Background Readings for Keynote Lectures

We encourage you to take a look at the readings before arriving in Copenhagen. The readings are relevant for understanding lectures and will be part of the group discussions; we thus strongly recommend that you read them as preparation for attending the summer school.

Note: You will need an academia.edu account (free of charge) to access some of the readings.

Søren Overgaard

Hanne Jacobs

  • Jacobs, H. (2010). I am awake: Husserlian reflections on wakefulness and attention. Alter. Revue de Phénoménologie 18: 183–201.
  • Jacobs, H. (2016). Husserl on reason, reflection, and attention. Research in Phenomenology 46: 257–76.

David Cerbone

  • Cerbone, D. (2016). ‘Feckless prisoners of their times’: Historicism and moral reflection. Unpublished manuscript.
  • Cerbone, D. (2017). Ground, background, and rough ground: Dreyfus, Wittgenstein, and phenomenology. Unpublished manuscript.

Extra readings (texts not provided here):

  • Dreyfus, H.L. (1991). Being-in-the-world: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I. MIT Press. (especially the Introduction and Chapter 1)
  • Dreyfus, H.L. (1980). Holism and Hermeneutics. The Review of Metaphysics 34(1): 3-23.
  • Kelly, S.D. (2005). Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty. The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty, 74-110.
  • McManus, D. (2008). Rules, regression and the ‘background’: Dreyfus, Heidegger and Mcdowell. European Journal of Philosophy16(3), 432-458.
  • Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy of mind. Cambridge University Press. (Chapter 8)
  • Stroud, B. (1991). The background of thought. In Lepore and van Gulick (eds.). John Searle and His CriticsCambridge: Blackwell, 245-258.

Rudolf Bernet

  • Bernet, R. (2017). A Husserlian analysis of imagining what is unreal, quasi-real, possibly real, and unreal. (Unpublished)
  • Merleau-Ponty, M. (2013). Recherches sur l’usage littéraire du langage. Cours au Collège de France. Notes, 1953. Texte établi par B. Zaccarello et E. de Saint-Aubert. Genève: MetisPresses. (Untranslated)

Dan Zahavi

  • Zahavi, D., & Kriegel, U. (2015). For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not. In Dahlstrom, D & Hopp, W. (eds.) Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches. Oxford: Routledge, 56-78. You can find it here: https://www.academia.edu/8670893/For-me-ness