Reasons, awareness, and we-agency

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Reasons, awareness, and we-agency. / Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico.

In: Philosophical Forum, Vol. 46, No. 4, 2015, p. 341.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Lo Presti, PUE 2015, 'Reasons, awareness, and we-agency', Philosophical Forum, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 341.

APA

Lo Presti, P. U. E. (2015). Reasons, awareness, and we-agency. Philosophical Forum, 46(4), 341.

Vancouver

Lo Presti PUE. Reasons, awareness, and we-agency. Philosophical Forum. 2015;46(4):341.

Author

Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico. / Reasons, awareness, and we-agency. In: Philosophical Forum. 2015 ; Vol. 46, No. 4. pp. 341.

Bibtex

@article{622c727240d24e0587d517f2b21d3247,
title = "Reasons, awareness, and we-agency",
abstract = "Matters collective are receiving increased attention. Philosophers discuss concepts such as we-action, we-want, we-intentionality, and in general how to understand psychological states and agency prefixed the first person plural we. I will be concerned with we-agency in particular, and I will be focusing on one issue of we-agency specifically; namely, what kind of reasons it involves, and in what sense it “involves” reasons. The two central claims of the paper are, first, that we-agency involves a special kind of reason: All individual part-actions of a we-action must be performed for a we-reason. By a we-reason, I understand a reason such that the agent wants what she does to realize an end together with others; she wants to do it as part of what a we does. This positive claim, it will be seen, is quite uncontroversial. Secondly, we-actions need not involve reasons that any participating agent is aware of as a we-reason. In other words, consciousness of what one does as part of what a we does is not conceptually implied in we-action.",
author = "{Lo Presti}, {Patrizio Ulf Enrico}",
year = "2015",
language = "English",
volume = "46",
pages = "341",
journal = "Philosophical Forum",
issn = "0031-806X",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Reasons, awareness, and we-agency

AU - Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - Matters collective are receiving increased attention. Philosophers discuss concepts such as we-action, we-want, we-intentionality, and in general how to understand psychological states and agency prefixed the first person plural we. I will be concerned with we-agency in particular, and I will be focusing on one issue of we-agency specifically; namely, what kind of reasons it involves, and in what sense it “involves” reasons. The two central claims of the paper are, first, that we-agency involves a special kind of reason: All individual part-actions of a we-action must be performed for a we-reason. By a we-reason, I understand a reason such that the agent wants what she does to realize an end together with others; she wants to do it as part of what a we does. This positive claim, it will be seen, is quite uncontroversial. Secondly, we-actions need not involve reasons that any participating agent is aware of as a we-reason. In other words, consciousness of what one does as part of what a we does is not conceptually implied in we-action.

AB - Matters collective are receiving increased attention. Philosophers discuss concepts such as we-action, we-want, we-intentionality, and in general how to understand psychological states and agency prefixed the first person plural we. I will be concerned with we-agency in particular, and I will be focusing on one issue of we-agency specifically; namely, what kind of reasons it involves, and in what sense it “involves” reasons. The two central claims of the paper are, first, that we-agency involves a special kind of reason: All individual part-actions of a we-action must be performed for a we-reason. By a we-reason, I understand a reason such that the agent wants what she does to realize an end together with others; she wants to do it as part of what a we does. This positive claim, it will be seen, is quite uncontroversial. Secondly, we-actions need not involve reasons that any participating agent is aware of as a we-reason. In other words, consciousness of what one does as part of what a we does is not conceptually implied in we-action.

M3 - Journal article

VL - 46

SP - 341

JO - Philosophical Forum

JF - Philosophical Forum

SN - 0031-806X

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 333304683