Perceptual Occlusion and the Differentiation Condition
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Numerous philosophers accept the differentiation condition, according to which one does not see an object unless one visually differentiates it from its immediate surroundings. This paper, however, sounds a sceptical note. Based on suggestions by Dretske (2007) and Gibson (2002 [1972]), I articulate two ‘principles of occlusion’ and argue that each principle admits of a reading on which it is both plausible and incompatible with the differentiation condition. To resolve the inconsistency, I suggest we abandon the differentiation condition.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 128 |
Journal | Synthese - An international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science |
Volume | 203 |
Number of pages | 22 |
ISSN | 0039-7857 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2024 |
ID: 388941642