Naïve Realism and the Problem of Illusion

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Naïve Realism and the Problem of Illusion. / Overgaard, Søren.

In: Analytic Philosophy, Vol. 63, No. 3, 2022, p. 174-191.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Overgaard, S 2022, 'Naïve Realism and the Problem of Illusion', Analytic Philosophy, vol. 63, no. 3, pp. 174-191. https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12230

APA

Overgaard, S. (2022). Naïve Realism and the Problem of Illusion. Analytic Philosophy, 63(3), 174-191. https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12230

Vancouver

Overgaard S. Naïve Realism and the Problem of Illusion. Analytic Philosophy. 2022;63(3):174-191. https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12230

Author

Overgaard, Søren. / Naïve Realism and the Problem of Illusion. In: Analytic Philosophy. 2022 ; Vol. 63, No. 3. pp. 174-191.

Bibtex

@article{dc7540c06e7146e1a41a71f5e4163edc,
title = "Na{\"i}ve Realism and the Problem of Illusion",
abstract = "As standardly conceived, an illusion is a case in which appearances in at least one respect conflict with reality. Such a conflict only obtains in cases where a non-F object appears to be F—appears F in a {\textquoteleft}committal{\textquoteright} way, as I put it. It is, however, possible for an object to appear F in a non-committal way—i.e. without appearing to be F. The paper discusses a number of recent na{\"i}ve realist attempts to account for illusion. Drawing on the distinction between committal and non-committal appearances, I argue that none of the proposals is able to account for illusion as standardly conceived.",
author = "S{\o}ren Overgaard",
year = "2022",
doi = "10.1111/phib.12230",
language = "English",
volume = "63",
pages = "174--191",
journal = "Analytic Philosophy",
issn = "2153-9596",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Naïve Realism and the Problem of Illusion

AU - Overgaard, Søren

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - As standardly conceived, an illusion is a case in which appearances in at least one respect conflict with reality. Such a conflict only obtains in cases where a non-F object appears to be F—appears F in a ‘committal’ way, as I put it. It is, however, possible for an object to appear F in a non-committal way—i.e. without appearing to be F. The paper discusses a number of recent naïve realist attempts to account for illusion. Drawing on the distinction between committal and non-committal appearances, I argue that none of the proposals is able to account for illusion as standardly conceived.

AB - As standardly conceived, an illusion is a case in which appearances in at least one respect conflict with reality. Such a conflict only obtains in cases where a non-F object appears to be F—appears F in a ‘committal’ way, as I put it. It is, however, possible for an object to appear F in a non-committal way—i.e. without appearing to be F. The paper discusses a number of recent naïve realist attempts to account for illusion. Drawing on the distinction between committal and non-committal appearances, I argue that none of the proposals is able to account for illusion as standardly conceived.

U2 - 10.1111/phib.12230

DO - 10.1111/phib.12230

M3 - Journal article

VL - 63

SP - 174

EP - 191

JO - Analytic Philosophy

JF - Analytic Philosophy

SN - 2153-9596

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 260542589