If one comes to Phénoménologie de la perception after having read Sein und Zeit (or Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs) one will be in for a surprise. Both works contain a number of both implicit and explicit references to Husserl, but the presentation they give is so utterly different, that one might occasionally wonder whether they are referring to the same author. Thus nobody can overlook that Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of Husserl differs significantly from Heidegger’s. It is far more charitable. In fact, when evaluating the merits of respectively Husserl and Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty often goes very much against the standard view. This is not only the case in his notorious remark on the very first page of Phénoménologie de la Perception where he declares that the whole of Sein und Zeit is nothing but an explication of Husserl’s notion of Lifeworld, but also - to give just one further example - in one of his Sorbonne-lectures, where Merleau-Ponty writes that Husserl took the issue of historicity far more seriously than Heidegger.\\(^1\\)

1. Husserl and the Merleau-Pontyean

My point of departure will be the slightly surprising fact that a large number of Merleau-Ponty scholars have questioned the validity of Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Husserl. Let me illustrate this with a few references.

In his book The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty Gary Madison writes that Merleau-Ponty in the central essay ‘The Philosopher and His Shadow’ attempts to unearth the implications of Husserl’s late philosophy and to think his ‘unthought thought’. But as Madison then continues, “the essay is no doubt more interesting for what it tells us about Merleau-Ponty’s own late thought.”.\\(^2\\) Thus, according to Madison, the essay is not so much about what Husserl did say, as it is about what he should have said, and it must consequently be read as an exposition of Merleau-Ponty’s own thoughts rather than as a genuine Husserl-interpretation.\\(^3\\) And as he then adds: “I do not mean to say that Merleau-Ponty completely misunderstood Husserlian philosophy [...] but only that he did not want or could not believe that Husserl was nothing more than the idealist he was.”.\\(^4\\)

In Dillon’s book Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology we find a very similar interpretation. Speaking of the same essay from 1959, Dillon writes: “Just as he finds his own thought in the unthought of Husserl, the Husserl Merleau-Ponty finds reason to praise is frequently an extrapolation of his own philosophy.”.\\(^5\\) And Dillon then basically continues along the same line as Madison: If Husserl had rigorously pursued the ontological implications of the notion of the lifeworld which he set forth in Krisis “he might have altered his own transcendental idealism (with all its latent solipsism) and arrived at a position similar to Merleau-Ponty’s. But the fact is that Husserl never abandoned the reductions or the idealism to which they inevitably lead.”.\\(^6\\)

To mention just one more example: In his book Sense and Subjectivity. A Study of Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty Philip Dwyer writes that although Merleau-Ponty occasionally tries to make excuses for Husserl and even distorts his doctrine in order to make it more palatable, the fact remains that for the most part, Husserl’s work was antithetical to Merleau-Ponty’s.\\(^7\\) And as Dwyer then concludes: “In my view, what, for the most part, Husserl meant by and practiced as ‘phenomenology’ can only be described as giving new meaning to the word ‘muddled.’ The less said about the details of Husserl’s philosophy the better.”.\\(^8\\)

Given Merleau-Ponty’s persistent and rather enthusiastic (though by no means uncritical) interest in Husserl - an occupation that lasted throughout his life, and which actually increased rather than diminished in the course of time\\(^9\\) - this unwillingness among Merleau-Ponty scholars to take his Husserl-interpretation seriously is somewhat astonishing. Why this certainty that the philosophy of the two are anti-thetical, and that Merleau-Ponty must have misrepresented Husserl’s position more or less knowingly in order to make it less offensive? Some of the reasons have already been mentioned. In the eyes of a number of Merleau-Ponty scholars, Husserl remained an intellectualist, an idealist, and a solipsist to the very end, regardless of what Merleau-Ponty might have said to the contrary.
If we take another look at Madison’s and Dillon’s accounts, we will basically encounter a criticism of Husserl that seems to owe much more to Heidegger’s reading of Husserl, than to Merleau-Ponty’s. In their view, Husserl held unto the idea of a self-transparent transcendental ego that could be fully disclosed through systematic reflection. This transcendental ego was moreover conceived along the lines of a transcendental onlooker for whom its own body, worldly things, and other subjects would be but constituted objects spread out before its gaze. Thus Dillon and Madison imply that Husserl understood transcendental subjectivity as a sovereign spirit which reigns supremely over the world as its original creator and as the final judge of truth and value. Husserl consequently remained an immanentist and intellectualist. He never realized the significance of the Other, he never understood the problem of passivity, and he never acknowledged the role of the body, but unto the very end located the sole constitutive foundation in the pure agency of the transcendental ego.

On what textual basis do Madison and Dillon base this interpretation? Unfortunately both of them seem to consider the criticism they express to be so very much the received opinion that they deem a thorough documentation to be unnecessary. This is in particular the case for Madison, whose work contains amazingly few references to Husserl’s own writings. The situation is slightly better in Dillon, but even he does not always bother to substantiate his criticism and when he finally does, the only works he refers to are from the usual group, i.e., Die Idee der Phänomenologie, Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, Ideen I, Cartesiansche Meditationen and Krisis. For somebody not familiar with Husserl’s writings, this might seem to be more than sufficient, but as any Husserl scholar will know, the fact that Dillon does not refer to the posthumously published material makes a decisive difference. Not only does it imply that he never refers to the work by Husserl that had the greatest impact on Merleau-Ponty, namely Ideen II, but neither does he draw on volumes like Erste Philosophie II, Erfahrung und Urteil, Analysen zur passiven Synthese, or Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität I-III, all of which contain material that are highly pertinent when it comes to the issues that Merleau-Ponty claimed to find in Husserl.

As has been known for a long time thanks to Van Breda’s article ‘Maurice Merleau-Ponty et les Archives-Husserl à Louvain’ Merleau-Ponty got access to some of Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts very early on. In fact, when he arrived in Louvain in April 1939, he was the very first foreigner to visit the Husserl-Archives, and his interest in Husserl’s research-manuscripts persisted until the very end. The reason being no doubt that he saw the main thrust of Husserl’s work to be contained in these manuscripts. As he wrote in a letter from 1942: “After all, Husserl’s philosophy is almost entirely contained in the unpublished manuscripts...” A remark that merely echoes Husserl’s own estimation. As Husserl writes to Adolf Grimm in 1931: “Indeed, the largest and, as I actually believe, most important part of my life’s work still lies in my manuscripts, scarcely manageable because of their volume.”

To formulate my point more directly. I think the reason many Merleau-Ponty scholars have had difficulties in accepting Merleau-Ponty’s visionary if not to say revolutionary interpretation of Husserl is because they in contrast to Merleau-Ponty himself failed to take Husserl’s research-manuscripts into account. I think Merleau-Ponty did in fact capture some important submerged tendencies in Husserl’s thinking. Tendencies which might not be very obvious if one sticks to the works published during Husserl’s life, but which become overwhelmingly clear if one - as is nowadays a must - draws upon the volumes subsequently published in Husserliana. Thus to a certain extent, I will even argue that Merleau-Ponty did not go far enough. The publication of Husserliana has shown that Husserl did in fact think through some of the themes, that Merleau-Ponty still took to belong to his unthought.

What I intend to do in the following is to pick out some of Merleau-Ponty’s central assertions, and then try to match them with statements taken from Husserl’s posthumously published works, i.e., from material not considered by Madison and Dillon.

- I will start off with Merleau-Ponty’s claim that Husserl’s phenomenological reduction might have more in common with Heidegger’s emphasis on our Being-in-the-world than with any traditional idealism. As Merleau-Ponty puts it in the preface to Phénoménologie de la perception: The aim of the reduction is not to let us withdraw from the world in order to uncover a detached constituting consciousness but on the contrary to thematize our intentional rapport with the world. A relation that is so pervasive and tight, that we normally fail to notice it.
- I will next consider Merleau-Ponty’s statement in Signes to the effect that Husserl eventually abandoned the idea of a static relationship between the constituted and the constituting, and instead discovered a reciprocity and reversibility between nature and incarnated subjectivity.
I will then turn to the issue of embodiment. According to Merleau-Ponty Husserl ascribed a significant constitutive role to the body and was particularly interested in its unique subject-object structure, since he saw it as a key to an understanding of intersubjectivity.  

This will lead me to Merleau-Ponty’s claim that Husserl’s archeological effort to go beyond the theoretical, ethical, and objectifying level of act-intentionality made him discover the existence of an operative intentionality characterized by anonymity and passivity.

The final issue I wish to consider, is Merleau-Ponty’s repeated claim that Husserl considered transcendental subjectivity to be an intersubjectivity. One finds statements to this effect in for instance Phénoménologie de la perception, Signes and Sens et non-sens.

2. Reduction and constitution

Let me start out by briefly outlining what I take to be Husserl’s mature view on the reduction. As is well known, Husserl claims that it is necessary to suspend our naive and dogmatic presuppositions concerning the ontological status of the world and instead follow the principle of principles, that is to regard every originary intuition as the legitimizing source of cognition, if we wish to commence our phenomenological exploration. That is, in order to avoid unjustified ontological presuppositions, one has to undertake a radical reduction towards the phenomenologically given. Contrary to repeated misunderstandings, this reduction, however, does not imply a negation, an abandonment, a bracketing or an exclusion of the transcendent world. Quite to the contrary, the purpose of the epoché and reduction is exactly to enable us to approach the world in a way that will allow for a disclosure of its true sense.

And to speak of the sense of reality in this context does not, as Husserl will eventually add, imply that the being of reality, i.e., the really existing world, is somehow excluded from the phenomenological sphere of research. As Husserl writes in respectively Krisis and Erste Philosophie II:

> What must be shown in particular and above all is that through the epoché a new way of experiencing, of thinking, of theorizing, is opened to the philosopher; here, situated above his own natural being and above the natural world, he loses nothing of their being and their objective truths.

First of all, it is better to avoid speaking of a phenomenological ‘residuum,’ and likewise of ‘excluding the world.’ Such language readily misleads us into thinking that from now on, the world would no longer figure as a phenomenological theme, leaving only the ‘subjective’ acts, modes of appearance, etc., related to the world. In a certain way this is indeed correct. But when universal subjectivity is posited in legitimate validity -- in its full universality, and, of course, as transcendental -- then what lies within it, on the correlate-side, is the world itself, as legitimately existing, along with everything that it is in truth: thus the theme of a universal transcendental inquiry also includes the world itself, with all its true being.

These passages clearly indicate that the epoché and the reduction do not imply a loss. They do not make us turn our attention away from the worldly objects, but permit us to examine them in a new light, namely in their appearance or manifestation for consciousness, that is qua constituted correlates. The passage from Erste Philosophie II is particularly illuminating since Husserl indicates that the exclusive interest in subjectivity is only apparent. The moment a proper transcendental interpretation of this subjectivity is in place, it will be revealed that its examination ultimately includes a study of all of its constituted transcendental correlates as well, for which reason nothing is strictly speaking left out. To put it differently, and this is repeatedly emphasized by Husserl, eventually phenomenology incorporates everything it had first bracketed for methodological reasons:

> The excluding has at the same time the characteristic of a revaluing change in sign; and with this change the revalued affair finds a place once again in the phenomenological sphere. Figuratively speaking, that which is parenthesized is not erased from the phenomenological blackboard but only parenthesized, and thereby provided with an index. As having the latter it is, however, part of the major theme of inquiry (3/159 [1982, 171]. Cf 3/107, 6/155, 6/184)
To perform the epoché and the reduction is to carry out a change of attitude that makes a fundamental discovery possible, thus, ultimately enlarging our sphere of experience.\textsuperscript{26} Suddenly the perpetually functioning but until then, concealed transcendental subjectivity is revealed. This is why Husserl in \textit{Krisis} can compare the performance of the epoché with the transition from a two-dimensional to a three-dimensional life.\textsuperscript{27}

The effectuation of the epoché does not imply an exclusion (\textit{Ausschaltung}) of the world, but merely a suspension of our naïve and dogmatic believes concerning the nature and character of its existence. The so-called exclusion of the world is in reality an exclusion of a prejudiced conception of the world:

The real actuality is not ‘reinterpreted,’ to say nothing of its being denied; it is rather that a countersensical interpretation of the real actuality, i.e., an interpretation which contradicts the latter’s own sense as clarified by insight, is removed (3/120 [1982, 129]. Compare 8/465).

Husserl urges us to suspend our automatic positing of the world and give up our ontic preoccupation with it, in order to attend to its mode of givenness.\textsuperscript{28} We are in other words henceforth only to examine worldly objects insofar as they are being experienced, perceived, imagined, judged, used etc., i.e., insofar as they are correlated to an experience, a perception, an imagination etc. Thus, the attempt at a philosophical disclosure of the world leads indirectly to a disclosure of the correlated experiencing subjectivity, since the phenomenological approach to the world must necessarily be by way of its appearance - for subjectivity.\textsuperscript{29} An indirect approach which is particularly emphasised by Husserl in his so-called \textit{ontological way to the reduction}.

Let me repeat that the explication of constituting subjectivity takes place hand in hand with and inseparably from a philosophical clarification of the world. And it must be emphasized that the constitutive correlation to be investigated is not a correlation between consciousness and some abstract intermediary entity, but between consciousness and the transcendent worldly object itself.\textsuperscript{30} It is, as Husserl repeatedly writes, reality itself which is a constituted intentional correlate.\textsuperscript{31} And it is against this background that Husserl in both \textit{Cartesianische Meditationen} and in \textit{Erste Philosophie II} claims, that a fully developed transcendental phenomenology is \textit{eo ipso} a true and real ontology,\textsuperscript{32} where all ontological concepts are elucidated in their correlation to the constituting subjectivity.\textsuperscript{33}

In other words, contrary to some widespread misunderstandings, Husserl is not occupied with meaningtheoretical reflections without metaphysical or ontological implications. To claim that is not only to misinterpret his theory of intentionality, but also the transcendentalphilosophical nature of his thinking. As Fink remarks in an article from 1939, only a complete misunderstanding of the aim of phenomenology leads to the mistaken but often repeated claim that Husserl’s phenomenology is not interested in reality, not interested in the question of being, but only in subjective meaningformations in intentional consciousness.\textsuperscript{34}

So far so good. But does Husserl not after all speak of a constituting transcendental ego, and does the very notion of constitution not imply an asymmetry between subjectivity and world that inevitably leads to some form of idealism? As Merleau-Ponty points out, however, in his \textit{Notes de cours sur L’origine de la géométrie de Husserl}, although Husserl never stopped using the concepts of consciousness and constitution, it would be an error to overlook the decisive changes these concepts underwent in the course of his thinking.\textsuperscript{35}

Let me try to illustrate these changes by drawing attention to texts where Husserl seems to entertain the idea that the process of constitution implies reciprocity and intertwining between world and subjectivity.

But first, what exactly is \textit{constitution}? To make a very concise suggestion: Constitution must be understood as a process that allows for manifestation and signification, i.e., it must be understood as a process that permits that which is constituted to appear, unfold, articulate and show itself as what it is.\textsuperscript{36} Contrary to another widespread misunderstanding however, this process does not take place out of the blue, as if it was deliberately and impulsively initiated and dominated \textit{ex nihilo} by the transcendental ego. As Husserl points out in a manuscript from 1931, constitution has two primal sources, the primal ego and the primal non-ego. Both are inseparably one, and thus abstract if regarded on their own.\textsuperscript{37} Both are irreducible structural moments in the process of constitution, in the process of bringing to appearance. Thus, although Husserl insists that subjectivity is a condition of possibility for manifestation,
he apparently does not think that it is the only one, i.e., although it might be a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient one. Since Husserl occasionally identifies the non-ego with the world 38 - thereby operating with a more fundamental notion of the world than the concept of an objective reality which he attempted to nihilate in the (in)famous § 49 of *Ideen I* - and since he even finds it necessary to speak of the world as a *transcendental non-ego*. 39 I think one is entitled to conclude that he conceives of constitution as a process involving several intertwined transcendental constituents: Both subjectivity and world (and ultimately also intersubjectivity, cf. below). Obviously, this should not be taken as a new form of dualism. On the contrary, the idea is exactly that subjectivity and world cannot be understood in separation from each other. Thus, Husserl’s position seems very close to the one adopted by Merleau-Ponty in the following passage:

The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject which is nothing but a project of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world which the subject itself projects. The subject is a being-in-the-world and the world remains 'subjective' since its texture and articulations are traced out by the subject’s movement of transcendence. 40

To put it differently, Merleau-Ponty was certainly right in claiming that Husserl did not remain satisfied with the position he had originally advocated in *Ideen I*. As Husserl himself writes in *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität III* (with an obvious critical reference to his own earlier view): It is an abstraction to speak of a pure worldless ego-pole. The full subjectivity is a world-experiencing life. 41 And eventually, Husserl also gave up the idea of a static correlation between the constituting and the constituted. As he points out in some of his later writings, the constitutive performance is characterized by a kind of *reciprocity* insofar as the constituting agent is itself constituted in the process of constitution. Thus, Husserl claims that the constitution of the world as such implies a mundanisation of the constituting subject, 42 and he occasionally speaks about the reciprocal co-dependency existing between the constitution of space and spatial objects on the one hand and the self-constitution of the ego and the body on the other. 43 In other words, it is a misunderstanding to think that the subject could somehow refrain from constituting, just as it is a misunderstanding to think that the transcendental subject remains unaffected by its own constitutive performance:

The constituting consciousness constitutes itself, the objectivating consciousness objectivates itself -- and indeed, in such a way that it brings about an objective nature with the form of spatiotemporality; within this nature, my own lived body; and, psychophysically one with the latter (and thereby localized in natural spatiotemporality according to place, temporal position, and duration), the entire constituting life, the entire ego, with its stream of consciousness, its ego-pole and habitualities. 44

To understand Husserl’s final position on this issue it is however not sufficient to stick to the dyad subjectivity-world. Intersubjectivity must necessarily be taken into account as well as the third indispensable element. Ultimately the constitutive process is a process that takes place in a threefold structure: subjectivity-intersubjectivity-world. As Husserl already wrote in *Ideas II*: I, we, and the world belongs together. 45 The remaining and difficult task was to clarify their exact relation. I think there are strong indications that Husserl increasingly came to view the three as intrinsically intertwined. As we have already seen, Husserl took the self- and world-constitution to go hand in hand. But Husserl also claims that the world- and self-constitution takes place intersubjectively. 46 And when it comes to intersubjectivity, he explicitly states that it is unthinkable unless it is explicitly or implicitly in communion. This involves being a plurality of monads that constitutes in itself an Objective world and that spatializes, temporalizes, realizes itself - psychophysically and, in particular, as human beings - within that world. 47

I.e. the constitution of the world, the unfolding of self, and the establishing of intersubjectivity are all parts in an interrelated and simultaneous process. 48

3. The Body

5
So far I have argued that Merleau-Ponty was right when he claimed that Husserl did eventually acknowledge a certain constitutive reciprocity between subjectivity and world, a certain dialectical reversibility between the constituting and the constituted. Let me now turn to an area that might be specifically suited to illustrate this in further detail, namely Husserl’s investigation of the body.

As is well known, Husserl claims that the perception of space and spatial objects presupposes a functioning lived body. This is not only due to the body’s function as the indispensable center of orientation, but also to the constitutive contribution of its mobility. Our perception of the world is not a question of passive reception, but of active exploration. At first, Husserl merely calls attention to the importance of bodily movements (the movement of the eyes and the head, the touch of the hand, the step of the body etc.) for the experience of space and spatial objects, but ultimately he claims that perception is correlated to and accompanied by the self-sensation or self-affection of the moving body. Every visual or tactile appearance are given in correlation to a kinaesthetic experience. When I play the piano, the keys are given in conjunction with a sensation of finger-movement. When I watch a horserace, the running horse is given in conjunction with the sensation of eye-movement. This kinaesthetic experience amounts to bodily self-awareness and according to Husserl it should not be considered as a mere accompanying phenomena. On the contrary, it is absolutely indispensable when it comes to the constitution of perceptual objects.

As is clear from his investigation into the bodily roots of perceptual intentionality, Husserl was very well aware of the constitutive role of the body, and he clearly recognizes the importance of distinguishing the pre-reflective, unthematic, lived body-awareness from the thematized consciousness of the body. My original body-awareness is not a type of object-consciousness, is not a perception of the body as an object. Quite the contrary, the latter is a founded move which, like every other perceptual experience, is dependent upon and made possible by the pre-reflectively functioning body-awareness:

Here it must also be noted that in all experience of things, the lived body is co-experienced as a functioning lived body (thus not as a mere thing), and that when it itself is experienced as a thing, it is experienced in a double way -- i.e., precisely as an experienced thing and as a functioning lived body together in one.

Originally, I do not have any consciousness of my body. I am not perceiving it, I am it. Originally, my body is experienced as a unified field of activity and affectivity, as a volitional structure, as a potentiality of mobility, as an ‘I do’ and ‘I can’. My awareness of my functioning body is an immediate, pre-reflective self-awareness, and not a type of object-intentionality.

At the same time, Husserl is anxious to emphasize the peculiar two-sidedness of the body. My body is given as an interiority, as a volitional structure, and as a dimension of sensing, but it is also given as a visually and tactually appearing exteriority. As Claesges writes, “The lived body—understood in terms of the notion of a ‘double reality’—thereby simultaneously has the character of being egoic and of being foreign to the ego.” But what is the relation between that which Husserl calls the ‘Innen’ and the ‘Aussenleiblichkeit’? In both cases I am confronted with my own body. But why is the visually and tactually appearing body at all experienced as the exteriority of my body? If we examine the case of the right hand touching the left hand, the touching hand feels the surface of the touched hand. But when the left hand is touched, it is not simply given as a mere object, since it feels the touch itself. The decisive difference between touching one’s own body and everything else, be it inanimate objects or the body of Others, is consequently that it implies a double-sensation. Husserl also speaks of a bodily reflection taking place between the different parts of the body. What is crucial however is that the relation between the touching and the touched is reversible, since the touched is touched, and the touched is touching. It is this reversibility that testifies that the interiority and the exteriority are different manifestations of the same. The phenomenon of double-sensation consequently presents us with an ambiguous setting in which the hand alternates between two roles, that of touching and that of being touched. That is, the phenomenon of double-sensation provides us with an experience of the dual nature of the body. It is the very same hand which can appear in two different fashions, as alternately touched and touching. Thus, in contrast to the self-manifestation of, say, an act of judging, my bodily self-givenness permits me to confront my own exteriority. For Husserl this experience is decisive for empathy, and it serves as the springboard for diverse alienating forms of self-apprehension. Thus, it is exactly the unique subject-object status of the body, the remarkable interplay between ipseity and alterity characterizing the double-sensation which permits me to recognize and experience other embodied subjects. When my left hand touches my right, I am experiencing myself in a manner that
anticipates both the way in which an Other would experience me and the way in which I would experience an Other. This might be what Husserl is referring to when he writes that the possibility of sociality presupposes a certain intersubjectivity of the body. I hardly need to point out to what large extent this account anticipates Merleau-Ponty’s analysis.

As I have mentioned above, Husserl occasionally speaks of the reciprocal co-dependency existing between the constitution of spatial objects, on the one hand, and the constitution of the body, on the other. The very exploration and constitution of objects imply a simultaneous self-exploration and self-constitution. This is not to say that the way we live our body is a form of object-intentionality, but merely that it is an embodied subjectivity characterized by intentionality which is self-aware. The body is not first given for us and subsequently used to investigate the world. The world is given to us as bodily investigated, and the body is revealed to us in its exploration of the world. To phrase it differently, we are aware of perceptual objects by being aware of our own body and how the two interact, that is, we cannot perceive physical objects without having an accommodating bodily self-awareness, be it thematic or unthematic. But the reverse ultimately holds true as well: The body only appears to itself when it relates to something else—or to itself as Other. As Husserl writes, “We perceive the lived body [Leib] but along with it also the things that are perceived ‘by means of’ it.”

This reciprocity is probably nowhere as obvious as in the tactual sphere—the hand cannot touch without being touched and brought to givenness itself. In other words, the touching and the touched are constituted in the same process, and according to Husserl this holds true for our sensibility in general. Thus, Husserl would argue that every experience possesses both an egoic and a non-egoic dimension. These two sides can be distinguished, but not separated:

The ego is not something for itself and that which is foreign to the ego something severed from it, so that there is no way for the one to turn toward the other; rather, the ego is inseparable from what is foreign to it [...].

As Merleau-Ponty would put it (with Husserl’s approval, I believe): Subjectivity is essentially oriented and open toward that which it is not, be it worldly entities or the Other, and it is exactly in this openness that it reveals itself to itself. What is disclosed by the cogito is consequently not an enclosed immanence, a pure interior self-presence, but an openness toward alterity, a movement of exteriorization and perpetual self-transcendence. It is by being present to the world that we are present to ourselves, and it is by being given to ourselves that we can be conscious of the world.

In the light of the preceding discussion, Husserl’s view concerning the intrinsic connection between time-consciousness, affection, and incarnation cannot come as a surprise. As Husserl points out in *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*, inner time-consciousness taken on its own is a pure but abstract form. And he further characterizes the phenomenology of inner time-consciousness as an abstractive analysis which has to be complemented by a phenomenology of association dealing with the fundamental laws and forms governing the syntheses pertaining to the content. In concreto there can be no primal impression without hyletic data, and no self-temporalization in separation from the hyletic affection. That is, there can be no inner time-consciousness without a temporal content. Time-consciousness never appears in pure form but always as a pervasive sensibility, as the very sensing of the sensations: “We regard sensing as the original consciousness of time [...].” But these sensations do not appear out of nowhere. They refer us to our bodily sensibility.

But if there can be no primal impression without a hyletic content, and no hyletic content without a lived body (according to Husserl, the hyletic data are only given in correlation to kinaesthetic experiences), it must be concluded that the nature of temporality and embodiment cannot be exhaustively comprehended independently of each other. We are ultimately dealing with an incarnated temporality.

To forestall misunderstandings, let me just add that I am not arguing that Husserl would claim that every type of experience is a bodily experience. I am only claiming that he takes the lived body to be indispensable for sense-experience and thereby of crucial (founding) significance for other types of experience. As Husserl writes in *Ideen* III and II:

Of course, from the standpoint of pure consciousness sensations are the indispensable material foundation for all basic sorts of noeses [...].

Hence in this way a human being’s total consciousness is in a certain sense, by means of its hyletic substrate, bound to the body [Leib], though, to be sure, the intentional lived
experiences themselves are no longer directly and properly localized; they no longer form a stratum on the body [Leib].

4. Anonymity and passivity

Husserl has often been accused of focusing exclusively on the performance of an active and self-possessed ego. This is hardly true. If we examine the case of a simple perception, Husserl would say that I in a regular intentional act am directed at and preoccupied with my intentional object. Whenever I am intentionally directed at objects I am also pre-reflectively self-aware. But when I am directed at and occupied with objects I am not thematically conscious of myself. And when I do thematize myself in a reflection, the very act of thematization remains unthematic. In short, when subjectivity functions it is self-aware, but it is not thematically conscious of itself, and it therefore lives, as Husserl puts it, in anonymity.

One of the significant consequences of this is that there will always remain an unthematic spot in the life of the subject. It is, as Husserl says, evident that the very process of thematization does not itself belong to the thematized content, just as a perception or description does not belong to that which is perceived or described. Even a universal reflection will consequently contain a moment of naïveté, since reflection is necessarily prevented from grasping itself. It will forever miss something important, namely, itself qua anonymously functioning subject-pole.

We are confronted with a fundamental limit here. When I reflect, I encounter myself as a thematized ego, whereas the Living Present of my functioning subjectivity eludes my thematization and remains anonymous. That is, just like Merleau-Ponty, Husserl acknowledges the limits of reflection, and declares that there will always remain a difference between the lived and the understood. However, Husserl would deny that this leads to skepticism. As he points out, the elusiveness and evasiveness of lived consciousness are not deficiencies to overcome, are not results that threaten the phenomenological enterprise, but are rather to be taken as the defining traits of its pre-reflective givenness.

At this point it might be retorted that the existence of an anonymous life will remain a problem for a Husserlian phenomenology for as long as the latter adheres to the earlier mentioned principle of principles, which declares that phenomenology is supposed to base its considerations exclusively on that which is given intuitively in the phenomenological reflection. I think there is some truth in this, but I also think Husserl himself eventually realized the limitations of this methodological principle, particularly the moment he started investigating the dimension of passivity.

Thus, contrary to yet another widespread misunderstanding, Husserl did not overlook the problem of passivity. In fact, he dedicated numerous analyses to this important issue. Although our starting point might be acts in which the subject is actively taking position, that is, acts in which the subject is comparing, differentiating, judging, valuing, wishing, or willing something, Husserl is quick to point out that whenever the subject is active, it is also passive, since to be active is to react on something. And as he ultimately says, every kind of active position-taking presupposes a preceding affection.

[E]goic activity presupposes passivity - egoic passivity - and both presuppose association and preconsciousness in the form of the ultimate hyletic substratum.

In the light of this investigation of passivity, Husserl eventually conceded that the intentional activity of the subject is founded upon and conditioned by an obscure and blind passivity, by drives and associations, and he even admits that there are constitutive processes of an anonymous and involuntary nature taking place in the underground or depth-dimension of subjectivity that cannot be seized by direct reflection. Reflection is not the primary mode of consciousness, and it cannot uncover the deepest layers of subjectivity. Thus, the supremacy of reflection (and the absolute validity of the principle of principles) is exactly called into question. But although it must be acknowledged that there are depth-dimensions in the constitutive processes which do not lie open to the view of reflection, this does not necessarily imply that they remain forever completely ineffable, beyond phenomenological investigation. They can be disclosed, not through a direct thematization, but through an elaborate 'archeological effort', that is, through an indirect operation of dismantling and deconstruction (Husserl’s
own term is of course Abbau). As he declares in Analysen zur passiven Synthesis, his investigation of the problem of passivity could well carry the title 'a phenomenology of the unconscious.'

5. Intersubjectivity

Let me finally turn to the issue of intersubjectivity. The easiest way to introduce Husserl's analysis of intersubjectivity is through his concept of the lifeworld, since Husserl claims that it is intersubjective through and through. This is not merely to be understood as an accentuation of the fact that I, in my being in the world, am constantly confronted with intersubjective meaning, understood as meaning-formations (such as social institutions, cultural products etc.), which have their origin in community and tradition, and which therefore refer me to my fellowmen and ancestors. Husserl also advocates the more fundamental view, that already my perceptual experience is an experience of intersubjectively accessible being, that is being which does not exist for me alone, but for everybody. I experience objects, events and actions as public, not as private, and consequently Husserl claims that a phenomenological analysis, insofar as it unveils the being-sense (Seinsinn) of the world as intersubjectively valid, leads to a disclosure of the transcendental relevance of foreign subjectivity and thus to an examination of transcendental intersubjectivity; and as he ultimately formulates it: Transcendental intersubjectivity is the absolute ground of being (Seinsboden) from which the meaning and validity of everything objectively existing originate.

More generally, Husserl characterizes the intersubjective-transcendental sociality as the source of all real truth and being, and occasionally he even describes his own project as a sociological transcendental philosophy, and writes, that the development of phenomenology necessarily implies the step from an egological to a transcendental-sociological phenomenology. For as he writes, a radical implementation of the transcendental reduction leads with necessity to a disclosure of the intersubjective being which does not exist for me alone, but for everybody. He writes, that the development of phenomenology necessarily implies the step from an egological to a transcendental-sociological phenomenology. For as he writes, a radical implementation of the transcendental reduction leads with necessity to a disclosure of the intersubjective being which does not exist for me alone, but for everybody.

As I have already indicated, scholars have occasionally claimed that not all of Merleau-Ponty's references to passages in Husserl's unpublished manuscripts should be taken at face value. To give one example, Spiegelberg for instance points out that Merleau-Ponty's repeated quotation of a statement in Husserl's Krisis to the effect that transcendental subjectivity is an inter-subjectivity is actually not contained in this work. But although Husserl might not have made exactly that statement in Krisis, he did so elsewhere, for instance in Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität III. Here Husserl writes:

I have to distinguish: the currently transcendentally phenomenologizing subjectivity (as an actual ego - monad), and transcendental subjectivity as such; the latter turns out to be transcendental intersubjectivity, which includes the transcendently phenomenologizing subjectivity within itself.

This is by no means an isolated statement. In Erste Philosophie II Husserl writes that the transcendental subjectivity in its full universality is exactly inter-subjectivity (8/480), and in a research manuscript from 1927, which has been published in Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität I he writes that the absolute reveals itself as the intersubjective relation between subjects. Thus, Husserl's recurrent point is that just as a radical carrying out of the transcendental reduction will lead to intersubjectivity, a thorough self-reflection necessarily leads to the discovery of absolute intersubjectivity.

It is obvious that Husserl believed the notion of a plurality of transcendental subjects to be coherent, that is, possible. Ultimately, he would even strengthen this assertion, and claim that it is necessary, insofar as “subjectivity is what it is - an ego functioning constitutively - only within intersubjectivity.” The claim that subjectivity only becomes fully constitutive, that is, transcendental, through its relation with Others, is in striking contrast with any traditional Kantian understanding of transcendental subjectivity. Curiously enough, it is exactly this traditional understanding which Schütz tacitly accepts in his well-known critique of Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity. Thus Schütz writes:

...it must be earnestly asked whether the transcendental Ego in Husserl's concept is not essentially what Latin grammarians call a 'singular tantum,' that is, a term incapable of being put into the plural. Even more, it is in no way established whether the existence of Others is a problem of the transcendental sphere at all, i.e. whether
the problem of intersubjectivity does exist between transcendental egos [...]; or whether intersubjectivity and therefore sociality does not rather belong exclusively to the mundane sphere of our life-world.  

Husserl however takes issue with this position in a manuscript now published in the supplementary volume to Krisis, where he explicitly states that the possibility of a transcendental elucidation of self and world is lost if one follows the Kantian tradition in interpreting transcendental subjectivity as the isolated ego and thereby ignores the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity.

It could eventually be suggested that Husserl's intersubjective turn is without any real impact, since it is merely a formal acknowledgment which leaves his overall concept of philosophy with its strong essentialism untouched. This suggestion, however, would be unfounded. Let me briefly illustrate why.

If one accepts Husserl's conviction that reality is intersubjectively valid and that my reality-positing acts are dependent upon my interaction with Others, one is bound to take not only the consensus but also the dissent of the world-experiencing subjects seriously. Husserl's extended analyses of this problem eventually made him enter fields that have traditionally been reserved for psychopathology, sociology, anthropology, and ethnology. Whereas a strict Kantian transcendental philosophy would have considered such empirical and mundane domains as without any transcendental relevance, due to his interest in transcendental intersubjectivity, Husserl was forced to consider them from a transcendental point of view. Thus, I believe that Husserl's late thinking is characterized by a decisive expansion of the transcendental sphere; an expansion which was brought about by his interest in intersubjectivity, and which ultimately forced him to consider the transcendental significance of such issues as generativity, tradition, historicity, and normality.

One philosopher who clearly did grasp these implications was Merleau-Ponty. As he eloquently formulates it in Signes:

Now if the transcendental is intersubjectivity, how can the borders of the transcendental and the empirical help becoming indistinct? For along with the other person, all the other person sees of me - all my facticity - is reintegrated into subjectivity, or at least posited as an indispensable element of its definition. Thus the transcendental descends into history. Or as we might put it, the historical is no longer an external relation between two or more absolutely autonomous subjects but has an interior and is an inherent aspect of their very definition. They no longer know themselves to be subjects simply in relation to their individual selves, but in relation to one another as well.

Let me say a few words about the two concepts normality and generativity since they clearly illustrate some of the more far-reaching consequences of Husserl’s phenomenology of intersubjectivity.

Basically, Husserl claims that our experiences are guided by anticipations of normality. We apprehend, experience and constitute in accordance with the normal and typical structures, models and patterns which our earlier experiences have sedimented in our mind. If that which we experience happens to clash with our earlier experiences - if it is different - we have an experience of anormality, which subsequently leads to a modification and specification of our anticipations. Originally Husserl examined this process in connection with his analysis of the passive synthesis, but it is not only at work in the solitary subject. As Husserl says, I have been together with people as long as I remember, and my anticipations are therefore structured in accordance with the intersubjectively handed-down forms of apperception. Normality is also conventionality, which in its being transcends the individual. What is normal I learn from Others (and first and foremost from my closest relatives), that is by the people by whom I am brought up, and who educate me, and I am thereby involved in a common tradition, which through a chain of generations stretches back into a dim past. For that reason, Husserl even goes as far as to claim that the incorporation into a historical generative context belongs just as inseparably to the ego, as its very temporal structure.

What I generate from out of myself (primally instituting) is mine. But I am a ‘child of the times’; I am a member of a we-community in the broadest sense -- a community that has its tradition and that for its part is connected in a novel manner with the generative subjects, the closest and the most distant ancestors. And these have ‘influenced’ me: I am what I am as an heir.
As Husserl puts it, my own home-worldly normality is instituted through tradition and generativity and is therefore historical. Normality is a tradition-bound set of norms. Thus, Husserl designates the normal life as generative and claims that any normal person is historical as a member of a historical community. Moreover, the very constitution of objectivity and of a common objective world is a historical process. Far from being already constituted, the meaning-formations ‘objectivity’ and ‘reality’ have status as intersubjective presumptions, which can only be realized in an infinite process of socialization and horizont-fusion. For this reason, Husserl can even write that there is no stagnant world, since it is only given for us in its relativity of normality and anormality.

In other words, Husserl considered the subject’s imbeddedness in a living tradition to have constitutive implications. It is not merely the case that I live in a world, which is permeated by references to Others, and which Others have already furnished with meaning, or that I understand the world (and myself) through a traditional, handed down, linguistic conventionality. The very category ‘historical reality’ implies a type of transcendence which can only be constituted insofar as I take over traditional meaning, which has its origin outside of me, in a historical past.

Is it on this background possible to conclude that Husserl in the last phase of his thinking substituted the transcendental ego as the phenomenological point of departure for the historical community of the lifeworld? I think the answer is no. Although the transcendental intersubjectivity is the transcendental foundation, it is vital not to forget Husserl’s phenomenological approach. There is no community without ego-centering, and consequently no generative intersubjectivity without a transcendental ego, where the intersubjectivity can unfold itself. As Husserl has emphasized several times, the ‘we’ stretches from me onwards to the simultaneous, past and future Others; the historically primary is our present. In other words: the transcendental analysis of the historical past, of the previous generations, and more generally, the transcendental phenomenological treatment of meaning, which transcends the finiteness of the subject, must always take its point of departure from the first-person perspective.

6. Conclusion

I have tried to make a strong case for Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Husserl. My way of doing that has been by drawing on material from Husserl research-manuscripts. Material which I believe serious Merleau-Ponty scholars have to take into account if they want to evaluate the relation between Merleau-Ponty and Husserl.

My thesis has been that a central part of Merleau-Ponty’s Husserl-interpretation was indeed grounded. Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to follow the spirit rather than the letter of Husserl’s writings, his endeavor to distinguish between Husserl’s programmatic statements and his actual phenomenological analyses, and his effort to think along with Husserl and to articulate his unthought thought, might not live up to the standards of modern text-philology. But the amazing fact is, that his reading was ahead of its time, and that it to a large extent anticipated results that have only much more recently been confirmed by Husserl-scholarship.

Having said that, I do have to add of course, that I am not claiming that everything Merleau-Ponty said about Husserl is correct, or that the Husserl Merleau-Ponty uncovered is the only one. Husserl was not only a prolific writer, he was also an eternal beginner, and his writings contain a variety of different suggestions and tendencies, not all of which point in the direction of Merleau-Ponty. However, this fact was recognized by Merleau-Ponty himself. As he says in Notes de cours sur L’origine de la géométrie de Husserl: “I am not proposing an interpretation of Husserl’s work as a coherent whole, and have never done so. All I am saying is that his work contains something else besides the early Husserl. To show this, back to the texts.” For the very same reason, I am obviously not arguing that there is no relevant or significant difference between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Such a claim would be absurd. Not only are there many issues on which the two disagree - to mention but one, in Visible et Invisible Merleau-Ponty probably went further than Husserl ever did (some would say too far) in his attempt to surpass the dualism between subject and world - and more generally, both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty had insights that cannot be found in the other. Nevertheless, and these are the two points I have wanted to make: 1) Even if Merleau-Ponty’s reading only captures part of what Husserl was up to, it has the great virtue of staying clear of most of the common misconceptions. It consequently allows one to be in a far better position to evaluate Husserl’s theory (even the part of it that clashes with Merleau-Ponty’s own view), than if one in advance subscribes to the view that Husserl
is a solipsist, a subjective idealist, and an essentialist. 2) I do think there is far more congruence between Husserl’s philosophical project and Merleau-Ponty’s, than say between Husserl’s project and Heidegger’s or Sartre’s. In that sense Merleau-Ponty certainly was the most Husserlian of the three major post-husserlian phenomenologists. This was a fact that Merleau-Ponty himself readily acknowledged, but which many Merleau-Pontyeans have tried to belittle. Perhaps because they felt more comfortably with sticking to a Husserl-interpretation that would leave them with a handy whipping-boy, against which they could then display the brilliance of Merleau-Ponty. Obviously, this is not an acceptable scholarly stance. And again this was something clearly seen by Merleau-Ponty himself, since he quite explicitly scolds scholars who too quickly resort to the standard-criticism of Husserl rather than making the effort of actually reading his writings. Let me give the last word to Merleau-Ponty: “So Naville and Hervé, each for his own reasons, have something other to do than master the texts of an untranslated and two-thirds unpublished Husserl? All right. But then why talk about it?”

NOTES

1 Merleau-Ponty 1945, i, 1988 (MP à la Sorbonne), 421-422.
5 M.C. Dillon, Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology (Northwestern University Press: Evanston, 1997), 27.
6 Dillon 1997, 87.
7 Ph. Dwyer, Sense and Subjectivity. A Study of Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty (Brill: Leiden, 1990), 33-34.
8 Dwyer 1990, 34.
9 For a careful account of the different phases of Merleau-Ponty’s Husserl-reading see Toadvine’s essay “Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Husserl: A Chronological Overview” in this volume. The issue of Merleau-Ponty’s own development raises a question, which I will be unable to pursue in this paper, namely the relation between his early and later thought. Madison and Dillon disagree on this point, and for that reason draws different conclusions when it concerns Husserl’s influence on Merleau-Ponty. Whereas Dillon emphasizes the continuity between Phénoménologie de la perception and Le visible et l’invisible, Madison denies it. Consequently Dillon claims that Merleau-Ponty’s break with Husserlian phenomenology is already to be found in Phénoménologie de la perception, whereas Madison actually argues that Merleau-Ponty’s position in that work does not differ in any radical way from Husserl’s (!), and that all the supposed shortcomings of the work is due to that fact (Madison 1981, 32, 226).
15 Hua 15/lxvi.
16 Let me just add, that I think the situation is changing. As some of the contributions in this volume testifies to, a number of younger Merleau-Ponty scholars are no longer ignoring Husserl’s posthumously published writings.
17 Merleau-Ponty PP/fr 1945, vii-ix.
19 Merleau-Ponty 1960, 210, 215, 221.
22 Hua 3/51, 3/43.
23 Hua 8/457, 3/120, 8/465.
26 Hua 6/154, 1/66.
When Husserl is speaking of ontology in this context, I think he is referring to formal and material ontology. Obviously this type of ontology, understood as a theory of objects, must be distinguished from the (fundamental) ontological questions occupying later phenomenologists. However, this is not to say that Husserl had nothing to offer when it concerns those questions. In fact, I believe that his own investigation into the nature of temporality and self-awareness heads in that direction, but I cannot pursue that question here. Cf. however D. Zahavi, “Michel Henry and the Phenomenology of the Invisible,” Continental Philosophy Review, 32/3, 1999a, 223-240, and D. Zahavi, Self-awareness and Alterity, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999b.


Merleau-Ponty Notes de Cours sur l'origine de geometrie, 1998, 64.

Deleuze: c. Hua 15/434.

Ms. C 10 15b. I am grateful to the Director of the Husserl-Archives in Leuven, Prof. Rudolf Bernet, for permitting me to consult and quote from Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts.

Hua 15/131, 15/287, Ms. C 2 3a.

Ms. C 7 6b.

Merleau-Ponty 1945, 491-492 [1962, 430].

Hua 15/287. For further uses of the term ‘Weltbewuβtseinsleben’ see Hua 29/192 and 29/247.

Hua 1/130.

Hua 5/128. One of the significant consequences of this is that the empirical subject can no longer be regarded as a contingent appendix to the transcendental subject, and therefore no longer as something which transcendental phenomenology can allow itself to ignore. On the contrary, it is of crucial importance to understand why the transcendental subject as a part of its constitutive performance must necessarily conceive of itself as a worldly intramundane entity. The explanation offered by Husserl is that the transcendental ego can only constitute an objective world if it is incarnated and socialized, both of which entails a mundanisation (29/160-65, 1/130, 5/128, 16/162).

Hua 15/546.

Hua 4/288.

Hua 1/166.


Hua 6/416-7, 15/639, 15/367-8.

Hua 11/299.


Hua 14/57. Cf. 15/326, 9/392.

Hua 11/14, 1/128, 14/540, 9/391.

Hua 9/197, 14/414, 14/462, 4/145.

Hua 14/540, 9/391.


Hua 14/337.

Hua 4/145.

Hua 1/128. Cf. 15/302.

Hua 14/75, 13/263, Ms. D 12 III 14.

Hua 15/652.

Hua 8/62, 15/300, 14/457, 14/462, 9/197, 13/263. In his article “Le paradoxe de l’expression chez Merleau-Ponty” (in R. Barbaras (ed.): Merleau-Ponty, Notes de cours sur L’origine de la géométrie de Husserl, PUF, Paris, 1998, 331-348), Waldenfels illustrates the difference between a good and a bad ambiguity in a neat way. The good ambiguity is the neither-nor, the bad ambiguity is the both-and (338). If one accepts this way of making the distinction, it could be claimed that one of the differences between...
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty is that Husserl's traditional language-use commits him to a bad ambiguity, whereas Merleau-Ponty is more aware of the need for a radical break with the traditional categories and consequently better prepared to opt for a good ambiguity. One illustration is Husserl's occasional talk of the body as a subject-object whereas Merleau-Ponty is cautious to emphasize that the body is neither.

63 Hua 4/297.

64 Hua 5/128, 15/287.

65 Hua 4/147.

66 Hua 13/386, 16/178, 15/300.

67 Hua 5/10, [1980, 9 trans. slightly altered].

68 Hua 14/75, 15/297, 15/301.

69 As Husserl writes apropos the relation between the kinaesthetic and the hyletic sensations: “The system of kinaestheses, however, is not constituted in advance; rather, its constitution takes place along with the constitution of the hyletic objects that it is aiming toward in each case.”“Das System der Kinästhesen ist aber nicht im voraus konstituiert, sondern seine Konstitution erfolgt in eins mit der Konstitution hyletischer Objekte, auf die es jeweils hinauswill […]”Ms. D 10 11a.

70 Ms. C 10 2b.

71 Ms. C 16 68a.


73 Hua 11/118, 11/128, 1/28, EU 76, Ms. L I 15 3a.

74 Hua 10/107 [1991, p.112].

75 Hua 15/324, 15/293, 13/292, 4/153, Ms. D 10 IV 15.


77 Hua 5/11 [1980, p.10].


79 Hua 9/478.

80 Hua 14/29.

81 Hua 8/412, 15/484.

82 Hua 25/89.

83 Hua 4/213, 4/337, Ms. E III 2 12b.

84 Ms. C 3 41b-42a.

85 Hua 9/514, 4/276-277.

86 Hua 9/514, 4/276-277.


89 Hua 9/431, 14/289, 14/390, 17/243, 6/469.

90 Hua 1/123, 15/5.

91 Hua 15/110.

92 Hua 9/344.

93 Hua 1/35, 1/182, 8/449, 9/295, 9/474.

94 Hua 9/539.

95 This formulation, which is from Husserl's London-lectures in 1922, can be found in K. Schuhmann, Husserls Staatsphilosophie (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1988), p. 56.

96 Hua 1/69, 9/245-46, 8/129.


98 Hua 15/74-5.

99 Hua 13/480.

100 Hua 9/344.

101 Hua 6/275, 6/472.

102 Hua 6/175 [1970, 172].


104 Hua 29/120.

105 Cf. Hua 15/391.

106 Merleau-Ponty 1960, 134 [? , ?].

107 Hua 9/186.
Despite Husserl’s increasing emphasis of intersubjectivity, he did not cease to stress the importance of subjectivity. As he points out in *Krisis*, it would be a methodological mistake to start out with transcendental intersubjectivity, since this might lead to a neglection of the *Ur-Ich* (6/188). Ultimately, intersubjectivity can only be treated as a transcendental problem through a radical ‘mich-selbst-befragen’ (Hua 6/206), that is from the first-person perspective. For an extensive discussion of why this celebration of subjectivity does not undermine Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity, but on the contrary constitutes a necessary and called for supplement, see D. Zahavi, *Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivität. Eine Antwort auf die sprachpragmatische Kritik* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996).

Cf. N. Depraz, *Transcendance et incarnation* (Paris: Vrin, 1995); A. Steinbock, *Home and Beyond. Generative Phenomenology after Husserl* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1995); D. Zahavi 1996. This should be emphasized given the fact that Merleau-Ponty’s Husserl-Interpretation has been called into question not only by Merleau-Ponty scholars, but also by a number of more traditional Husserl-scholars.

Sense and Non-Sense Northwestern UP 1964,135-36. I owe this last reference to Linda Fisher.