Scaffolding Social Freedom: Structural Supports for Intersubjective Autonomy

CFS lecture by Joel Anderson, Professor of Moral Psychology & Social Philosophy, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands.

The lecture is open to all and all are welcome.

Abstract:

In my talk, I will argue that individual autonomy and social freedom are mutually constitutive. Against individualist liberal accounts treating autonomy as independence and social freedom as aggregated individual liberties, I show that both concepts are best understood as intersubjectively constituted achievements requiring ongoing structural supports. Building on Catriona Mackenzie's feminist theory of relational autonomy, I elaborate the intersubjectivity of autonomy along three dimensions. Self-determination requires that opportunities be recognized as genuinely accessible, not merely formally available. Self-governance develops through dialogical practices where deliberative competencies emerge within shared spaces of mutual challenge and support. Self-authorization depends on what Habermas calls "Selbstvergewisserung" – vouching for oneself to others – revealing autonomous authority as a performative achievement rather than unilateral possession. This reconceptualization of autonomy aligns with Axel Honneth's account of social freedom as relational accomplishment. Social freedom emerges when recognition relations become institutionalized, supporting self-determination through compatible aims, self-governance through collective resources, and self-authorization through mutual accountability. By contrast, conditions of "Anerkennungsvergessenheit" (forgetfulness of recognition) systematically obscures our constitutive vulnerability and interdependence. Realizing intersubjective autonomy requires intentionally designed scaffolding: structural supports at material, institutional, and psychological levels. When democratically authorized, such supports enhance rather than diminish agency. I address three key objections: that this scaffolded account of autonomy threatens independence, overrationalizes relationships, and undermines authentic judgment – each presupposing problematic assumptions about autonomy as isolation rather than effective agency. The framework provides resources for social critique focused on deficiencies of supporting structures and institutional designs that neglect recognition relations. Most fundamentally, it reveals vulnerability not as a deficiency requiring elimination but as a constitutive feature of autonomous agency that, when situated within appropriate recognition relations and supportive scaffolds, enables the fragile accomplishment of social freedom.