Experiences without for-me-ness? Reconsidering alleged counter examples from psychopathology and psychedelics
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Experiences without for-me-ness? Reconsidering alleged counter examples from psychopathology and psychedelics. / Henriksen, Mads Gram; Parnas, Josef.
In: Thaumazein, Vol. 7, 2019, p. 6-20.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Experiences without for-me-ness? Reconsidering alleged counter examples from psychopathology and psychedelics
AU - Henriksen, Mads Gram
AU - Parnas, Josef
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - In contemporary consciousness studies, a central question concerns the natureof the most primitive and fundamental features of phenomenal consciousness.Some authors (e.g., Zahavi) have argued that for-me-ness (or minimal selfhood)is a fundamental and necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness.The concept of for-me-ness articulates that experiences are first-personallymanifest, i.e. they are always given to the subject of experience in a way inwhich they are not given to anybody else. Several authors have challengedthis claim by presenting what they take to be counter examples, i.e. experiences,which, in their view, lack for-me-ness, thereby seemingly rebutting theclaim that for-me-ness is a necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness.In this study, (i) we present the account of for-me-ness, (ii) present three allegedcounter examples that come from the domains of psychopathology andpsychedelics, and (iii) critically discuss these examples and eventually refutethem all. Thus, we maintain that for-me-ness is a necessary, ineliminable featureof phenomenal consciousness.
AB - In contemporary consciousness studies, a central question concerns the natureof the most primitive and fundamental features of phenomenal consciousness.Some authors (e.g., Zahavi) have argued that for-me-ness (or minimal selfhood)is a fundamental and necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness.The concept of for-me-ness articulates that experiences are first-personallymanifest, i.e. they are always given to the subject of experience in a way inwhich they are not given to anybody else. Several authors have challengedthis claim by presenting what they take to be counter examples, i.e. experiences,which, in their view, lack for-me-ness, thereby seemingly rebutting theclaim that for-me-ness is a necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness.In this study, (i) we present the account of for-me-ness, (ii) present three allegedcounter examples that come from the domains of psychopathology andpsychedelics, and (iii) critically discuss these examples and eventually refutethem all. Thus, we maintain that for-me-ness is a necessary, ineliminable featureof phenomenal consciousness.
M3 - Journal article
VL - 7
SP - 6
EP - 20
JO - Thaumazein
JF - Thaumazein
SN - 1982-2103
ER -
ID: 222248251