Towards a Husserlian Integrative Account of Experiential and Narrative Dimensions of the Self

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Towards a Husserlian Integrative Account of Experiential and Narrative Dimensions of the Self. / Vesterager, Mette.

In: Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2019, p. 162-188.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Vesterager, M 2019, 'Towards a Husserlian Integrative Account of Experiential and Narrative Dimensions of the Self', Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 162-188. https://doi.org/10.1163/15691624-12341361

APA

Vesterager, M. (2019). Towards a Husserlian Integrative Account of Experiential and Narrative Dimensions of the Self. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 50(2), 162-188. https://doi.org/10.1163/15691624-12341361

Vancouver

Vesterager M. Towards a Husserlian Integrative Account of Experiential and Narrative Dimensions of the Self. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology. 2019;50(2):162-188. https://doi.org/10.1163/15691624-12341361

Author

Vesterager, Mette. / Towards a Husserlian Integrative Account of Experiential and Narrative Dimensions of the Self. In: Journal of Phenomenological Psychology. 2019 ; Vol. 50, No. 2. pp. 162-188.

Bibtex

@article{d23b7780566846f08d204e90f60c95ce,
title = "Towards a Husserlian Integrative Account of Experiential and Narrative Dimensions of the Self",
abstract = "The aim of this paper is to outline an integrative account of experiential and narrative dimensions of the self based on Husserl{\textquoteright}s genetic phenomenology. I argue that we should discard “strong narrativism” which holds that our experiential life has a narrative structure and, accordingly, that experiential and narrative dimensions of the self coincide. We should also refrain from equating the experiential self with the minimal self, as the former does not simply constitute a formally individuated subject as the latter but a properly individualized one with personal characteristics and habituality. Husserl{\textquoteright}s genetic phenomenology offers both a description of the individualized self as experiential, i.e. as pre-reflective and embodied, and as narrative, i.e. as an autonomous linguistic agent. Through Husserl{\textquoteright}s concepts of sedimentation and secondary passivity, we can explain the dialectical relationship between experiential and narrative dimensions of the self.",
author = "Mette Vesterager",
year = "2019",
doi = "10.1163/15691624-12341361",
language = "English",
volume = "50",
pages = "162--188",
journal = "Journal of Phenomenological Psychology",
issn = "0047-2662",
publisher = "Brill",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Towards a Husserlian Integrative Account of Experiential and Narrative Dimensions of the Self

AU - Vesterager, Mette

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - The aim of this paper is to outline an integrative account of experiential and narrative dimensions of the self based on Husserl’s genetic phenomenology. I argue that we should discard “strong narrativism” which holds that our experiential life has a narrative structure and, accordingly, that experiential and narrative dimensions of the self coincide. We should also refrain from equating the experiential self with the minimal self, as the former does not simply constitute a formally individuated subject as the latter but a properly individualized one with personal characteristics and habituality. Husserl’s genetic phenomenology offers both a description of the individualized self as experiential, i.e. as pre-reflective and embodied, and as narrative, i.e. as an autonomous linguistic agent. Through Husserl’s concepts of sedimentation and secondary passivity, we can explain the dialectical relationship between experiential and narrative dimensions of the self.

AB - The aim of this paper is to outline an integrative account of experiential and narrative dimensions of the self based on Husserl’s genetic phenomenology. I argue that we should discard “strong narrativism” which holds that our experiential life has a narrative structure and, accordingly, that experiential and narrative dimensions of the self coincide. We should also refrain from equating the experiential self with the minimal self, as the former does not simply constitute a formally individuated subject as the latter but a properly individualized one with personal characteristics and habituality. Husserl’s genetic phenomenology offers both a description of the individualized self as experiential, i.e. as pre-reflective and embodied, and as narrative, i.e. as an autonomous linguistic agent. Through Husserl’s concepts of sedimentation and secondary passivity, we can explain the dialectical relationship between experiential and narrative dimensions of the self.

U2 - 10.1163/15691624-12341361

DO - 10.1163/15691624-12341361

M3 - Journal article

VL - 50

SP - 162

EP - 188

JO - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology

JF - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology

SN - 0047-2662

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 246198684