even for Husserl’s early theory in *Logical Investigations*), but to have Brentano’s theory of intentionality presented again and again as the sole Continental alternative to the approaches found in analytical philosophy, as is frequently being done by analytical philosophers, reveals an astonishing lack of familiarity with the philosophical tradition.

17 Another area is the issue of self-awareness. The phenomenological investigation of self-awareness has typically been set in the context of a discussion of such diverse issues as spatiality, embodiment, temporality, intersubjectivity, attention, and so forth. However, it is also a characteristic feature of recent analytical philosophy that an increasing number of philosophers have distanced themselves from traditional armchair philosophy and abandoned the attempt to capture the basic structures of mind solely by means of a priori conceptual analysis. Instead, they have started to engage in dialogue with empirical science, and to draw upon the resources found in cognitive science, psychopathology, neuropsychology, and developmental psychology. As a result, they have become aware of the interplay between subjectivity, embodiment, and environment, and have reached conclusions on issues such as the existence of prelinguistic forms of self-awareness, the bodily roots of self-experience, and the connection between exteroception and proprioception, that all bear a striking resemblance to views already found in phenomenology. Cf. Zahavi, 1999 and 2002.

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