Whose mind? Two interpretations of what it is to directly perceive other minds
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Whose mind? Two interpretations of what it is to directly perceive other minds. / Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico.
In: Theory & Psychology, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2016, p. 419.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Whose mind? Two interpretations of what it is to directly perceive other minds
AU - Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - According to direct perception theory (DPT) people understand each other’s minds by way of perceiving each other’s behavioral engagements in the world. I argue that DPT admits of two interpretations. One interpretation is found in Searle’s social ontology. The other interpretation departs from an enactivist account of social cognition. Both can make sense of what it is to perceive other minds, but in two different ways. The first claims that people can directly perceive states of mind shared in a community. In contrast, the second interpretation allows for direct perception of particular individuals’ states of mind in the context of participation in social practices. The two interpretations are argued to be compatible. People can perceive communal states of mind in another’s responsiveness to action possibilities in social environments, not only the particular other’s states of mind.
AB - According to direct perception theory (DPT) people understand each other’s minds by way of perceiving each other’s behavioral engagements in the world. I argue that DPT admits of two interpretations. One interpretation is found in Searle’s social ontology. The other interpretation departs from an enactivist account of social cognition. Both can make sense of what it is to perceive other minds, but in two different ways. The first claims that people can directly perceive states of mind shared in a community. In contrast, the second interpretation allows for direct perception of particular individuals’ states of mind in the context of participation in social practices. The two interpretations are argued to be compatible. People can perceive communal states of mind in another’s responsiveness to action possibilities in social environments, not only the particular other’s states of mind.
KW - Faculty of Humanities
KW - Collective intentionlity
KW - constitutive rules
KW - direct perception
KW - enaction
KW - social understanding
M3 - Journal article
VL - 26
SP - 419
JO - Theory & Psychology
JF - Theory & Psychology
SN - 0959-3543
IS - 4
ER -
ID: 333304825