An account of Boeschian cooperative behaviour

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Book chapter › Research › peer-review

Standard

An account of Boeschian cooperative behaviour. / Blomberg, Olle.

Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems: Explanation, Implementation and Simulation. ed. / Catrin Misselhorn. Cham : Springer, 2015. p. 169-184 (Philosophical Studies Series, Vol. 122).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Book chapter › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Blomberg, O 2015, An account of Boeschian cooperative behaviour. in C Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems: Explanation, Implementation and Simulation. Springer, Cham, Philosophical Studies Series, vol. 122, pp. 169-184. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15515-9_9

APA

Blomberg, O. (2015). An account of Boeschian cooperative behaviour. In C. Misselhorn (Ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems: Explanation, Implementation and Simulation (pp. 169-184). Springer. Philosophical Studies Series Vol. 122 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15515-9_9

Vancouver

Blomberg O. An account of Boeschian cooperative behaviour. In Misselhorn C, editor, Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems: Explanation, Implementation and Simulation. Cham: Springer. 2015. p. 169-184. (Philosophical Studies Series, Vol. 122). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15515-9_9

Author

Blomberg, Olle. / An account of Boeschian cooperative behaviour. Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems: Explanation, Implementation and Simulation. editor / Catrin Misselhorn. Cham : Springer, 2015. pp. 169-184 (Philosophical Studies Series, Vol. 122).

Bibtex

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title = "An account of Boeschian cooperative behaviour",
abstract = "According to reductionist accounts, intentional joint action can be exhaustively analysed with concepts that are already available and anyway needed for understanding intentional singular action. Most such accounts include a condition that it must be common knowledge between the participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that causes and coordinates the joint action (a CK-condition). Without such common knowledge, the resulting joint action supposedly isn{\textquoteright}t an intentional joint action. I argue that reductionists should reject the CK-condition. Either the CK-condition is unnecessary or else the reductionist fails to account for the target phenomenon of intentional joint action.",
author = "Olle Blomberg",
year = "2015",
month = jul,
day = "22",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-15515-9_9",
language = "English",
isbn = "978-3-319-15514-2",
series = "Philosophical Studies Series",
publisher = "Springer",
pages = "169--184",
editor = "Catrin Misselhorn",
booktitle = "Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems",
address = "Switzerland",

}

RIS

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T1 - An account of Boeschian cooperative behaviour

AU - Blomberg, Olle

PY - 2015/7/22

Y1 - 2015/7/22

N2 - According to reductionist accounts, intentional joint action can be exhaustively analysed with concepts that are already available and anyway needed for understanding intentional singular action. Most such accounts include a condition that it must be common knowledge between the participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that causes and coordinates the joint action (a CK-condition). Without such common knowledge, the resulting joint action supposedly isn’t an intentional joint action. I argue that reductionists should reject the CK-condition. Either the CK-condition is unnecessary or else the reductionist fails to account for the target phenomenon of intentional joint action.

AB - According to reductionist accounts, intentional joint action can be exhaustively analysed with concepts that are already available and anyway needed for understanding intentional singular action. Most such accounts include a condition that it must be common knowledge between the participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that causes and coordinates the joint action (a CK-condition). Without such common knowledge, the resulting joint action supposedly isn’t an intentional joint action. I argue that reductionists should reject the CK-condition. Either the CK-condition is unnecessary or else the reductionist fails to account for the target phenomenon of intentional joint action.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-15515-9_9

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-15515-9_9

M3 - Book chapter

SN - 978-3-319-15514-2

T3 - Philosophical Studies Series

SP - 169

EP - 184

BT - Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems

A2 - Misselhorn, Catrin

PB - Springer

CY - Cham

ER -

ID: 130769619