Reasons, awareness, and we-agency
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Reasons, awareness, and we-agency. / Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico.
In: Philosophical Forum, Vol. 46, No. 4, 2015, p. 341.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Reasons, awareness, and we-agency
AU - Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - Matters collective are receiving increased attention. Philosophers discuss concepts such as we-action, we-want, we-intentionality, and in general how to understand psychological states and agency prefixed the first person plural we. I will be concerned with we-agency in particular, and I will be focusing on one issue of we-agency specifically; namely, what kind of reasons it involves, and in what sense it “involves” reasons. The two central claims of the paper are, first, that we-agency involves a special kind of reason: All individual part-actions of a we-action must be performed for a we-reason. By a we-reason, I understand a reason such that the agent wants what she does to realize an end together with others; she wants to do it as part of what a we does. This positive claim, it will be seen, is quite uncontroversial. Secondly, we-actions need not involve reasons that any participating agent is aware of as a we-reason. In other words, consciousness of what one does as part of what a we does is not conceptually implied in we-action.
AB - Matters collective are receiving increased attention. Philosophers discuss concepts such as we-action, we-want, we-intentionality, and in general how to understand psychological states and agency prefixed the first person plural we. I will be concerned with we-agency in particular, and I will be focusing on one issue of we-agency specifically; namely, what kind of reasons it involves, and in what sense it “involves” reasons. The two central claims of the paper are, first, that we-agency involves a special kind of reason: All individual part-actions of a we-action must be performed for a we-reason. By a we-reason, I understand a reason such that the agent wants what she does to realize an end together with others; she wants to do it as part of what a we does. This positive claim, it will be seen, is quite uncontroversial. Secondly, we-actions need not involve reasons that any participating agent is aware of as a we-reason. In other words, consciousness of what one does as part of what a we does is not conceptually implied in we-action.
M3 - Journal article
VL - 46
SP - 341
JO - Philosophical Forum
JF - Philosophical Forum
SN - 0031-806X
IS - 4
ER -
ID: 333304683