TY - JOUR

T1 - The anticipating brain is not a scientist

T2 - the free-energy principle from an ecological-enactive perspective

AU - Bruineberg, Jelle

AU - Kiverstein, Julian

AU - Rietveld, Erik

N1 - Funding Information: Thanks to: Micah Allen, Andy Clark, Dimitrije Markovic and Martin Stokhof. Erik Rietveld would like to acknowledge the research funding awarded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) in the form of a VIDI-grant and the European Research Council in the from of ERC Starting Grant 679190. The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. Funding Information: Acknowledgements Thanks to: Micah Allen, Andy Clark, Dimitrije Markovic and Martin Stokhof. Erik Rietveld would like to acknowledge the research funding awarded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) in the form of a VIDI-grant and the European Research Council in the from of ERC Starting Grant 679190. Publisher Copyright: © 2016, The Author(s).

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - In this paper, we argue for a theoretical separation of the free-energy principle from Helmholtzian accounts of the predictive brain. The free-energy principle is a theoretical framework capturing the imperative for biological self-organization in information-theoretic terms. The free-energy principle has typically been connected with a Bayesian theory of predictive coding, and the latter is often taken to support a Helmholtzian theory of perception as unconscious inference. If our interpretation is right, however, a Helmholtzian view of perception is incompatible with Bayesian predictive coding under the free-energy principle. We argue that the free energy principle and the ecological and enactive approach to mind and life make for a much happier marriage of ideas. We make our argument based on three points. First we argue that the free energy principle applies to the whole animal–environment system, and not only to the brain. Second, we show that active inference, as understood by the free-energy principle, is incompatible with unconscious inference understood as analagous to scientific hypothesis-testing, the main tenet of a Helmholtzian view of perception. Third, we argue that the notion of inference at work in Bayesian predictive coding under the free-energy principle is too weak to support a Helmholtzian theory of perception. Taken together these points imply that the free energy principle is best understood in ecological and enactive terms set out in this paper.

AB - In this paper, we argue for a theoretical separation of the free-energy principle from Helmholtzian accounts of the predictive brain. The free-energy principle is a theoretical framework capturing the imperative for biological self-organization in information-theoretic terms. The free-energy principle has typically been connected with a Bayesian theory of predictive coding, and the latter is often taken to support a Helmholtzian theory of perception as unconscious inference. If our interpretation is right, however, a Helmholtzian view of perception is incompatible with Bayesian predictive coding under the free-energy principle. We argue that the free energy principle and the ecological and enactive approach to mind and life make for a much happier marriage of ideas. We make our argument based on three points. First we argue that the free energy principle applies to the whole animal–environment system, and not only to the brain. Second, we show that active inference, as understood by the free-energy principle, is incompatible with unconscious inference understood as analagous to scientific hypothesis-testing, the main tenet of a Helmholtzian view of perception. Third, we argue that the notion of inference at work in Bayesian predictive coding under the free-energy principle is too weak to support a Helmholtzian theory of perception. Taken together these points imply that the free energy principle is best understood in ecological and enactive terms set out in this paper.

KW - Action-readiness

KW - Active inference

KW - Affordances

KW - Enaction

KW - Free-energy principle

KW - Metastability

KW - Predictive-coding

KW - Skilled intentionality

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84992063453&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s11229-016-1239-1

DO - 10.1007/s11229-016-1239-1

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:84992063453

VL - 195

SP - 2417

EP - 2444

JO - Synthese

JF - Synthese

SN - 0039-7857

IS - 6

ER -